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When building systems that guarantee confidentiality, system designers must first
define confidentiality appropriately. Although researchers have proposed defini-
tions of properties such as secrecy, anonymity, and privacy for a wide variety of
system models, general definitions that are intuitive, widely applicable, and suf-
ficiently formal have proven surprisingly elusive. The goal of this dissertation
is to provide such a framework for systems that interact with multiple agents,
emphasizing definitions of secrecy (to rule out unwanted information flows) and
anonymity (to prevent observers from learning the identity of an agent who per-
forms some action). The definitions of secrecy extend earlier definitions of secrecy
and nondeducibility given by Shannon and Sutherland. Roughly speaking, one
agent maintains secrecy with respect to another if the second agent cannot rule
out any possibilities for the behavior or state of the first agent. These definitions
are characterized syntactically, using a modal logic of knowledge. Definitions of
anonymity are given, with respect to agents, actions, and observers, and are also
stated in terms of a modal logic of knowledge. The general framework is shown
to handle probability and nondeterminism cleanly, and to be useful for reasoning
about asynchronous systems as well as synchronous systems. It also suggests gen-
eralizations of secrecy and anonymity that may be useful for dealing with issues
such as resource-bounded reasoning. Finally, the dissertation leverages these def-
initions of secrecy and formulates new strategy-based information-flow conditions
for a simple imperative programming language that includes input and output op-
erators. A soundness theorem demonstrates the feasibility of statically enforcing
the security conditions via a simple type system.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The goal of this dissertation is to provide a formal framework for reasoning about
confidentiality properties in systems with which multiple agents interact over time.
The importance of confidentiality in multiagent systems has increased greatly dur-
ing the past several years due to the widespread use of communication networks
such as the Internet. Computer users may be reluctant to engage in useful activities
such as Web browsing, message sending, and file sharing unless they can receive
guarantees that their privacy or anonymity will be protected to some reasonable
degree. Similarly, large organizations want guarantees that their communication
systems will not leak confidential data to unauthorized users.
When building systems that provide confidentiality guarantees, system design-
ers must first start with appropriate definitions of confidentiality. Though defi-
nitions of properties such as secrecy, anonymity, and privacy have been proposed
for a wide variety of system models, general definitions that are intuitive, widely
applicable, and sufficiently formal have proven surprisingly elusive.
Properties such as secrecy, anonymity, noninterference, privacy, and so on can
be construed as providing answers to the following set of questions:
• What information needs to be hidden?
• Who does it need to be hidden from?
• How well does it need to be hidden?
By analyzing confidentiality properties with these questions in mind, it often be-
comes clear how different properties relate to each other. These questions can also
1
2serve as a test of a definition’s usefulness: a property should be able to provide
clear answers to these three questions.
We focus here on two particular confidentiality properties: secrecy, which re-
quires that the state of one agent remains hidden from others, and anonymity,
which requires that the identity of the agent who performs some action remains
hidden from other observers. Our definitions of secrecy and anonymity focus on
the knowledge of agents who interact with a system. Accordingly, we state many
of our definitions in terms of a logic of knowledge. By formalizing secrecy and
anonymity in terms of knowledge we can capture the intuitions that practitioners
have and also equate our knowledge-based definitions with more standard semantic
definitions.
The use of the term “secrecy” in this dissertation is perhaps somewhat nonstan-
dard. In contrast to definitions that are concerned with the secrecy of particular
secrets (such as encrypted messages), the definitions of secrecy presented here aim
to ensure that one agent learns nothing at all about the state of another. The term
“total secrecy” might be more indicative of the general class of properties in which
we are interested, but we avoid using it as an umbrella term both for brevity and
because we use the term in a specific technical sense later in the dissertation. Our
definitions of secrecy can be viewed as restrictions on the information that may
flow from one agent to another, and are similar in spirit to other information-flow
properties such as noninterference.
We believe that it is important to provide broad, general definitions of secrecy
and anonymity for a general class of multiagent systems—definitions that empha-
size the underlying unity of the notions we are trying to capture. Our work is
intended to to do just that. Although our definitions should be appropriate for
3a wide variety of settings, we pay special attention to the domain of imperative
programming languages. In particular, we apply our definitions of secrecy to for-
malizing definitions of information-flow security for interactive programs written
in a simple imperative language. We hope it will be clear that our definitions apply
equally well to other settings.
In the remainder of this introductory chapter we motivate the need for a new
framework in which we can couch semantic definitions of secrecy and anonymity.
In Section 1.1 we discuss secrecy and in Section 1.2 we discuss anonymity. In Sec-
tion 1.3 we discuss definitions of information-flow security for imperative programs,
and in Section 1.4 we describe the structure of the rest of the dissertation.
1.1 Secrecy and information flow
In the past three decades there have been many attempts to define what it means
for a system to be perfectly secure, in the sense that one group of agents is unable to
deduce anything at all about the behavior of another group. More generally, many
papers in computer science have, in a variety of different settings, defined properties
of secrecy and privacy and have discussed techniques for achieving these properties.
In the computer-security literature, early definitions of “perfect security” were
based on two different intuitions. Noninterference [31] attempted to capture the
intuition that an agent at a high security level is unable to interfere with an
agent at a lower security level, while nondeducibility [87] attempted to capture the
intuition that an agent at a low security level is unable to deduce anything about
the state of agents at a higher security level. Others definitions have involved a
notion of information flow, and taken a system to be secure if it is impossible
for information to flow from a high user to a low user. With these basic ideas
4in mind, definitions of security have been provided for a wide variety of system
models, including semantic models that encode all possible input/output behaviors
of a computing system and language-based models that deal with process algebras
and with more traditional constructs such as imperative programming languages.
(Focardi and Gorrieri [22] provide a classification of security properties expressed
using process algebras; Sabelfeld and Myers [76] give a survey of language-based
techniques.)
Sutherland’s definition of nondeducibility was based on a simple idea: a system
can be described as a set of “worlds” that encode the local states of users, and
security is maintained if high and low states are independent in the sense that a low
user can never totally rule out any high state based on his own local state. As we
shall see, nondeducibility is closely related to Shannon’s [81] probabilistic definition
of secrecy in the context of cryptography, which requires high and low events to
be probabilistically independent. This can be shown to imply that the low agent’s
posterior probability of a high event should be the same as his prior probability of
that event before he began interacting with the system. (Nondeducibility is also
closely related to Cohen’s earlier definition of strong dependency [7]. Cohen’s work
is concerned with information transmission over channels, which are represented
as functions that transform inputs into outputs, whereas Sutherland’s work is
concerned with possible worlds to represent states of a system, but their definitions
are essentially identical.)
Definitions of noninterference that follow Goguen and Meseguer’s early work
(see, for example, McCullough [56] and McLean [58]) are quite different in flavor
from the definitions of Shannon and Sutherland. Typically, they represent the
system as a set of input/output traces, and deem the system secure if the set
5of traces is closed under operations that add or remove high events. Variants
of this idea have been proposed to deal with issues such as verification, system
composition, timing attacks, and so on. Although these definitions have been
useful for solving a variety of technical problems, the complexity of some of this
work has, in our view, obscured the simplicity of earlier definitions based on the
notion of independence. While nondeducibility has been criticized for its inability
to deal with a variety of security concerns, we claim that the basic idea captures
notions of secrecy and privacy in an elegant and useful way.
We define secrecy in terms of an agent’s knowledge, using the “runs-and-
systems” framework [20], which generalizes the standard input/output trace mod-
els that have been used in many definitions of noninterference. The trace-based
approach has been concerned primarily with the input and output values exchanged
as a user or observer interacts with the system. Thus, with a trace-based approach,
it is possible to define secrecy only for systems that can be characterized by ob-
servable input and output events. This is insufficient for modeling a variety of
interesting systems. As Focardi and Gorrieri [22] point out, for example, it is dif-
ficult to deal with issues such as deadlock using a purely trace-based approach.
It is also difficult to represent an agent’s notion of time in systems that may ex-
hibit differing degrees of synchrony. As we shall see, the added generality of the
runs-and-systems approach lets us deal with these issues in a straightforward way.
Many frameworks for reasoning about information flow have assumed, often
implicitly, a very coarse notion of uncertainty. Either an agent knows, with cer-
tainty, that some fact is true, or she does not; a definition of secrecy therefore
amounts to a characterization of which facts some agent must not know, or which
facts she must think are possible. Indeed, this is the intuition that we make precise
6in Section 3.1.4. In the literature, such definitions are called possibilistic, because
they consider only what agents consider possible or impossible. In practice, how-
ever, such a coarse-grained notion of uncertainty is simply too weak. It is easy
to concoct examples where one agent has possibilistic secrecy but where intuition
suggests that secrecy is not maintained. We extend our definitions of secrecy to
incorporate probability, a much more fine-grained notion of uncertainty, using a
standard approach for reasoning about probability in the runs-and-systems frame-
work [44]. Just as Shannon’s definitions of secrecy can be viewed as a probabilistic
strengthening of Sutherland’s definition of nondeducibility, our definitions of prob-
abilistic secrecy generalize the possibilistic definitions we give. In fact, there is
a sense in which they are the same definitions, except with a different measure
of uncertainty—a point made precise when we generalize them using plausibilistic
measures in Section 3.3.
We also provide syntactic characterizations of secrecy, using a logic that in-
cludes modal operators for reasoning about knowledge and probability. We dis-
cuss what it means for a fact to “depend on” the state of an agent and show that
secrecy can be characterized as the requirement that low agents never know any
fact that depends on the state of a high agent. (In the probabilistic case, the
requirement is that low agents must think that any such fact is equally likely at all
points of the system.) This knowledge-based characterization lets us make precise
the connection between secrecy (of one agent with respect to another) and the
notion of a “secret,” that is, a fact about the system that an agent is not allowed
to know. This syntactic approach also opens the door to natural generalizations of
information-flow properties that require secrecy for only some facts, and allows us
to consider notions of secrecy based on more computational notions of knowledge,
7which may be more appropriate for resource-bounded agents.
As we show in Chapter 5, our approach provides insight into a number of other
information-flow conditions that have been proposed in the literature. We illus-
trate this point by considering separability [58], generalized noninterference [58],
nondeducibility on strategies [93], and probabilistic noninterference [32]. One of
our goals in this chapter, obviously, is to convince the reader that our definitions
are in fact as general as we claim they are. More importantly, we hope that pro-
viding a unified framework for comparing definitions of secrecy will facilitate the
cross-fertilization of ideas.
1.2 Anonymity
A variety of systems have been built to provide anonymity for the senders and
receivers of electronic communication. (See, for example, [1, 30, 51, 71, 82, 88].)
The goal of these systems, stated broadly, is to ensure that the identity of agents
who transmit communication remains hidden from other users. Because these
systems offer quite different guarantees about the degree of anonymity that they
provide, we believe that it is helpful to have a formal framework that can be used
to specify anonymity requirements and compare different systems. To this end, we
provide a variety of definitions that formalize what it means for the identity of an
agent who performs an action to be hidden from observers of the system.
Anonymity is obviously different from secrecy. Roughly speaking, a high agent
maintains secrecy with respect to a low agent if the low agent never knows anything
about the high user that he didn’t initially know. In contrast, our definitions
of anonymity say that an agent performing an action maintains anonymity with
respect to an observer if the observer never learns certain facts having to do with
8whether or not the agent performed the action. It is possible for an agent to have
complete secrecy—for some definition of secrecy—while still not having very strong
guarantees of anonymity. Conversely, it is possible to have anonymity without
preserving secrecy. Thinking carefully about the relationship between secrecy and
anonymity suggests new and interesting ways of thinking about anonymity. In
addition, formalizing anonymity in terms of knowledge is useful for capturing the
intuitions that practitioners have. Not surprisingly, our formalization of anonymity
is similar in spirit to our formalization of secrecy.
We remark that we are not the first to use knowledge and belief to formal-
ize notions of anonymity and other similar properties. Glasgow, MacEwen, and
Panangaden [29] describe a logic for reasoning about security that includes both
epistemic operators (for reasoning about knowledge) and deontic operators (for rea-
soning about permission and obligation). They characterize some security policies
in terms of the facts that an agent is permitted to know. Intuitively, everything
that an agent is not permitted to know must remain hidden. Our approach is
similar, except that we specify the formulas that an agent is not allowed to know,
rather than the formulas she is permitted to know. One advantage of accentuating
the negative is that we do not need to use deontic operators in our logic.
Syverson and Stubblebine [89] use an epistemic logic to formalize definitions
of anonymity, but the goal of our work is quite different from theirs. Syverson
and Stubblebine focus on describing an axiom system that is useful for reasoning
about real-world systems, and on how to reason about and compose parts of the
system into adversaries and honest agents. Our focus, on the other hand, is on
giving a semantic characterization of anonymity in a framework that lends itself
well to modeling systems.
9Shmatikov and Hughes [47] (whose work we discuss in more detail in Sec-
tion 5.2.3) position their approach to anonymity as an attempt to provide an
interface between logic-based approaches, which they claim are good for specifying
confidentiality properties, and formalisms like CSP, which they claim are good for
specifying systems. We agree with their claim that logic-based approaches are good
for specifying properties of systems. But given an appropriate semantics for the
logic, no such interface is necessary. There are many ways of specifying systems,
but many end up identifying a system with a set of runs or traces and can thus be
embedded in the runs and systems framework that we use.
As with secrecy, many definitions of anonymity do not deal with probability.
Certainly, if an agent j believes that any of 1000 users (including i) could have
performed the action that i in fact performed, then i has some degree of anonymity
with respect to j. However, if j believes that the probability that i performed the
action is .99, the possibilistic assurance of anonymity may provide little comfort.
Most previous formalizations of anonymity have not accounted for probability. One
significant advantage of our formalism is that it is completely straightforward to
add probability by following the same approach that we use for secrecy. As we
show in Section 4.2, this lets us formalize the (somewhat less formal) definitions
of probabilistic anonymity given by Reiter and Rubin [71].
In this dissertation we are more concerned with defining and specifying ano-
nymity properties than with describing systems for achieving anonymity or with
verifying anonymity properties. We define what anonymity means by using syn-
tactic statements with a well-defined semantics. Our work is similar in spirit to
previous papers that have given definitions of anonymity, such as the proposal for
terminology given by Pfitzmann and Ko¨hntopp [68] and the information-theoretic
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definitions of anonymity given by Diaz, Seys, Claessens, and Preneel [15].
1.3 Information-flow security for imperative programs
Secure programs should maintain the secrecy of confidential information. For
sequential imperative programming languages, this principle has led to a variety of
information-flow security conditions which assume that all confidential information
is supplied as the initial values of a set of program variables. This assumption
reflects an idealized batch-job model of input and output, whereby all inputs are
obtained (as initial values of program variables) from users before the program
begins execution, and all outputs are provided (as final values of program variables)
after program termination. Accordingly, these security conditions aim to protect
the secrecy only of initial values.
Many real-world programs, however, are interactive, sending output to and
receiving input from their external environment throughout execution. Examples
of such programs include web servers, GUI applications, and some command-line
applications. The batch-job model is unable to capture the behavior of interactive
programs because of dependencies between inputs and outputs. For example, a
program implementing a challenge/response protocol must first output a challenge
to the user and then accept the user’s response as input; clearly, the user cannot
supply the response as the initial value of a program variable. In contrast, the
interactive model generalizes the batch-job model: any batch-job program can be
simulated by an interactive program that reads the initial values of all relevant
variables, executes the corresponding batch-job program, and finally outputs the
values of all variables.
Given the prevalence of interactive programs, it is important to be able to
11
reason about their security properties. Traditionally, researchers have reasoned
about information flow in interactive systems by encoding them as state machines
(e.g., Mantel [54] and McLean [57, 58]) or as concurrent processes (e.g., Focardi
and Gorrieri [22]) and applying trace-based information-flow security conditions.
But since implementors usually create imperative programs, not abstract models,
a need exists for tools that enable direct reasoning about the security of such
programs.
We address that need by developing a model for reasoning about the informa-
tion-flow security of interactive imperative programs. We give novel strategy-based
semantic security conditions that are special cases of our definitions of secrecy. Our
model achieves a clean separation of user behavior from program code by employ-
ing user strategies, which describe how agents interact with their environment.
(The definitions build on the work of Wittbold and Johnson [93] and of Gray and
Syverson [32], both of whom consider user strategies.) Moreover, our framework
for secrecy suggests natural ways to give definitions of information-flow security
for imperative programs that account for nondeterminism and randomization.
We also leverage previous work on static analysis techniques by adapting the
type system of Volpano, Smith, and Irvine [92] to an interactive setting. Our
results demonstrate the feasibility of enforcing our stringent definitions of security.
1.4 Overview
The material of Chapter 2 is a review of the runs-and-systems framework of Fagin,
Halpern, Moses, and Vardi [20]. We describe their state-based approach for repre-
senting the local states of different agents in a multiagent system and an epistemic
logic for reasoning about the knowledge of such agents. We also describe how
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to add probability to the runs-and-systems framework, following the approach of
Halpern and Tuttle [44].
Chapter 3 presents definitions of secrecy in the context of the runs-and-systems
framework. Most of the definitions are semantic in nature; that is, they are con-
cerned with the local states of agents. We do, however, provide several syntactic
characterizations using the epistemic logic of Chapter 2, and we prove several re-
sults establishing equivalences between the semantic and logic-based definitions.
We also give probabilistic definitions of secrecy in Chapter 3 and generalize many
of the definitions using plausibility measures.
In Chapter 4 we give a variety of definitions of anonymity, most of which are
stated syntactically (as logical formulas that are valid in systems that preserve
anonymity).
Chapter 5 considers related work. We look at a number of definitions of secrecy,
noninterference, and anonymity, and establish that some of those definitions can
be cast as special cases of our definitions.
Chapter 6 considers definitions of secrecy for interactive imperative programs.
We give an operational semantics for a small interactive language, provide defini-
tions of noninterference that account for nondeterminism and randomization, and
describe a type system for the language that is sound with respect to the definitions
of noninterference.
The material in Chapters 3, 4, and 5 is joint work with Joseph Halpern and
appears in [39], [40], and [41]. The material in Chapter 6 is joint work with Michael
Clarkson and Stephen Chong [67].
Chapter 2
A Model for Multiagent Systems
This chapter provides a review of background material that is necessary for subse-
quent chapters. The technical material is not new: the framework for multiagent
systems described here was established in work by Halpern and Fagin [37] and
Halpern and Moses [38]. (See [20] for an excellent introduction to knowledge in
multiagent systems.) The approach for reasoning about probability in multiagent
systems described in Section 2.2 originates with Halpern and Tuttle [44].
2.1 Knowledge and multiagent systems
A multiagent system consists of n agents, each of whom is in some local state at
a given point in time. We assume that an agent’s local state encapsulates all the
information to which she has access. In a security setting the local state of an
agent might include initial information regarding keys, the messages she has sent
and received, and perhaps the reading of a clock. The basic framework makes no
assumptions about the precise nature of the local state.
We can view the whole system as being in some global state, which is a tuple
consisting of the local state of each agent and the state of the environment, where
the environment consists of everything relevant to the system that is not contained
in the state of the agents. Thus, a global state has the form (se, s1, . . . , sn), where
se is the state of the environment and si is agent i’s state, for i = 1, . . . , n.
A run is a function from time to global states. Intuitively, a run is a complete
description of what happens over time in one possible execution of the system. A
point is a pair (r,m) consisting of a run r and a time m. For simplicity, we take
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time to range over the natural numbers. At a point (r,m), the system is in some
global state r(m). If r(m) = (se, s1, . . . , sn), then we take ri(m) to be si, agent
i’s local state at the point (r,m). Formally, a system consists of a set of runs (or
executions). Let PT (R) denote the points in a system R.
Given a system R, let Ki(r,m) be the set of points in PT (R) that i thinks are
possible at (r,m); that is,
Ki(r,m) , {(r
′,m′) ∈ PT (R) : r′i(m
′) = ri(m)}.
The set Ki(r,m) is often called an i-information set because, intuitively, it corre-
sponds to the system-dependent information encoded in i’s local state at the point
(r,m).
A natural question to ask is where these runs come from. While the framework
itself does not deal with this issue, in practice we are interested in systems where
the runs are generated by a simple set of rules, such as a communication or security
protocol, a program written in some programming language, or a process described
in a concurrent process language. Translating such rules to a set of runs is not
always straightforward, but doing so is often useful inasmuch as it forces us to
think carefully about what features of the system are essential and relevant to the
safety or correctness issues that we are interested in. With respect to secrecy, the
way in which we model the local states of various agents is especially important. In
particular, if we do not want the actions or choices made by one agent to affect the
state of another agent, we should include sufficient information in the local state
of the first agent to reason about those actions or choices. (This issue is discussed
in more detail in Sections 3.2.4 and 5.1.2.)
To reason formally about secrecy and anonymity in multiagent systems, we use
a logic of knowledge and time. Starting with a set Φ of primitive propositions,
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we close off under negation, conjunction, the modal operators Ki for i = 1, . . . , n,
and ♦. In the context of security protocols, the set Φ might consist of primitive
propositions corresponding to facts such as “the key is n” or “agent A sent the
message m to B.” As usual, Kiφ means that agent i knows φ; Kiφ at a point
(r,m) if φ is true at all points in Ki(r,m). Finally, ♦φ is true at a point (r,m) if
φ is true at some point on run r (either before, at, or after time m). While it is,
of course, possible to define other temporal operators, the ♦ operator will prove
particularly useful in our definitions.
We use the standard approach [20] to give semantics to this language. An
interpreted system I consists of a pair (R, pi), where R is a system and pi is an
interpretation for the primitive propositions in Φ that assigns truth values to the
primitive propositions at the global states. Thus, for every p ∈ Φ and global state
s that arises in R, we have (pi(s))(p) ∈ {true, false}. Of course, pi also induces
an interpretation over the points in PT (R): simply take pi(r,m) to be pi(r(m)).
We now define what it means for a formula φ to be true at a point (r,m) in
an interpreted system I, written (I, r,m) |= φ, by induction on the structure of
formulas:
• (I, r,m) |= p iff (pi(r,m))(p) = true;
• (I, r,m) |= φ ∧ ψ iff (I, r,m) |= φ and (I, r,m) |= ψ;
• (I, r,m) |= ¬φ iff (I, r,m) 6|= φ;
• (I, r,m) |= Kiφ iff (I, r
′,m′) |= φ for all (r′,m′) ∈ Ki(r,m);
• (I, r,m) |= ♦φ iff there exists n such that (I, r, n) |= φ.
As usual, we say that φ is valid in I and write I |= φ if (I, r,m) |= φ for all points
(r,m) in I; similarly, φ is satisfiable in I if (I, r,m) |= φ for some point (r,m)
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in I. We abbreviate ¬Ki¬φ as Piφ. We read Piφ as “(according to agent i) φ is
possible.” Note that (I, r,m) |= Piφ if there exists a point (r
′,m′) ∈ Ki(r,m) such
that (I, r′,m′) |= φ.
The systems framework lets us express in a natural way some standard as-
sumptions about systems. For example, we can reason about synchronous systems,
where agents always know the time. Formally, R is synchronous if, for all agents
i and points (r,m) and (r′,m′), if ri(m) = r
′
i(m
′), then m = m′.
Another standard assumption is that agents have perfect recall. This assump-
tion is implicitly made in almost all system models considered in the security lit-
erature, but is not implicit in the runs-and-systems model. Roughly speaking, an
agent with perfect recall can reconstruct his complete local history. In synchronous
systems, for example, an agent’s local state changes with every tick of the external
clock, so agent i’s having perfect recall implies that the sequence 〈ri(0), . . . , ri(m)〉
must be encoded in ri(m+ 1). To formalize perfect recall, let agent i’s local-state
sequence at the point (r,m) be the sequence of local states she has gone through in
run r up to time m, without consecutive repetitions. Thus, if from time 0 through
time 4 in run r agent i has gone through the sequence 〈si, si, s
′
i, si, si〉 of local states,
where si 6= s
′
i, then her local-state sequence at (r, 4) is 〈si, s
′
i, si〉. Intuitively, an
agent has perfect recall if her current local state encodes her local-state sequence.
More formally, we say that agent i has perfect recall in system R if, at all points
(r,m) and (r′,m′) in PT (R), if (r′,m′) ∈ Ki(r,m), then agent i has the same
local-state sequence at both (r,m) and (r′,m′). Thus, agent i has perfect recall
if she “remembers” her local-state sequence at all times. It is easy to check that
perfect recall has the following key property: if (r′,m′1) ∈ Ki(r,m1), then for all
m2 ≤ m1, there exists m
′
2 ≤ m
′
1 such that (r
′,m′2) ∈ Ki(r,m2). (See [20] for more
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discussion of this definition.)
2.2 Probabilistic multiagent systems
Many real-world systems involve nondeterminism and randomization. Adding
probability to the runs-and-systems framework gives us more power to reason
about such systems. We present two ways of doing so: putting probabilities on
points and putting probabilities on runs.
We first consider putting probabilities on points, using a general approach de-
scribed by Halpern [36]. Intuitively, at any point in time, agents have probabilities
on the current state of the system (including the states of other agents). Accord-
ingly, this approach specifies a probability on points for every agent and every
point. Define a probability assignment PR to be a function that assigns to each
agent i and point (r,m) a probability space
PR(r,m, i) = (Wr,m,i,Fr,m,i, µr,m,i),
where Wr,m,i ⊆ PT (R) is i’s sample space at (r,m) and µr,m,i is a probability
measure defined on the subsets of Wr,m,i in Fr,m,i. (That is, Fr,m,i is a σ-algebra
that defines the measurable subsets of Wr,m,i.) We call a pair (R,PR) a probability
system.
To put probabilities on runs, we begin by assuming that there is some way
to assign a probability measure to the space of runs. (Intuitively, this measure
represents the objective probability with which various execution sequences will
occur.) Define a run-based probability system to be a triple (R,F , µ), where R is
a system, F is a σ-algebra of subsets of R, and µ is a probability measure defined
on F . Note that a run-based probability system requires only one probability
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measure, rather than a probability measure at each point and for each agent. In
practice, such a measure is often relatively easy to come by. In the same way that
a set of runs can be generated by a protocol, a runs-based probability system can
be generated by a probabilistic protocol: the probability of a set of runs sharing
a common prefix can be derived by multiplying the probabilities of the protocol
transitions necessary to generate the prefix (see [36, 44] for further discussion).
Here and throughout the paper, we assume for simplicity that in a run-based
probability system (R,F , µ), F contains all sets of the form R(Ki(r,m)), for all
points (r,m) and all agents i. That is, if a set of runs is generated by an agent’s
local state, it is measurable. We also assume that µ(R(Ki(r,m))) > 0, so that we
can condition on information sets.
We now discuss an approach due to Halpern and Tuttle [44] that is useful for
connection probability systems and run-based probability systems. Given an agent
i and a point (r,m), we would like to derive the probability measure µr,m,i from µ
by conditioning µ on Ki(r,m), the information that i has at the point (r,m). The
problem is that Ki(r,m) is a set of points, not a set of runs, so straightforward
conditioning does not work. To solve this problem, we condition µ on the set of
runs going through Ki(r,m), rather than on Ki(r,m). Given a set U of points, let
R(U) be the set of runs in R going through the points in U :
R(U) , {r ∈ R : (r,m) ∈ U for some m}.
Conditioning is always well-defined, given our assumption that R(Ki(r,m)) has
positive measure.
We can now define a measure µr,m,i on the points in Ki(r,m) as follows. If
S ⊆ R and A ⊆ PT (R), let A(S) be the set of points in A that lie on runs in S;
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that is,
A(S) , {(r′,m′) ∈ A : r′ ∈ S}.
In particular, Ki(r,m)(S) consists of the points in Ki(r,m) that lie on runs in S.
Let Fr,m,i consist of all sets of the form Ki(r,m)(S), where S ∈ F . Then define
µr,m,i(Ki(r,m)(S)) , µ(S |R(Ki(r,m)).
It is easy to check that if U ⊆ Ki(r,m) is measurable with respect with respect to
µr,m,i, then µr,m,i(U) = µ(R(U) |R(Ki(r,m))). We say that the resulting probabil-
ity system (R,PR) is determined by the run-based probability system (R,F , µ),
and call µ the underlying measure. We call a probability system standard if it is
determined by a run-based probability system.
We can also extend the logic of knowledge described in the last section to
probabilistic systems. Define an interpreted probability system I to be a tuple
(R,PR, pi), where (R,PR) is a probability system. In an interpreted probability
system we can give semantics to syntactic statements of probability. We are most
interested in formulas of the form Pri(φ) = α (or similar formulas with ≤, >, etc.,
instead of =). Such formulas were given semantics by Fagin, Halpern, and Megiddo
[19]; we follow their approach here. Intuitively, a formula such as Pri(φ) = α is
true at a point (r,m) if, according to µr,m,i, the probability that φ is true is given
by α. More formally, (I, r,m) |= Pri(φ) = α if
µr,m,i({(r
′,m′) ∈ Ki(r,m) : (I, r
′,m′) |= φ}) = α.
Similarly, we can give semantics to Pri(φ) ≤ α and Pr(φ) > α, etc., as well as
conditional formulas such as Pr(φ |ψ) = α. Note that although these formulas
talk about probability, they are either true or false at a given state.
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The semantics for a formula such as Pri(φ) implicitly assumes that the set of
points in Ki(r,m) where φ is true is measurable. While there are ways of dealing
with non-measurable sets (see [19]), here we assume that all relevant sets are
measurable. This is certainly true in synchronous standard systems determined
by a a run-based system where all sets of runs are measurable. More generally, it
is true in a probability system (R,PR) where, for all r, m, i, all the sets in the
probability space PR(r,m, i) are measurable.
Chapter 3
Defining Secrecy
3.1 Secrecy in nonprobabilistic systems
3.1.1 Defining secrecy
In this section we give abstract definitions of secrecy for systems described using the
runs-and-systems model. Recall that we use the term “secrecy” in a fairly specific
way: roughly speaking, we define secrecy so as to ensure that low-confidentiality
agents do not know anything about the state of high-confidentiality agents. (Here-
after we use the more concise terms “high” and “low” when describing the con-
fidentiality level associated with inputs, users, and so on.) In Section 3.1.4, we
formalize these intuitions using the epistemic logic of Section 2.1.
To motivate our definitions, we use programs expressed in a simple imperative
programming language. (We define such a language formally in Chapter 6, Sec-
tion 6.2.) We assume that these programs are executed sequentially on a single
machine, and that users with different security clearances can interact with the
machine via channels appropriate to their security level. For example, the com-
mand input x from H prompts the high channel H for an input and stores the
input value in program variable x, while the command output e to L outputs the
value of the expression e on the low channel L.
All the programs that we consider determine systems in an obvious way, once
we decide whether to model the systems synchronously or asynchronously. For
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example, in a synchronous system determined by the following program:
output 0 to L;
output 1 to L
the system consists of exactly one run.1 In this run, L’s local state is initially
empty (i.e., 〈 〉) and is then updated with a new output event—where out(L, i)
denotes the output of value i on channel L—at each time step. At time 1, L’s
local state is 〈out(L, 1)〉, and at time 2 it is 〈out(L, 1), out(L, 2)〉. Since there is
no output event at subsequent steps, at time 4, L’s local state is
〈out(L, 1), out(L, 2), , 〉.
L’s local state is different at time 2 and time 4, since L is aware that time has
passed. By way of contrast, one way to translate programs to asynchronous systems
is to model agents’ local states so that they are modified only when input and
output event occurs on channels to which they have access. In an asynchronous
system determined by the program above, L’s state would be unchanged after
time 2.
The strongest notion of secrecy that we consider in this section is the require-
ment that an agent, based on her local state, must not be able to infer anything
about the local state of another agent. To guarantee that an agent i is unable to
rule out any possible local states for another agent j, we require that every possible
local state for j be compatible with every possible local state for i:
Definition 1 Agent j maintains total secrecy with respect to i in system R if, for
all points (r,m) and (r′,m′) in PT (R), Ki(r,m) ∩ Kj(r
′,m′) 6= ∅.
1Though for simplicity we ignore timing variations arising due to blocking input
commands, our system model can easily handle such timing issues.
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Total secrecy is a strong property. For almost any imaginable system, it is,
in fact, too strong to be useful. There are two important respects in which it is
too strong. First, total secrecy is not at all selective about which parts of the
high agent are protected. Second, total secrecy is unreasonably demanding with
respect to issues of time and synchrony. Both of these issues can be handled with
appropriate weakenings of total secrecy, which are now discussed.
3.1.2 Weakening total secrecy using information functions
The first respect in which total secrecy is too strong has to do with the fact
that total secrecy protects everything about the state of the high agent. In some
systems, we might want only some part of the high agent’s state to be kept secret
from the low agent. For example, we might want the high agent to be able to
observe details about the state of the low agent, in which case our definitions are
too strong because they rule out any correlation between the states of the high
and low agents.
To make this more concrete, consider the following program:
input x from L;
output x to H;
output 1 to L
H does not maintain total secrecy with respect to L because after L sees out(L, 1)
he knows that H has already seen L’s first input value as her output. (Note that
in a synchronous setting the final output is irrelevant: L would know that H had
seen L’s input value at the second time step.) If we want to protect only the
input values provided by H, total secrecy is too strong. We may be interested in a
weaker notion of secrecy, which allows L to realize that H knows L’s input value
but still keeps all of the “significant” part of H’s state secret. Rather than trying
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to define “significant,” we characterize significance abstractly using what we call
an “information function.”
Definition 2 A j-information function on R is a function f from PT (R) to
some range that depends only on j’s local state; that is f(r,m) = f(r ′,m′) if
rj(m) = r
′
j(m
′).
Thus, for example, if j’s local state at any point (r,m) includes a list of input and
output operations, f(r,m) could consist of only the output values contained in j’s
local state. Intuitively, f(r,m) is intended to represent that part of j’s local state
that is significant to whomever is doing the reasoning.
Definition 3 If f is a j-information function, agent j maintains total f -secrecy
with respect to i in system R if, for all points (r,m) and values v in the range of
f , Ki(r,m) ∩ f
−1(v) 6= ∅ (where f−1(v) is simply the preimage of v, that is, all
points (r,m) such that f(r,m) = v).
Of course, if f(r,m) = rj(m), then f
−1(r′j(m
′)) = Kj(r
′,m′), so total secrecy is a
special case of total f -secrecy.
To see how f -secrecy handles the example program above, suppose that we
introduce an information function f that extracts only the input events from H’s
state. Because f(r,m) is always empty, it is easy to see that H maintains total
f -secrecy with respect to L. If our goal is to protect only the input values provided
by H, any program that never reads input values from H is trivially secure.
Total f -secrecy is a special case of nondeducibility, introduced by Suther-
land [87]. Sutherland considers “abstract” systems that are characterized by a
set W of worlds. He focuses on two agents, whose views are represented by infor-
mation functions g and h on W . Sutherland says that no information flows from
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g to h if, for all worlds w,w′ ∈ W , there exists some world w′′ ∈ W such that
g(w′′) = g(w) and h(w′′) = h(w′). This notion is often called nondeducibility (with
respect to g and h) in the literature. To see how total f -secrecy is a special case of
nondeducibility, let W = PT (R), the set of all points of the system. Given a point
(r,m), let g(r,m) = ri(m). Then total f -secrecy is equivalent to nondeducibility
with respect to g and f .
Note that nondeducibility is symmetric: no information flows from g to h iff
no information flows from h to g. Since most standard noninterference properties
focus only on protecting the state of some high agent, symmetry appears to suggest
that if the actions of a high agent are kept secret from a low agent, then the actions
of a low agent must also be kept secret from the high agent. Our definitions help
to clarify this issue. Total secrecy as we have defined it is indeed symmetric: j
maintains total secrecy with respect to i iff i maintains total secrecy with respect
to j. However, total f -secrecy is not symmetric in general. If j maintains total
f -secrecy with respect to i, it may not even make sense to talk about i maintaining
total f -secrecy with respect to j, because f may not be an i-information function.
Thus, although f -secrecy is an instantiation of nondeducibility (with respect to an
appropriate g and h), the symmetry at the level of g and h does not translate to
symmetry at the level of f -secrecy, which is where it matters.
While f -secrecy is useful conceptually, it is essentially a trivial technical gener-
alization of the basic notion of secrecy, because for any agent j and j-information
function f , we can reason about a new agent jf whose local state at any point
(r,m) is rjf (m) = f(rj,m). Therefore, every theorem we prove involving secrecy
holds for f -secrecy as well. For this reason, and to simplify the definitions given in
the remainder of the paper, we ignore information functions and deal only with se-
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crecy of one agent with respect to another. Indeed, all our definitions hold without
change for any agent “created” by identifying an agent with a function on global
states.
3.1.3 Run-based secrecy and synchronous secrecy
The second respect in which total secrecy is too strong involves time. To under-
stand the issue, consider synchronous systems (as defined in Section 2.1). In such
systems, the low agent knows the time and knows that the high agent knows it
too. Thus, the low agent can rule out all high states except those that occur at
the current time. Even in semisynchronous systems, where agents know the time
to within some tolerance , total secrecy is impossible, because low agents can rule
out high states that occur only in the distant past or future.
Total secrecy may be an unreasonable condition even in asynchronous systems.
To see this, consider the following program:
input x from H;
output 1 to L
Even though L does not know which value was entered by H, H does not maintain
total secrecy with respect to L in this program simply because L knows, after
seeing his output value, that H has already entered some input value. Indeed,
total secrecy—and also total f -secrecy, for an information function f that extracts
high input values—rules out any program where low output events follow high
input events.
We now consider two distinct ways of resolving this problem. The first way
weakens total secrecy by considering runs instead of points. Total secrecy (of j
with respect to i) says that at all times, agent i must consider all states of j to
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be (currently) possible. A weaker version of total secrecy says that at all times, i
must consider it possible that every possible state of j either occurs at that time,
or at some point in the past or future. We formalize this in the following definition.
Given a set U of points, recall that R(U) is the runs in R going through a point
in U .
Definition 4 Agent j maintains run-based secrecy with respect to j in system R
if, for all points (r,m) and (r′,m′) in PT (R), R(Ki(r,m)) ∩R(Kj(r
′,m′)) 6= ∅.
It is easy to check that j maintains run-based secrecy with respect to j in
system R iff for all points (r,m) and (r′,m′) in PT (R), there exists a run r′′ and
times n and n′ such that r′′i (n) = ri(m) and r
′′
j (n
′) = r′j(m
′). To relate the formal
definition to its informal motivation, note that every state of j that occurs in the
system has the form r′j(m
′) for some point (r′,m′). Suppose that i’s state is ri(m).
If there exists a point (r′′, n′′) such that r′′i (n
′′) = ri(m) and r
′′
j (n
′′) = r′j(m
′), agent
i considers it possible that j currently has state r′j(m
′). If instead r′′j (n) = r
′
j(m
′)
for n〈n′′, then i currently considers it possible that j was in state r′j(m
′) at some
point in the past; similarly, if n > n′′, then i thinks that j could be in state r′j(m
′)
at some point in the future. Note that total secrecy implies run-based secrecy,
but the converse is not necessarily true (as shown in Example 2, in Section A.1
in the appendix). While run-based secrecy is still a very strong security property,
it seems much more reasonable than total secrecy. In particular, H maintains
run-based secrecy with respect to L in the system corresponding to the program
input x from H; output 1 to L—as far as L is concerned, all the runs in this system
look identical. However, run-based secrecy does not hold in systems derived from
the kinds of programs typically used to demonstrate indirect information flows,
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such as
input x from H;
if (x = 0) then
output 0 to L
else
output 1 to L;
where run-based secrecy does not hold because L’s output gives information about
whether H’s input value was equal to 0.
The second way to weaken total secrecy is to relax the requirement that the
low agent cannot rule out any possible high states. We make this formal as follows.
Definition 5 An i-allowability function on R is a function C from PT (R) to
subsets of PT (R) such that Ki(r,m) ⊆ C(r,m) for all (r,m) ∈ PT (R).
Intuitively, PT (R)−C(r,m) is the set of points that i is allowed to “rule out” at the
point (r,m). It seems reasonable to insist that the points that i considers possible
at (r,m) not be ruled out, which is why we require that Ki(r,m) ⊆ C(r,m).
Definition 6 If C is an i-allowability function, then j maintains C-secrecy with
respect to i if, for all points (r,m) ∈ PT (R) and (r′,m′) ∈ C(r,m), we have
Ki(r,m) ∩ Kj(r
′,m′) 6= ∅.
If C(r,m) = PT (R) for all points (r,m) ∈ PT (R), then C-secrecy reduces to
total secrecy. Synchrony can be captured by the allowability function S(r,m) =
{(r′,m) : r′ ∈ R}. Informally, this says that agent i is allowed to know what time
it is. We sometimes call S-secrecy synchronous secrecy. It is easy to see that H
maintains synchronous secrecy with respect to L in the system generated by the
program input x from H; output 1 to L.
In synchronous systems, synchronous secrecy has a simple characterization.
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Proposition 1 Agent j maintains synchronous secrecy with respect to i in a
synchronous system R iff, for all runs r, r′ ∈ R and times m, we have that
Ki(r,m) ∩ Kj(r
′,m) 6= ∅.
Proof: This follows trivially from the definitions. ut
In synchronous input/output trace systems, synchronous secrecy is essentially
equivalent to the standard notion of separability [58]. (Total secrecy can be viewed
as an asynchronous version of separability. See Section 5.1.1 for further discussion
of this issue.) The security literature has typically focused on either synchronous
systems or completely asynchronous systems. One advantage of our framework
is that we can easily model both of these extreme cases, as well as being able
to handle in-between cases, which do not seem to have been considered up to
now. Consider a semisynchronous system where agents know the time to within
a tolerance of . At time 5, for example, an agent knows that the true time is in
the interval [5− , 5+ ]. This corresponds to the allowability function SS(r,m) =
{(r′,m′) : |m −m′| ≤ }, for the appropriate . We believe that any attempt to
define security for semisynchronous systems will require something like allowability
functions.
C-secrecy and run-based secrecy represent two quite different approaches to
weakening total secrecy: allowability functions restrict the set of j-information
sets that i must consider possible, while run-based secrecy focuses on runs rather
than points. Even if we focus on synchronous secrecy, the two notions are distinct.
In systems without perfect recall, for example, we may have synchronous secrecy
without having run-based secrecy, while in asynchronous systems we may have
run-based secrecy without having synchronous secrecy. (See Section A.1 in the
appendix for examples.) However, there are contexts in which the definitions do
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coincide, suggesting that they are capturing some of the same intuitions. Consider,
for example, our definition of synchronous secrecy. Intuitively it might at first
seem that synchronous secrecy goes too far in weakening total secrecy. Informally,
j maintains total secrecy with respect to i if i never learns anything not only about
j’s current state, but also his possible future and future states. Synchronous secrecy
seems only to say that i never learns anything about j’s state at the current time.
However, when agents have perfect recall, it turns out that synchronous secrecy
implies run-based secrecy, thus addressing this concern.
To make this precise for a more general class of allowability functions, we need
the following definition, which captures the intuition that an allowability function
depends only on timing. Given any two runs, we want the allowability function to
map points on the first run to contiguous, nonempty sets of points on the second
run in a way that respects the ordering of points on the first run and covers all
points on the second run.
Definition 7 An allowability function C depends only on timing if it satisfies
the following three conditions: (a) for all runs r, r′ ∈ R, and all times m′, there
exists m such that (r′,m′) ∈ C(r,m); (b) if (r′,m′) ∈ C(r,m), and n ≥ m (resp.
n ≤ m), there exists n′ ≥ m′ (resp. n′ ≤ m′) such that (r′, n′) ∈ C(r, n); (c) if
(r′, n1) ∈ C(r,m), (r
′, n2) ∈ C(r,m), and n1 ≤ m
′ ≤ n2, then (r
′,m′) ∈ C(r,m).
It is easy to check that both synchronous and semi-synchronous allowability func-
tions depend only on timing. We now show that C-secrecy implies run-based
secrecy if C depends only on timing.
Proposition 2 If R is a system where i and j have perfect recall, C depends only
on timing, and j maintains C-secrecy with respect to i, then j maintains run-based
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secrecy with respect to i.
In synchronous systems with perfect recall, synchronous secrecy and run-based
secrecy agree. This reinforces our claim that both definitions are natural, useful
weakenings of total secrecy.
Proposition 3 If R is a synchronous system where both i and j have perfect
recall, then agent j maintains synchronous secrecy with respect to i iff j maintains
run-based secrecy with respect to i.
The requirement in Proposition 3 that both agents have perfect recall is nec-
essary; see Example 1, in the appendix, for details. Without perfect recall, two
things can go wrong. First, if i does not have perfect recall, she might be able
to determine at time n what j’s state is going to be at some future time n′ > n,
but then forget about it by time n′, so that j maintains synchronous secrecy with
respect to i, but not run-based secrecy. Second, if j does not have perfect recall, i
might learn something about j’s state in the past, but j might still maintain syn-
chronous secrecy with respect to i because j has forgotten this information by the
time i learns it. These examples suggest that secrecy is less interesting when agents
can forget facts that they once knew. At any rate, it makes sense to model agents
as if they have perfect recall, since not doing so requires us to trust that agents
will forget facts when we need them to, leading to weaker security guarantees.
3.1.4 Syntactic characterizations of secrecy
Our definitions of secrecy are semantic; they are given in terms of the local states
of agents. As we shall see, it is helpful to reason syntactically about secrecy,
using the logic of knowledge discussed in Section 2.1. Our goal in this section is
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to characterize secrecy in terms of the knowledge—or more precisely, the lack of
knowledge—of the agent with respect to whom secrecy is maintained. To this end,
we show that the state of an agent j is kept secret from an agent i exactly if i does
not know any formulas that depend only on the state of j, or, dually, if i always
thinks that any formula that depends on the state of j is currently possible.
For this characterization, we use the modal logic of knowledge described in
Section 2.1. But first, we need to define what it means for a formula to depend on
the local state of a particular agent. Given an agent j, a formula φ is j-local in an
interpreted system I if, for all points (r,m) and (r′,m′) such that rj(m) = r
′
j(m
′),
(I, r,m) |= φ iff (I, r′,m′) |= φ. It is easy to check that φ is j-local in I iff
I |= Kjφ ∨Kj¬φ; thus, j-locality can be characterized syntactically. (See [17] for
an introduction to the logic of local propositions.) The notion of j-locality has
another useful semantic characterization:
Proposition 4 A formula φ is j-local in an interpreted system I = (R, pi) iff
there exists a set Ω of j-information sets such that (I, r,m) |= φ exactly when
(r,m) ∈
⋃
K∈ΩK.
The following theorem shows that the semantic characterizations of secrecy
given in Section 3.1.1 correspond closely to our intuitions of what secrecy should
mean: agent j maintains secrecy with respect to i precisely if i cannot rule out any
satisfiable facts that depend only on the local state of j.
Theorem 1 Suppose that C is an i-allowability function. Agent j maintains C-
secrecy with respect to agent i in system R iff, for every interpretation pi and
point (r,m), if φ is j-local and (I, r′,m′) |= φ for some (r′,m′) ∈ C(r,m), then
(I, r,m) |= Piφ.
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Since total secrecy is just C-secrecy for the allowability function C such that
C(r,m) consists of all point in R, the following corollary, which gives an elegant
syntactic characterization of total secrecy, is immediate.
Corollary 1 Agent j maintains total secrecy with respect to agent i in system
R iff, for every interpretation pi, if the formula φ is j-local and satisfiable in
I = (R, pi), then I |= Piφ.
Corollary 1 says that total secrecy requires i not to know any j-local fact that
is not valid in I. A similar result holds for synchronous secrecy. For brevity, and
because we prove more general results in later sections, we ignore the details here.
We can also give a similar syntactic characterization of run-based secrecy. For
j to maintain total secrecy with respect to i, if φ is j-local, it is always necessary
for i to think that φ was possible. For run-based secrecy, we require only that i
think that φ is possible sometime in the current run. Recall that the formula ♦φ
means “φ is true at some point in the current run.”
Theorem 2 Agent j maintains run-based secrecy with respect to agent i in system
R iff, for every interpretation pi, if φ is j-local and satisfiable in I = (R, pi), then
I |= Pi♦φ.
The results of this section show that secrecy has a syntactic characterization
that is equivalent to the semantic characterization. We speculate that this char-
acterization may be relevant to natural generalizations of secrecy involving de-
classification and resource-bounded agents. With declassification [95, 65], system
administrators may deem that some facts about high users may be leaked to low
users. If a secrecy policy corresponds to a set of formulas that must be kept se-
cret from the low agent, it seems likely that declassification could be modeled by
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specifying particular formulas to be removed from the set. Another generalization
of secrecy involves replacing knowledge by a more computational notion such as
algorithmic knowledge [20, 42]. Recall that the definition of knowledge described
in Section 2.1 suffers from the logical omniscience problem: agents know all tau-
tologies and know all logical consequences of their knowledge [20]. In the context
of security, it may not matter that an agent with unbounded computational re-
sources can factor and decrypt a message, so long as resource-bounded agents
cannot decrypt the message. It would be interesting to define secrecy with respect
to resource-bounded agents by requiring only that agents do not algorithmically
know various facts.
3.2 Secrecy in probabilistic systems
The definitions of secrecy that we have considered up to now are possibilistic; they
consider only whether or not an event is possible. They thus cannot capture what
seem like rather serious leakages of information. As a motivating example, consider
a system R with two agents Alice and Bob, who we think of as sitting at separate
computer terminals. Suppose that L is a language with n words. At time 1, Bob
inputs a string x ∈ L chosen uniformly at random. At time 2, with probability
1− , the system outputs x directly to Alice’s terminal. However, with probability
, the system is struck by a cosmic ray as Bob’s input is transmitted to Alice,
and in this case the system outputs a random string from L. (Bob receives no
information about what Alice sees.) Thus, there are n(n+ 1) possible runs in this
system: n runs where no cosmic ray hits, and n2 runs where the cosmic ray hits.
Moreover, it is immediate that Bob maintains (possibilistic) synchronous secrecy
with respect to Alice even though, with very high probability, Alice sees exactly
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what Bob’s input was.
Although this example may seem contrived, it is easy to implement in a pro-
gramming language that includes operators for randomization. For example, sup-
pose that we extend the input/output language from the last section to include an
infix operator p8, where the command c0 p8 c1 executes c0 with probability p and
c1 with probability 1− p, and an operator rand that returns one of the n words in
the language L with uniform probability. The following program implements the
cosmic-ray system:
input w from B;
{output rand() to A 8 output w to A}
To reason about the unwanted information flow in this example, we need to add
probability to the framework. We can do that by putting an obvious probability
measure on the runs in R:
• for each x ∈ L, the run where Bob inputs x and no cosmic ray hits (so that
Alice sees x) gets probability (1− )/n.
• for each pair (x, y) ∈ L × L, the run where the cosmic ray hits, Bob inputs
x, and Alice sees y gets probability /n2.
If Alice sees x, her posterior probability that Bob’s input was x is
PrAlice(Bob typed x |Alice sees x) =
+ n− n
n
= 1−
n− 1
n
.
If Alice sees x, her posterior probability that Bob’s input was y 6= x is
PrAlice(Bob typed x |Alice sees y) =

n
.
Thus, if  > 0, even though Alice never learns with certainty that Bob’s input was
x, her probability that it was x rises from 1/n to almost 1 as soon as she sees an x.
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In this section we introduce definitions of probabilistic secrecy. The definitions
and the technical results we obtain closely resemble the definitions and results of
the previous two sections. This is no coincidence. As we show in Section 3.3,
probabilistic and possibilistic secrecy are instances of a definition of plausibilistic
secrecy for which similar results can be proved in more generality.
3.2.1 Defining probabilistic secrecy
To reason about probabilistic secrecy we employ the probabilistic systems defined
in Section 2.2. We can give definitions of secrecy both for probability systems (with
probabilities on points) and for run-based probability systems (with probabilities
on runs).
Given a probability system, we can give relatively straightforward definitions of
probabilistic total secrecy and synchronous secrecy. Rather than requiring that an
agent i think that all states of another j are possible, we require that all of those
states be measurable and equally likely according to i’s subjective probability
measure.
Definition 8 Agent j maintains probabilistic total secrecy with respect to agent
i in (R,PR) if, for all points (r,m), (r′,m′), and (r′′,m′′) in PT (R), we have
Kj(r
′′,m′′) ∩ Ki(r,m) ∈ Fr,m,i, Kj(r
′′,m′′) ∩ Ki(r
′,m′) ∈ Fr′,m′,i, and
µr,m,i(Kj(r
′′,m′′) ∩ Ki(r,m)) = µr′,m′,i(Kj(r
′′,m′′) ∩ Ki(r
′,m′)).
Probabilistic total secrecy is a straightforward extension of total secrecy. In-
deed, if for all points (r,m) we have µr,m,i({(r,m)}) > 0, then probabilistic total
secrecy implies total secrecy (as in Definition 1).
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Proposition 5 If (R,PR) is a probability system such that µr,m,i({(r,m)}) > 0
for all points (r,m) and j maintains probabilistic total secrecy with respect to i in
(R,PR), then j also maintains total secrecy with respect to i in R.
Like total secrecy, probabilistic total secrecy is an unrealistic requirement in
practice, and cannot be achieved in synchronous systems. To make matters worse,
the sets Kj(r
′′,m′′) ∩ Ki(r,m) are typically not measurable according to what is
perhaps the most common approach for defining PR, as we show in the next
section. Thus, even in completely asynchronous systems, total secrecy is usually
impossible to achieve for measurability reasons alone. Fortunately, the obvious
probabilistic analogue of synchronous secrecy is a more reasonable condition.
Definition 9 Agent j maintains probabilistic synchronous secrecy with respect to
agent i in (R,PR) if, for all runs r, r′, r′′ and all times m, we have Kj(r
′′,m) ∩
Ki(r,m) ∈ Fr,m,i, Kj(r
′′,m) ∩ Ki(r
′,m) ∈ Fr′,m,i, and
µr,m,i(Kj(r
′′,m) ∩ Ki(r,m)) = µr′,m,i(Kj(r
′′,m) ∩ Ki(r
′,m)).
Note that if we set up the cosmic-ray system of the previous section as a probability
system in such a way that Alice’s probability on points reflects the posterior prob-
abilities we described for the system, it is immediate that Bob does not maintain
probabilistic synchronous secrecy with respect to Alice.
We now consider definitions of probabilistic secrecy for run-based probability
systems. Recall from Section 3.1.1 that run-based total secrecy requires that, for
all points (r,m) and (r′,m′), we have R(Ki(r,m)) ∩ R(Kj(r
′,m′)) 6= ∅. In other
words, run-based total secrecy is a property based on what can happen during runs,
rather than points. In a run-based probability system where all information sets
have positive measure, it is easy to see that this is equivalent to the requirement
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that µ(R(Kj(r
′,m′)) |R(Ki(r,m))) > 0. We strengthen run-based total secrecy by
requiring that these probabilities be equal, for all i-information sets.
Definition 10 Agent j maintains run-based probabilistic secrecy with respect to
i in (R,F , µ) if for any three points (r,m), (r′,m′), (r′′,m′′) ∈ PT (R),
µ(R(Kj(r
′′,m′′)) |R(Ki(r,m))) = µ(R(Kj(r
′′,m′′)) |R(Ki(r
′,m′))).
The probabilities for the cosmic-ray system were defined on sets of runs. More-
over, facts such as “Alice sees x” and “Bob typed y” correspond to information
sets, exactly as in the definition of run-based probabilistic secrecy. It is easy to
check that Bob does not maintain run-based probabilistic secrecy with respect to
Alice.
In Section 3.2.2, we consider the connection between probability measures on
points and on runs, and the corresponding connection between probabilistic se-
crecy and run-based probabilistic secrecy. For the remainder of this section, we
consider symmetry in the context of probabilistic secrecy. In Section 3.1.1, we
mentioned that our definitions of secrecy were symmetric in terms of the agents i
and j. Perhaps surprisingly, probabilistic secrecy is also a symmetric condition, at
least in most cases of interest. This follows from a deeper fact: under reasonable
assumptions, secrecy (of j with respect to i) implies the probabilistic independence
of i-information sets and j-information sets. (See Lemma 1 in the appendix for
more details.)
Consider probabilities on points: if there is no connection whatsoever between
PR(r,m, i) and PR(r,m, j) in a probability system (R,PR), there is obviously
no reason to expect secrecy to be symmetric. However, if we assume that the
probabilities of i and j at (r,m) are derived from a single common probability
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measure by conditioning, then symmetry follows. This assumption, which holds
for the probability systems we will consider here (and is standard in the economics
literature [64]), is formalized in the next definition.
Definition 11 A probability system (R,PR) satisfies the common prior assump-
tion if there exists a probability space (PT (R),Fcp , µcp) such that for all agents i
and points (r,m) ∈ PT (R), we have Ki(r,m) ∈ FW , µcp(Ki(r,m)) > 0, and
PRi(r,m) = (Ki(r,m), {U ∩Ki(r,m) |U ∈ FW}, µcp | Ki(r,m)).
2
In probability systems that satisfy the common prior assumption, probabilistic
secrecy is symmetric.
Proposition 6 If (R,PR) is a probability system (resp., synchronous probability
system) that satisfies the common prior assumption with prior probability µcp, the
following are equivalent:
(a) Agent j maintains probabilistic total (resp., synchronous) secrecy with respect
to i.
(b) Agent i maintains probabilistic total (resp., synchronous) secrecy with respect
to j.
(c) For all points (r,m) and (r′,m′),
µcp(Kj(r
′,m′) | Ki(r,m)) = µcp(Kj(r
′,m′))
(resp., for all points (r,m) and (r′,m),
µcp(Kj(r
′,m) | Ki(r,m)) = µcp(Kj(r
′,m) | PT (m)),
2Actually, it is more standard in the economics literature not to require that
µcp(Ki(r,m)) > 0. No requirements are placed on µr,m,i if µcp(Ki(r,m)) = 0. See
[35] for a discussion of this issue.
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where PT (m) is the set of points occurring at time m; that is, the events
Ki(r,m) and Kj(r
′,m) are conditionally independent with respect to µcp,
given that the time is m).
In run-based probability systems there is a single measure µ that is independent
of the agents, and we have symmetry provided that the system is synchronous or
both agents have perfect recall. (If neither condition holds, secrecy may not be
symmetric, as illustrated by Example 2 in the appendix.)
Proposition 7 If (R,F , µ) is a run-based probability system that is either syn-
chronous or one where agents i and j both have perfect recall, then the following
are equivalent:
(a) Agent j maintains run-based probabilistic secrecy with respect to i.
(b) Agent i maintains run-based probabilistic secrecy with respect to j.
(c) For all points (r,m), (r′,m′) ∈ PT (R), R(Ki(r,m)) and R(Kj(r
′,m′)) are
probabilistically independent with respect to µ.
3.2.2 Secrecy in standard probability systems
In Section 2.2 we defined standard probability systems to be those that are de-
termined by run-based probability systems using the approach of Halpern and
Tuttle [44]. Note that synchronous standard probability systems satisfy the com-
mon prior assumption, as defined in the previous section. If we assume that all
runs are measurable, then we can simply take µcp(r,m) = µ(r)/2
m+1. This ensures
that the time m points have the same relative probability as the runs, which is
exactly what is needed. More generally, if PT (m) is the set of time m points and S
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is a measurable subset of R, we take µcp(PT (m)(S)) = µ(S)/2
m+1. It follows from
Proposition 6 that probabilistic synchronous secrecy is symmetric in synchronous
standard systems.
In synchronous standard systems with perfect recall, probabilistic secrecy and
run-based probabilistic secrecy coincide. (We remark that Example 1 shows that
the requirement of perfect recall is necessary.) This provides further evidence that
our notion of synchronous secrecy is appropriate in synchronous systems.
Proposition 8 If (R,PR) is the standard system determined by the synchronous
run-based probability system (R,F , µ), and agents i and j have perfect recall in R,
then agent j maintains run-based probabilistic secrecy with respect to i in (R,F , µ)
iff j maintains probabilistic synchronous secrecy with respect to i in (R,PR).
3.2.3 Characterizing probabilistic secrecy
We now demonstrate that we can characterize probabilistic secrecy syntactically,
as in the nonprobabilistic case, using the definition of an interpreted probability
system given in Section 2.2.
The first result shows that we can characterize probabilistic total and syn-
chronous secrecy.
Theorem 3 (a) If (R,PR) is a probabilistic system, then agent j maintains
probabilistic total secrecy with respect to agent i iff, for every interpretation
pi and formula φ that is j-local in I = (R,PR, pi), there exists a constant σ
such that I |= Pri(φ) = σ.
(b) If (R,PR) is a synchronous probabilistic system, then agent j maintains
probabilistic synchronous secrecy with respect to agent i iff, for every inter-
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pretation pi, time m, and formula φ that is j-local in I = (R,PR, pi), there
exists a constant σm such that (I, r,m) |= Pri(φ) = σm for all runs r ∈ R.
We can also characterize run-based secrecy in standard systems using the ♦
operator. For this characterization, we need the additional assumption of perfect
recall.
Theorem 4 If (R,PR) is a standard probability system where agent j has perfect
recall, then agent j maintains run-based probabilistic secrecy with respect to agent i
iff, for every interpretation pi and every formula φ that is j-local in I = (R,PR, pi),
there exists a constant σ such that I |= Pri(♦φ) = σ.
Example 3 demonstrates that the assumption of perfect recall is necessary in The-
orem 4 and that synchrony alone does not suffice.
3.2.4 Secrecy in adversarial systems
It is easy to capture our motivating cosmic-ray system example using a synchronous
standard system because we assumed a probability on the set of runs. Furthermore,
it is not hard to show that Bob does not maintain synchronous secrecy with respect
to Alice in this system. However, there is an important and arguably inappropriate
assumption that was made when we modeled the cosmic-ray system, namely, that
we were given the probability with which Bob inputs various strings. While we took
that probability to be uniform, it was not necessary to do so: any other probability
distribution would have served to make our point. The critical assumption was that
there is some well-defined distribution that is known to the modeler. However, in
many cases the probability distribution is not known. In the cosmic-ray example,
if we think of the strings as words in natural language, it may not be reasonable to
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view all strings as equally likely. Moreover, the probability of a string may depend
on the speaker: it is unlikely that a teenager would have the same distribution
as an adult, or that people having a technical discussion would have the same
distribution as people discussing a movie.
There are many settings in which it makes sense to reason about the nonde-
terminism of a system in terms of an initial nondeterministic step followed by a
sequence of deterministic or probabilistic steps. The nondeterministic step could
determine the choice of speaker, the adversary’s protocol, or the input to a proba-
bilistic protocol. Indeed, it has been argued [70, 90] that any setting where there is
a mix of nondeterministic, probabilistic, and deterministic moves can be reduced
to one where there is an initial nondeterministic move followed by probabilistic or
deterministic moves. In such a setting, we do not have one probability distribution
over the runs in a system. Rather, we can partition the set of runs according to
the nondeterministic initial step, and then use a separate probability distribution
for the set of runs corresponding to each initial step. For example, consider a set-
ting with a single agent and an adversary. Suppose that the agent uses a protocol
p and the adversary uses one of a set {q1, . . . , qn} of protocols. The system R
consists of all the runs generated by running (p, qk) for k = 1, . . . , n. R can then
be partitioned into n subsets D1, . . . , Dn, where Dj consists the runs of the joint
protocol (p, qj). While we may not want to assume a probability on how likely the
adversary is to use qj, typically there is a natural probability distribution on each
set Dj. Note that we can capture uncertainty about a speaker’s distribution over
natural language strings in the same way; each protocol corresponds to a different
speaker’s “string-production algorithm.”
Situations where there is a nondeterministic choice followed by a sequence of
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probabilistic or deterministic choices can be characterized by an adversarial prob-
ability system, which is a tuple (R,D,∆), where R is a system, D is a count-
able partition of R, and ∆ , {(D,FD, µD) : D ∈ D} is a set of probability
spaces, where µD is a probability measure on the σ-algebra FD (on D ∈ D) such
that, for all agents i, points (r,m), and cells D, R(Ki(r,m)) ∩ D ∈ FD and, if
R(Ki(r,m)) ∩D 6= ∅, then µD(R(Ki(r,m))) > 0.
3
There are several ways of viewing the cosmic-ray example as an adversarial
probability system. If we view the input as a nondeterministic choice, then we can
take D(x) to consist of all runs where the input is x, and let D , {D(x) : x ∈ L}.
The measure µx on D(x) is obvious: the one run in D(x) where the cosmic ray
does not strike gets probability 1 − ; the remaining n runs each get probability
/n. Note that we can assign a probability on D(x) without assuming anything
about Bob’s input distribution. Alternatively, we can assume there are k “types”
of agents (child, teenager, adult, etc.), each with their own distribution over inputs.
Then the initial nondeterministic choice is the type of agent. Thus, the set of runs
is partitioned into sets Dj, j = 1, . . . , k. We assume that agents of type j generate
inputs according to probability Prj. In each set Dj, there is one run where Bob
inputs x and the cosmic ray does not strike; it has probability Prj(x)(1−). There
are n runs where Bob inputs x and the cosmic ray strikes; each gets probability
Prj(x)/n.
For another example of a system where initial nondeterministic choices play an
important role, consider the following program, an insecure one-time pad imple-
3We actually should have written µD(R(Ki(r,m)) ∩ D) rather than
µD(R(Ki(r,m))) here, since R(Ki(r,m)) is not necessarily in FD (and is certainly
not in FD if R(Ki(r,m)) is not a subset of D). For brevity we shall continue to
abuse notation and write µD(U) as shorthand for µD(U ∩D).
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mentation first described by Wittbold and Johnson [93]:
P1 : while (true) do
x := 0 0.58 x := 1;
output x to H;
input y from H;
output x⊕ y to L
(We assume that H can input only 0 and 1 and that ⊕ is the exclusive-or operator.)
Note that, in every iteration of this loop, H can transmit a bit b to L by choosing
x ⊕ b as his input value. More generally, given a bit string z = z1 . . . zk, H can
transmit z to L by giving xi ⊕ zi as input at the ith iteration (where xi is H’s
output value). Thus, even though H’s input values are kept completely secret from
L—they are encrypted with a one-time pad that L cannot see—H can transmit
arbitrary messages to L. Clearly there is a sense in which Program P1 is completely
insecure.
To model the system generated by P1 in a way that demonstrates the lack of
secrecy, we need somehow to reason about the “intention” of H. One way to do so
is to assume that a string z is encoded in H’s initial local state and that H follows
the protocol suggested above, choosing the input value xi ⊕ zi. If fstring is an H-
information function that extracts the string from H’s local state, then requiring
H to maintain some form of fstring -secrecy with respect to L would disallow the
information leak in the program above.
Although it may seem strange to be concerned about preserving the secrecy
of an agent who is actively attempting to transmit secret information, this turns
out to be a reasonable way to capture threats such as “rogue agents” or Trojan-
horse programs whose goal is to leak confidential information to public users. Such
a threat model has been the motivation for many definitions of noninterference.
Intuitively, an agent j can interfere with another agent i if i’s state might depend
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on what j does. Though some papers have suggested otherwise [56], we claim that
nondeducibility-based definitions of secrecy provide a sensible way to reason about
noninterference. If i’s state depends on what j does, a reasonable model of j’s
local state should include information about the actions she can take that affect i.
When this is the case, i’s local state is correlated with j’s local state if j interferes
with i, so j preserves secrecy with respect to i only if j does not interfere with i.
We can identify an adversarial probability system with a set of run-based prob-
ability systems, by viewing the measures in ∆ as constraints on a single measure
on R. Let FD , σ(
⋃
D∈D FD), the σ-algebra generated by the measurable sets
of the probability spaces of ∆. (It is straightforward to check that U ∈ FD iff
U =
⋃
D∈D UD, where UD ∈ FD.) Let M(∆) consist of all measures µ on F
such that (1) for all D ∈ D, if µ(D) > 0 then µ |D = µD (i.e., µ conditioned
on D is µD) and (2) for all agents i and points (r,m), there exists some cell D
such that R(Ki(r,m)) ∩D 6= ∅ and µ(D) > 0. It follows from these requirements
and our assumption that if R(Ki(r,m)) ∩ D 6= ∅ then µD(R(Ki(r,m) ∩ D) > 0
that µ(R(Ki(r,m)) > 0 for all agents i and points (r,m). We can thus associate
(R,D,∆) with the set of run-based probability systems (R,FD, µ), for µ ∈M(∆).
Rather than defining secrecy in adversarial systems directly, we give a slightly
more general definition. Define a generalized run-based probability system to be
a tuple (R,F ,M), where M is a set of probability measures on the σ-algebra
F . Similarly, define a generalized probability system to be a tuple (R,PR), where
PR is a set of probability assignments. We can define secrecy in generalized (run-
based) probability systems by considering secrecy with respect to each probability
measure/probability assignment.
Definition 12 Agent j maintains probabilistic total (resp. synchronous) secrecy
47
with respect to agent i in the generalized probabilistic system (R,PR) if, for all
PR ∈ PR, j maintains probabilistic total (resp. synchronous) secrecy with respect
to i in (R,PR). Agent j maintains run-based secrecy with respect to agent i
in the generalized probabilistic run-based system (R,F ,M) if, for all µ ∈ M, j
maintains run-based probabilistic secrecy with respect to i in (R,F , µ).
It is now straightforward to define secrecy in an adversarial systems by reducing
it to a generalized probabilistic system. Agent j maintains run-based probabilis-
tic secrecy with respect to i in (R,D,∆) if j maintains run-based probabilistic
secrecy with respect to i in (R,FD,M(∆)). Similarly, agent j maintains total
(resp. synchronous) secrecy with respect to i in (R,D,∆) if j maintains total
(resp. synchronous) secrecy with respect to i in (R,PR), where PR consists of
all the probability assignments determined by the run-based probability systems
(R,FD, µ) for µ ∈ M(∆). A straightforward analogue of Proposition 7 holds for
adversarial systems; again, secrecy is symmetric in the presence of assumptions
such as perfect recall or synchrony.
3.2.5 Secrecy and evidence
Secrecy in adversarial probability systems turns out to be closely related to the
notion of evidence in hypothesis testing (see [50] for a good overview of the litera-
ture). Consider this simple example: someone gives you a coin, which may be fair
or may be double-headed. You have no idea what the probability is that the coin
is fair, and it may be exceedingly unlikely that the coin is double-headed. But
suppose you then observe that the coin lands heads on each of 1,000 consecutive
tosses. Clearly this observation provides strong evidence in favor of the coin being
double-headed.
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In this example there are two hypotheses: that the coin is fair and that it is
double-headed. Each hypothesis places a probability on the space of observations.
In particular, the probability of seeing 1000 heads if the coin is fair is 1/21000, and
the probability of seeing 1000 heads if the coin is double-headed is 1. While we can
talk of an observation being more or less likely with respect to each hypothesis,
making an observation does not tell us how likely an hypothesis is. No matter how
many heads we see, we do not know the probability that the coin is double-headed
unless we have the prior probability of the coin being double headed. In fact, a
straightforward computation using Bayes’ Rule shows that if the prior probability
of the coin being double-headed is α, then the probability of the coin being double-
headed after seeing 1000 heads is α
α+((1−α)/21000
.
In an adversarial probability system (R,D,∆), the initial nondeterministic
choice plays the role of an hypothesis. For each D ∈ D, µD can be thought of as
placing a probability on observations, given that choice D is made. These observa-
tions then give evidence about the choice made. Agent i does not obtain evidence
about which choice was made if the probability of any sequence of observations is
the same for all choices.
Definition 13 Agent i obtains no evidence for the initial choice in the adversarial
probability system (R,D,∆) if, for all D,D′ ∈ D and all points (r,m) such that
R(Ki(r,m)) ∩D 6= ∅ and R(Ki(r,m)) ∩D
′ 6= ∅, we have
µD(R(Ki(r,m))) = µD′(R(Ki(r,m))).
Roughly speaking, i obtains no evidence for initial choices if the initial choices
(other than i’s own choice) are all secret. The restriction to cells such that
R(Ki(r,m)) ∩ D 6= ∅ and R(Ki(r,m)) ∩ D
′ 6= ∅ ensures that D and D′ are both
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compatible with i’s initial choice.
To relate this notion to secrecy, we consider adversarial probability systems
with a little more structure. Suppose that for each agent i = 1, . . . , n, there is a
set INIT i of possible initial choices. (For example, INIT i could consist of a set of
possible protocols or a set of possible initial inputs.) Let INIT = INIT 1 × · · · ×
INIT n consist of all tuples of initial choices. For yi ∈ INIT i, let Dyi consist of
all runs in R where agent i’s initial choice is yi; if y = (y1, . . . , yn) ∈ INIT , then
Dy = ∩
n
i=1Dyi consists of all runs where the initial choices are characterized by
y. Let D = {Dy : y ∈ INIT}. To model the fact that i is aware of his initial
choice, we require that for all points (r,m) and agents i, there exists y such that
R(Ki(r,m)) ⊆ Dy. If D has this form and each agent i is aware of his initial choice,
we call (R,D,∆) the adversarial system determined by INIT .
If i obtains no evidence for the initial choice, she cannot learn anything about
the initial choices of other agents. To make this precise in our framework, let
MINITi (∆) consist of the measures µ ∈ M(∆) such that for all cells D(y1,...,yn), we
have µ(D(y1,...,yn)) = µ(Dyi) ·µ(∩j 6=iDyj), that is, such that the initial choices made
by agent i are independent of the choices made by other agents. Intuitively, if the
choices of i and the other agents are correlated, i learns something about the other
agents’ choices simply by making his own choice. We want to rule out such situ-
ations. Note that because all the information sets have positive probability (with
respect to all µ ∈ M(∆)) and, for all i, there exists an information set Ki(r,m)
such that Dyi ⊇ R(Ki(r,m)), the sets Dyi must also have positive probability. It
follows that INIT and D must be countable.
Given i, let i− denote the “group agent” consisting of all agents other than i.
(In particular, if the system consists of only two agents, then i− is the agent other
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than i.) The local state of i− is just the tuple of local states of all the agents other
than i. Let fi− be the i
−-information function that maps a global state to the
tuple of (i−)’s initial choice. As we observed in Section 3.1.1, our definitions apply
without change to new agents that we “create” by identifying them with functions
on global states. In particular, our definitions apply to i−.
Theorem 5 Let (R,D,∆) be the adversarial probability system determined by
INIT and suppose that R is either synchronous or a system where i has per-
fect recall. Agent i obtains no evidence for the initial choice in (R,D,∆) iff agent
i− maintains generalized run-based probabilistic fi−-secrecy with respect to i in
(R,MINITi (∆)).
The assumption of either synchrony or perfect recall is necessary because the
proof relies on the symmetry of run-based secrecy (as established by Proposition 7).
We do not need to assume perfect recall for agent i− because the theorem deals
with fi−-secrecy and, on every run, fi− is constant. It therefore follows that the
“agent” associated with fi− (in the sense described in Section 3.1.1) has perfect
recall even if i− does not.
Thinking in terms of evidence is often simpler than thinking in terms of run-
based probabilistic secrecy. Moreover, the evidence-based definition of secrecy
is well-defined even when the set INIT of initial choices is uncountable. The
connection between evidence and secrecy is particularly relevant when it comes to
relating our work to that of Gray and Syverson [32]; see Section 5.1.2.
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3.3 Plausibilistic secrecy
So far, we have given definitions of secrecy for nonprobabilistic systems, for prob-
ability systems (where uncertainty is represented by a single probability measure),
and for generalized probability systems (where uncertainty is represented by a set
of probability measures). All of these definitions turn out to be special cases of
secrecy with respect to a general representation of uncertainty called a plausibility
measure [26, 27]. By giving a general definition, we can focus on the essential fea-
tures of all the definitions, as well as point the way to defining notions of secrecy
with respect to other representations of uncertainty that may be useful in practice.
The definitions of plausibility measures and plausibility spaces presented here
are adapted from previous work [26, 27, 34, 36]. Our primary contributions are
definitions of plausibilistic secrecy, as well as generalizations of several of the results
described in earlier sections of this chapter.
Recall that a probability space is a tuple (W,F , µ), where W is a set of worlds,
F is an algebra of measurable subsets of W , and µ maps sets in F to elements
of [0, 1] such that the axioms of probability are satisfied. A plausibility space is
a direct generalization of a probability space. We simply replace the probability
measure µ with a plausibility measure Pl, which maps from sets in F to elements of
an arbitrary partially ordered set. If Pl(A) ≤ Pl(B), then B is at least as plausible
as A. Formally, a plausibility space is a tuple (W,F ,D,Pl), where D is a domain
of plausibility values partially ordered by a relation ≤D, and where Pl maps from
sets in F to elements of D in such a way that if U ⊆ V , then Pl(U) ≤D Pl(V ).
We assume that D contains elements top and bottom, denoted >D and ⊥D, such
that Pl(W ) = >D and Pl(∅) = ⊥D.
As shown in [26, 36], all standard representations of uncertainty can be viewed
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as instances of plausibility measures. We consider a few examples here that will
be relevant to our discussion:
• It is straightforward to see that a probability measure µ on a space W is also
a plausibility measure by taking D = [0, 1], Pl = µ, and ≤D=≤.
• We can capture the notion of “possibility” using the trivial plausibility mea-
sure Pltriv that assigns the empty set plausibility 0 and all other sets plau-
sibility 1. That is, D = {0, 1}, ≤D=≤, Pltriv(∅) = 0, and Pltriv(U) = 1 if
U 6= ∅. (Intuitively, an event is possible if there is some world in which it
occurs.)
• A set M of probability measures on a space W can be viewed as a sin-
gle plausibility measure. In the special case where M is a finite set, say
M = {µ1, . . . , µn}, we can take DM to consist of n-tuples in [0, 1]
n, with
the pointwise ordering, and define PlM(U) , (µ1(U), . . . , µn(U)). Clearly
PlM(∅) = (0, . . . , 0) and PlM(W ) = (1, . . . , 1), so ⊥DM = (0, . . . , 0) and
>DM = (1, . . . , 1). If M is infinite, we consider a generalization of this ap-
proach. Let DM consist of all functions from M to [0, 1]. The pointwise
order on functions gives a partial order on DM; thus, ⊥DM is the constant
function 0, and >DM is the constant function 1. Define the plausibility mea-
sure PlM by taking PlM(U) to be the function fU such that fU(µ) = µ(U),
for all µ ∈M.
We can define secrecy using plausibility measures by direct analogy with the
probabilistic case. Given a system R, define a plausibility assignment PL on R
to be a function that assigns to each agent i and point (r,m) a plausibility space
(Wr,m,i,Fr,m,i,Plr,m,i); define a plausiblity system to be a pair (R,PL), where PL
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is a plausibility assignment on R. We obtain definitions of total plausibilistic
secrecy and synchronous plausibilistic secrecy by simply replacing “probability”
by “plausibility” in Definitions 8 and 9.
Given a plausibility measure Pl on a system R, we would like to define run-
based plausibilistic secrecy and repeat the Halpern-Tuttle construction to generate
standard plausibilistic systems. To do this, we need a notion of conditional plau-
sibility. To motivate the definitions to come, we start by describing conditional
probability spaces. The essential idea behind conditional probability spaces, which
go back to Popper [69] and de Finetti [12], is to treat conditional probability, rather
than unconditional probability, as the primitive notion. A conditional probability
measure µ takes two arguments V and U ; µ(V, U) is generally written µ(V |U).
Formally, a conditional probability space is a tuple (W,F ,F ′, µ) such that F is a
σ-algebra over W , F ′ is a nonempty subset of F that is closed under supersets
in F (so that if U ∈ F ′, U ⊆ V , and V ∈ F , then V ∈ F ′), the domain of µ is
F × F ′, and the following conditions are satisfied:
• µ(U |U) = 1 if U ∈ F ′.
• if U ∈ F ′ and V1, V2, V3, . . . are pairwise disjoint elements of F , then
µ(∪∞i=1Vi |U) =
∞∑
i=1
µ(Vi |U);
• µ(U1 ∩ U2 |U3) = µ(U1 |U2 ∩ U3) · µ(U2 |U3) if U1 ∈ F and U2 ∩ U3 ∈ F
′.
The first two requirements guarantee that, for each fixed U ∈ F ′, µ(· |U) is an
unconditional probability measure. The last requirement guarantees that the var-
ious conditional probability measures “fit together.” As is standard, we identify
unconditional probability with conditioning on the whole space, and write Pr(U)
as an abbreviation for Pr(U |W ).
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Given an unconditional probability space (W,F , µ), we immediately obtain a
conditional probability space by taking F ′ to consist of all sets U such that µ(U) 6=
0 and defining conditional probability in the standard way. However, starting with
conditional probability is more general in the sense that it is possible to extend
an unconditional probability space to a conditional probability space where F ′
contains sets U such that µ(U) = 0. In other words, there exist conditional
probability spaces (W,F ,F ′, µ) such that µ(U |W ) = 0 for some U ∈ F ′. This
generality is useful for reasoning about secrecy, because (as we shall see) it is
sometimes useful to be able to condition on sets that have a probability of 0.
To generalize conditional probability to the plausibilistic setting, we need to
define operators ⊕ and ⊗ that act as analogues of + and × for probability; these
operators add useful algebraic structure to the plausibility spaces we consider. We
extend the notion of an algebraic plausibility spaces [26, 34, 36] to allow an analogue
of countable additivity. We briefly sketch the relevant details here.
A countably-additive algebraic conditional plausibility space (cacps) is a tuple
(W,F ,F ′,Pl) such that
• F is a σ-algebra of subsets of W ;
• F ′ is a nonempty subset of F that is closed under supersets in F ;
• there is a partially-ordered domain D such that, for each V ∈ F ′, Pl(· |V ) is
a plausibility measure on (W,F) with range D (so, intuitively, the events in
F ′ are the ones for which conditioning is defined); and
• there are functions ⊕ : D∞ → D and ⊗ : D×D → D such that:
– if U ∈ F ′, V1, V2, . . ., are pairwise disjoint elements of F , and J is some
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subset of {1, 2, 3, . . .} such that Pl(Vi) = ⊥ exactly when i ∈ J , then
Pl(∪∞i=1(Vi |U)) = ⊕i/∈JPl(Vi |U).
– if U1, U2, U3 ∈ F and U2 ∩ U3 ∈ F
′, then
Pl(U1 ∩ U2 |U3) = Pl(U1 |U2 ∩ U3)⊗ Pl(U2 |U3).
– ⊗ distributes over ⊕, more precisely, a⊗ (⊕∞i=1bi) = ⊕
∞
i=1(a⊗ bi) if
∗ (a, bi), (a,⊕
∞
i=1bi) ∈ Dom(⊗) and
∗ (b1, b2, . . .), (a⊗ b1, a⊗ b2, . . .) ∈ Dom(⊕),
where
Dom(⊕) = {(Pl(V1 |U),Pl(V2 |U), . . .) :
V1, V2, . . . ∈ F are pairwise disjoint and U ∈ F
′},
and
Dom(⊗) = {(Pl(U1 |U2 ∩ U3),Pl(U2 |U3)) :
U2 ∩ U3 ∈ F
′, U1, U2, U3 ∈ F}.
(The reason that this property is required only for tuples in Dom(⊕)
and Dom(⊗) is discussed shortly.)
– if (a, c), (b, c) ∈ Dom(⊗), a⊗ c ≤ b⊗ c, and c 6= ⊥, then a ≤ b.
To understand the reason for the restriction to Dom(⊕) and Dom(⊗), consider
probability. In that case, D is [0, 1], and we take ⊕∞i=1bi to be max(
∑∞
i=1 b1, 1). It
is not too hard to show that the distributive property does not hold in general if
∑∞
i=1 bi > 1 (consider, for example a = 1/2, b1 = b2 = 2/3, and bi = 0 for i ≥ 3);
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however, it does hold if
∑∞
i=1 bi ≤ 1, a property that is guaranteed to hold if there
exist sets V1, V2, . . . that are pairwise disjoint and a set U such that bi = µ(Vi |U)
for some probability measure µ.
It can be shown (see [34, 36]) that the constraints on cacps’s imply that ⊥ acts
as an identity element for ⊕ and that > acts as an identity element for ⊗, just
as 0 and 1 do for addition and multiplication, as long as we restrict to tuples in
Dom(⊕) and Dom(⊗), respectively, which is all we care about in our proofs. The
constraints also imply that Pl(U |U) = > for U ∈ F .
All the plausibility measures we considered earlier can be viewed as examples
of cacps’s. First, the trivial plausibility measure Pltriv is a cacps if we take ⊕ to
be max and ⊗ to be min. A conditional probability space (as just defined) is a
cacps simply by defining ⊕ as above, so that ⊕∞i=1bi = max(
∑∞
i=1 bi, 1), and taking
⊗ to be multiplication. If we have a set M of probability measures on a space W ,
we can construct a conditional plausibility measure PlM in essentially the same
way that we constructed an unconditional plausibility measure from the set M,
so that PlM(V |U) is the function fV |U from measures in M to [0, 1] such that
fV |U(µ) = µ(V |U) if µ(U) 6= 0, and fV |U (µ) = ∗ (i.e., undefined) if µ(U) = 0. To
get a cacps, we simply define ⊕ and ⊗ pointwise (so that, for example, f ⊕ g is
that function such that (f ⊕g)(µ) = f(µ)⊕g(µ)). There are subtleties involved in
defining the set F ′ on which conditioning is defined—in particular, care is required
when dealing with sets U such that µ(U) > 0 for some, but not all, of the measures
in M. These issues do not affect the results of this paper because we assume that
the information sets on which we condition have positive probability, so we ignore
them here. See Halpern [36] for more details.
Define a run-based plausibility system to be a cacps (R,F ,F ′,Pl). Instead of
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requiring that µ(R(Ki(r,m))) > 0 as in the probabilistic case, we now require that
R(Ki(r,m)) ∈ F
′ for all agents i and points (r,m). This requirement guarantees
that conditioning on R(Ki(r,m)) is defined, but is easier to work with than the
requirement that µ(R(Ki(r,m))) > 0. We can now repeat the Halpern-Tuttle
construction to generate standard plausibilistic systems. With this construction,
we can explain how the results of Sections 3.2.1, 3.2.2, and 3.2.3 carry over to the
more general plausibilistic setting. As a rule of thumb, the results extend to the
plausibilistic setting by replacing + and × consistently in the proofs by ⊕ and ⊗,
but some care is required. We summarize the details here without stating them as
formal results; a technical discussion appears in the appendix.
• Proposition 8 generalizes to run-based plausibility systems.
• Theorems 3 and 4 carry over to the plausibilistic setting (with essentially
the same proofs) once we define a language for reasoning about plausibility
analogous to the language for reasoning about probability, with formulas of
the form Pli(φ) = α.
• Proposition 6 generalizes, given a common prior Plcp , provided that ⊗ is
commutative. Total secrecy requires that for all points (r,m),
Plcp(Ki(r,m) | PT (R)) 6= ⊥ and Plcp(Kj(r,m) | PT (R)) 6= ⊥;
similarly, synchronous secrecy requires that for all points,
Plcp(Ki(r,m) | PT (m)) 6= ⊥ and Plcp(Kj(r,m) | PT (m)) 6= ⊥.
• Proposition 7 generalizes provided that ⊗ is commutative and that for all
points (r,m) we have Pl(R(Ki(r,m)) |R) 6= ⊥ and Pl(R(Kj(r,m)) |R) 6= ⊥.
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• Theorem 5 can be extended using an appropriate definition of adversarial
plausibility systems.
These results demonstrate the essential unity of our definitions and theorems in
the probabilistic and nonprobabilistic cases, and suggest further generalizations.
In particular, it may be worthwhile to consider definitions of secrecy based on
representations of uncertainty that are more qualitative than probability is. Such
measures might be useful for mitigating the difficulties associated with quantifying
probability measures and deciding how nondeterministic choices are resolved.
Chapter 4
Defining Anonymity
4.1 Defining anonymity using knowledge
4.1.1 Revisiting secrecy
In Chapter 3, we looked at requirements of total secrecy in multiagent systems.
Total secrecy basically requires that in a system with “classified” and “unclassi-
fied” users, the unclassified users should never be able to infer the actions or the
local states of the unclassified users. For secrecy, the “what needs to be hidden”
component of the requirement is extremely restrictive: total secrecy requires that
absolutely everything that a classified user does must be hidden. The “how well
does it need to be hidden” component depends on the situation. Our definition of
secrecy says that for any nontrivial fact φ (that is, one that is not already valid)
that depends only the state of the classified or high-level agent, the formula ¬Kjφ
must be valid. Semantically, this means that whatever the high-level user does,
there exists some run where the low user’s view of the system is the same, but the
high-level user did something different. Our nonprobabilistic definitions are fairly
strong (simply because secrecy requires that so much be hidden). The probabilistic
definitions we gave require even more: not only can the agent not learn any new
classified fact, but he also cannot learn anything about the probability of any such
fact. (In other words, if an agent initially assigns a classified fact φ a probability
α of being true, he always assigns φ that probability.) It would be perfectly nat-
ural, and possibly quite interesting, to consider definitions of secrecy that do not
require so much to be hidden (e.g., by allowing some classified information to be
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declassified [95]), or to discuss definitions that do not require such strong secrecy
(e.g., by giving definitions that were stronger than the nonprobabilistic definitions
we gave, but not quite so strong as the probabilistic definitions).
4.1.2 Defining anonymity
The basic intuition behind anonymity is that actions should be divorced from
the agents who perform them, for some set of observers. Put another way, the
information that needs to be hidden is the identity of the agent (or set of agents)
who perform a particular action. Who the information needs to be hidden from,
that is, which observers, depends on the situation. The most interesting aspect of
the definitions of anonymity that we present here will often have to do with how
well an agent’s identity must be protected.
Throughout this chapter, and when we consider related definitions of anonymity
in the following chapter, we use the formula θ(i, a) to represent “agent i has per-
formed action a, or will perform a in the future.”1 For future reference, let δ(i, a)
represent “agent i has performed action a.” Note that θ(i, a) is a fact about the
run: if it is true at some point in a run, it is true at all points in a run (since
it is true even if i performs a at some point in the future). On the other hand,
δ(i, a) may be false at the start of a run, and then become true at the point where
i performs a.
It is not our goal in this dissertation to provide a “correct” definition of
anonymity. We also want to avoid giving an encyclopedia of definitions. Rather,
1If we want to consider systems that may crash we may want to consider θ′(i, a)
instead, where θ′(i, a) represents “agent i has performed action a, or will perform a
in the future if the system does not crash.” Since issues of failure are orthogonal to
the anonymity issues that we focus on here, we consider only the simpler definition.
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we give some basic definitions of anonymity to show how our framework can be
used. We base our choice of definitions in part on definitions presented in ear-
lier papers, to make clear how our work relates to previous work, and in part on
which definitions of anonymity we expect to be useful in practice. We first give an
extremely weak definition, but one that nonetheless illustrates the basic intuition
behind any definition of anonymity.
Definition 14 Action a, performed by agent i, is minimally anonymous with re-
spect to agent j in the interpreted system I, if I |= ¬Kj[θ(i, a)].
This definition makes it clear what is being hidden (θ(i, a)—the fact that i
performs a) and from whom (j). It also describes how well the information is
hidden: it requires that j not be sure that i actually performed, or will perform,
the action. Note that this is a weak requirement. It might be the case, for example,
that agent j is certain that the action was performed either by i, or by at most
one or two other agents, thereby making i a “prime suspect.” It might also be the
case that j is able to place a very high probability on i performing the action, even
though he isn’t absolutely certain of it. (Agent j might know that there is some
slight probability that some other agent i′ performed the action, for example.)
Nonetheless, it should be the case that for any other definition of anonymity we
give, if we want to ensure that i’s performing action a is to be kept anonymous
as far as observer j is concerned, then i’s action should be at least minimally
anonymous with respect to j.
Our definition of a being minimally anonymous with respect to j is equivalent
to the apparently weaker requirement I |= θ(i, a) ⇒ ¬Kj[θ(i, a)], which says that
if action a is performed by i, then j does not not know it. Clearly if j never knows
that a is performed by i, then j will never know that a is performed by i if i
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actually does perform a. To see that the converse holds, it suffices to note that
if i does not perform a, then surely ¬Kj[θ(i, a)] holds. Thus, this definition, like
several that will follow, can be viewed as having the form “if i performed a, then
j does not know some appropriate fact.”
The definition of minimal anonymity also makes it clear how anonymity relates
to secrecy, as defined in our earlier work [39]. To explain how, we first need to
describe how we defined secrecy in terms of knowledge. Given a system I, say
that φ is nontrivial in I if I 6|= φ, and that φ depends only on the local state of
agent i in I if I |= φ ⇒ Kiφ. Intuitively, φ is nontrivial in I if φ could be false
in I, and φ depends only on i’s local state if i always knows whether or not φ is
true. (It is easy to see that φ depends only on the local state of i if (I, r,m) |= φ
and ri(m) = r
′
i(m
′) implies that (I, r′,m′) |= φ.) According to the definition in
[39], agent i maintains total secrecy with respect to another agent j in system I if
for every nontrivial fact φ that depends only on the local state of i, the formula
¬Kjφ is valid for the system. That is, i maintains total secrecy with respect to
j if j does not learn anything new about agent i’s state. In general, θ(i, a) does
not depend only on i’s local state, because whether i performs a may depend on
whether or not i gets a certain message from some other agent i′. On the other
hand, if whether or not i performs a depends only on i’s protocol, and the protocol
is encoded in i’s local state, then θ(i, a) depends only on i’s local state. If θ(i, a)
does depend only on i’s local state and j did not know all along that i was going
to perform action a (i.e., if we assume that θ(i, a) is nontrivial), then Definition 14
is clearly a special case of the definition of secrecy. In any case, it is in much the
same spirit as the definition of secrecy. Essentially, anonymity says that the fact
that agent i has or will perform action a must be hidden from j, while total secrecy
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says that all facts that depend on agent i must be hidden from j.
Note that this definition of minimal anonymity is different from the one given
in an earlier presentation of this work [40]. There, the definition given used δ(i, a)
rather than θ(i, a). We say that a performed by agent i is minimally δ-anonymous
if Definition 14 holds, with θ(i, a) replaced by δ(i, a). It is easy to see that minimal
anonymity implies minimal δ-anonymity (since δ(i, a) implies θ(i, a)), but the con-
verse is not true in general. For example, suppose that j gets a signal if i is going
to perform action a (before i actually performs the action), but then never finds
out exactly when i performs a. Then minimal anonymity does not hold. In runs
where i performs a, agent j knows that i will perform a when he gets the signal.
On the other hand, minimal δ-anonymity does hold, because j never knows when
i performs a. In this situation, minimal anonymity seems to capture our intuitions
of what anonymity should mean better than minimal δ-anonymity does.
The next definition of anonymity we give is much stronger. It requires that
if some agent i performs an action anonymously with respect to another agent j,
then j must think it possible that the action could have been performed by any of
the agents (except for j). Let Pjφ be an abbreviation for ¬Kj¬φ. The operator
Pj is the dual of Kj; intuitively, Pjφ means “agent j thinks that φ is possible.”
Definition 15 Action a, performed by agent i, is totally anonymous with respect
to j in the interpreted system I if
I |= θ(i, a) ⇒
∧
i′ 6=j
Pj[θ(i
′, a)].
Definition 15 captures the notion that an action is anonymous if, as far as the
observer in question is concerned, it could have been performed by anybody in the
system.
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Again, in the conference version of the paper, we defined total anonymity using
δ(i, a) rather than θ(i, a). (The same remark holds for all the other definitions of
anonymity that we give, although we do not always say so explicitly.) Let total
δ-anonymity be the anonymity requirement obtained when θ(i, a) is replaced by
δ(i, a). It is not hard to show that if agents have perfect recall (which intuitively
means that their local state keeps track of all the actions they have performed—
see [20] for the formal definition), then total δ-anonymity implies total anonymity.
This is not true, in general, without perfect recall, because it might be possible for
some agent to know that i will perform action a—and therefore that no other agent
will—but forget this fact by the time that i actually performs a. Similarly, total
anonymity does not imply total δ-anonymity. To see why, suppose that the agents
are numbered 1, . . . , n, and that an outside observer knows that if j performs action
a, then j will perform it at time j. Then total anonymity may hold even though
total δ-anonymity does not. For example, at time 3, although the observer may
consider it possible that agent 4 will perform the action (at time 4), he cannot
consider it possible that 4 has already performed the action, as required by total
δ-anonymity.
Chaum [5] showed that total anonymity could be obtained using DC-nets. Re-
call that in a DC-net, a group of n users use Chaum’s dining cryptographer’s
protocol (described in the same paper) to achieve anonymous communication. If
we model a DC-net as an interpreted multiagent system I whose agents consist
exclusively of agents participating in a single DC-net, then if an agent i sends
a message using the DC-net protocol, that action is totally anonymous. (Chaum
proves this, under the assumption that any message could be generated by any user
in the system.) Note that in the dining cryptographer’s example, total anonymity
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and δ-total anonymity agree, because who paid is decided before the protocol
starts.
It is easy to show that if an action is totally anonymous, then it must be
minimally anonymous as well, as long as two simple requirements are satisfied.
First, there must be at least 3 agents in the system. (A college student with only
one roommate can’t anonymously leave out her dirty dishes, but a student with
at least two roommates might be able to.) Second, it must be the case that a
can be performed only once in a given run of the system. Otherwise, it might
be possible for j to think that any agent i′ 6= i could have performed a, but for
j to know that agent i did, indeed, perform a. For example, consider a system
with three agents besides j. Agent j might know that all three of the other agents
performed action a. In that case, in particular, j knows that i performed a, so
action a performed by i is not minimally anonymous with respect to j, but is totally
anonymous. We expect that this assumption will typically be met in practice. It
is certainly consistent with examples of anonymity given in the literature. (See,
for example, [5, 79]). In any case, if it is not met, it is possible to tag occurrences
of an action (so that we can talk about the kth time a is performed). Thus, we
can talk about the ith occurrence of an action being anonymous. Because the ith
occurrence of an action can only happen once in any given run, our requirement is
satisfied.
Proposition 9 Suppose that there are at least three agents in the interpreted sys-
tem I and that
I |=
∧
i6=j
¬[θ(i, a) ∧ θ(j, a)].
If action a, performed by agent i, is totally anonymous with respect to j, then it is
minimally anonymous as well.
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Proof: Suppose that action a is totally anonymous. Because there are three agents
in the system, there is some agent i′ other than i and j, and by total anonymity,
I |= θ(i, a) ⇒ Pj[θ(i
′, a)]. If (I, r,m) |= ¬θ(i, a), clearly (I, r,m) |= ¬Kj[θ(i, a)].
Otherwise, (I, r,m) |= Pj[θ(i
′, a)] by total anonymity. Thus, there exists a point
(r′,m′) such that r′j(m
′) = rj(m) and (I, r
′,m′) |= θ(i′, a). By our assumption,
(I, r′,m′) |= ¬θ(i, a), because i 6= i′. Therefore, (I, r,m) |= ¬Kj[θ(i, a)]. It follows
that a is minimally anonymous with respect to j. ut
Definitions 14 and 15 are conceptually similar, even though the latter definition
is much stronger. Once again, there is a set of formulas that an observer is not
allowed to know. With the earlier definition, there is only one formula in this set:
θ(i, a). As long as j doesn’t know that i performed action a, this requirement
is satisfied. With total anonymity, there are more formulas that j is not allowed
to know: they take the form ¬θ(i′, a). Before, we could guarantee only that j
did not know that i did the action; here, for many agents i′, we guarantee that j
does not know that i′ did not do the action. The definition is made slightly more
complicated by the implication, which restricts the conditions under which j is not
allowed to know ¬θ(i′, a). (If i didn’t actually perform the action, we don’t care
what j thinks, since we are concerned only with anonymity with respect to i.) But
the basic idea is the same.
Note that total anonymity does not necessarily follow from total secrecy, be-
cause the formula ¬θ(i′, a), for i′ 6= i, does not, in general, depend only on the local
state of i. It is therefore perfectly consistent with the definition of total secrecy for
j to learn this fact, in violation of total anonymity. (Secrecy, of course, does not
follow from anonymity, because secrecy requires that many more facts be hidden
than simply whether i performed a given action.)
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Total anonymity is a very strong requirement. Often, an action will not be
totally anonymous, but only anonymous up to some set of agents who could have
performed the action. This situation merits a weaker definition of anonymity. To
be more precise, let I be the set of all agents of the system and suppose that we
have some set IA ⊆ I—an “anonymity set,” using the terminology of Chaum [5]
and Pfitzmann and Ko¨hntopp [68]—of agents who can perform some action. We
can define anonymity in terms of this set.
Definition 16 Action a, performed by agent i, is anonymous up to IA ⊆ I with
respect to j if
I |= θ(i, a) ⇒
∧
i′∈IA
Pj[θ(i
′, a)].
In the anonymous message-passing system Herbivore [30], users are organized
into cliques C1, . . . , Cn, each of which uses the dining cryptographers protocol [5] for
anonymous message-transmission. If a user wants to send an anonymous message,
she can do so through her clique. Herbivore claims that any user i is able to send a
message anonymously up to Cj, where i ∈ Cj. As the size of a user’s clique varies,
so does the strength of the anonymity guarantees provided by the system.
In some situations, it is not necessary that there be a fixed anonymity set, as
in Definition 16. It suffices that, at all times, there exists some anonymity set with
at least, say, k agents. This leads to a definition of k-anonymity.
Definition 17 Action a, performed by agent i, is k-anonymous with respect to j
if
I |= θ(i, a) ⇒
∨
{IA:|IA|=k}
∧
i′∈IA
Pj[θ(i
′, a)].
This definition says that at any point j must think it possible that any of at
least k agents might perform, or have performed, the action. Note that the set of
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k agents might be different in different runs, making this condition strictly weaker
than anonymity up to a particular set of size k.
A number of systems have been proposed that provide k-anonymity for some k.
In the anonymous communications network protocol recently proposed by von Ahn,
Bortz, and Hopper [1], users can send messages with guarantees of k-anonymity. In
the system P 5 (for “Peer-to-Peer Personal Privacy Protocol”) [82], users join a log-
ical broadcast tree that provides anonymous communication, and users can choose
what level of k-anonymity they want, given that k-anonymity for a higher value of
k makes communication more inefficient. Herbivore [30] provides anonymity using
cliques of DC-nets. If the system guarantees that the cliques all have a size of at
least k, so that regardless of clique composition, there are at least k users capable
of sending any anonymous message, then Herbivore guarantees k-anonymity.
4.1.3 A more detailed example: dining cryptographers
A well-known example of anonymity in the computer security literature is Chaum’s
“dining cryptographers problem” [5]. In the original description of this problem,
three cryptographers sit down to dinner and are informed by the host that someone
has already paid the bill anonymously. The cryptographers decide that the bill
was paid either by one of the three people in their group, or by an outside agency
such as the NSA. They want to find out which of these two situations is the
actual one while preserving the anonymity of the cryptographer who (might have)
paid. Chaum provides a protocol that the cryptographers can use to solve this
problem. To guarantee that it works, however, it would be nice to check that
anonymity conditions hold. Assuming we have a system that includes a set of
three cryptographer agents C = {0, 1, 2}, as well as an outside observer agent o,
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the protocol should guarantee that for each agent i ∈ C, and each agent j ∈ C−{i},
the act of paying is anonymous up to C − {j} with respect to j. For an outside
observer o, i.e., an agent other than one of three cryptographers, the protocol
should guarantee that for each agent i ∈ C, the protocol is anonymous up to C
with respect to o. This can be made precise using our definition of anonymity up
to a set.
Because the requirements are symmetric for each of the three cryptographers,
we can describe the anonymity specification compactly by naming the agents us-
ing modular arithmetic. We use ⊕ to denote addition mod 3. Let the interpreted
system (I = (R, pi) represent the possible runs of one instance of the dining cryp-
tographers protocol, where the interpretation pi interprets formulas of the form
θ(i, “paid”) in the obvious way. The following knowledge-based requirements com-
prise the anonymity portion of the protocol’s specification, for each agent i ∈ C:
I |= θ(i, “paid”) ⇒ Pi⊕1θ(i⊕ 2, “paid”) ∧ Pi⊕2θ(i⊕ 1, “paid”)
∧ Poθ(i⊕ 1, “paid”) ∧ Poθ(i⊕ 2, “paid”).
In other words, if cryptographer i paid, then both of the other cryptographers
must think it possible that the third cryptographer could have paid. In addition,
an outside observer must think it possible that any of the three cryptographers
could have paid.
4.2 Probabilistic variants of anonymity
4.2.1 Probabilistic anonymity
All of the definitions presented in Section 4.1 were nonprobabilistic. As with se-
crecy, nonprobabilistic definitions of anonymity are, in some ways, quite weak. For
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all the definitions we gave, it was necessary only that observers think it possible
that multiple agents could have performed the anonymous action. However, an
event that is possible may nonetheless be extremely unlikely. Consider our defi-
nition of total anonymity (Definition 15). It states that an action performed by
i is totally anonymous if the observer j thinks it could have been performed by
any agent other than j. This may seem like a strong requirement, but it can look
quite weak when probabilities are involved. Suppose, for example that we have 102
agents, that j can determine that i performed action a with probability 0.99, and
that j believes that each of the other agents performed action a with probability
0.0001. In this case, agent i might not be very happy with the guarantees provided
by total anonymity. Of course, the appropriate notion of anonymity will depend
on the application: i might be content to know that no agent can prove that she
performed the anonymous action. In that case, it might suffice for the action to be
only minimally anonymous. However, in many other cases, an agent might want
a more quantitative, probabilistic guarantee that it will be considered reasonably
likely that other agents could have performed the action.
We focus here on definitions of anonymity given with respect to interpreted
standard probability systems, as defined in Section 2.2. We write I = (R, µ, pi)
to denote an interpreted probability system. (The probability assignment PR is
determined by µ according to the Halpern-Tuttle construction.)
It is straightforward to define probabilistic notions of anonymity in probabilistic
systems. We can think of Definition 14, for example, as saying that j’s probability
that i performs the anonymous action a must be less than 1 (assuming that every
nonempty set has positive probability). This can be generalized by specifying some
α ≤ 1 and requiring that the probability of θ(i, a) be less than α.
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Definition 18 Action a, performed by agent i, is α-anonymous with respect to
agent j if I |= θ(i, a) ⇒ Prj[θ(i, a)] < α.
Note that if we replace θ(i, a) by δ(i, a) in Definition 18, the resulting notion
might not be well defined. The problem is that the set
{(r′,m′) ∈ Ki(r,m) : (I, r
′,m′) |= δ(i, a)}
may not be measurable; it may not have the form Ki(r,m)(S) for some S ⊆ R.
The problem does not arise if I is a synchronous system (in which case i knows
that time, and all the points in Ki(r,m) are of the form (r
′,m)), but it does arise if
I is asynchronous. We avoid this technical problem by working with θ(i, a) rather
than δ(i, a).
Definition 18, unlike Definition 14, includes an implication involving θ(i, a). It
is easy to check that Definition 14 does not change when such an implication is
added; intuitively, if θ(i, a) is false then ¬Kj[θ(i, a)] is trivially true. Definition 18,
however, would change if we removed the implication, because it might be possible
for j to have a high probability of θ(i, a) even though it isn’t true. We include the
implication because without it, we place constraints on what j thinks about θ(i, a)
even if i has not performed the action a and will not perform it in the future. Such
a requirement, while interesting, seems more akin to “unsuspectibility” than to
anonymity.
Two of the notions of probabilistic anonymity considered by Reiter and Ru-
bin [71] in the context of their Crowds system can be understood in terms of
α-anonymity. Reiter and Rubin say that a sender has probable innocence if, from
an observer’s point of view, the sender “appears no more likely to be the orig-
inator than to not be the originator.” This is simply 0.5-anonymity. (Under
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reasonable assumptions, Crowds provides 0.5-anonymity for Web requests.) Sim-
ilarly, a sender has possible innocence if, from an observer’s point of view, “there
is a nontrivial probability that the real sender is someone else.” This corresponds
to minimal anonymity (as defined in Section 4.1.2), or to -anonymity for some
nontrivial value of .
It might seem at first that Definition 18 should be the only definition of
anonymity we need: as long as j’s probability of i performing the action is low
enough, i should have nothing to worry about. However, with further thought, it
is not hard to see that this is not the case.
Consider a scenario where there are 1002 agents, and where α = 0.11. Suppose
that the probability, according to Alice, that Bob performs the action is .1, but
that her probability that any of the other 1000 agents performs the action is 0.0009
(for each agent). Alice’s probability that Bob performs the action is small, but her
probability that anyone else performs it is more than three orders of magnitude
smaller. Bob is obviously the prime suspect.
This concern was addressed by Serjantov and Danezis [80] in their paper on
information-theoretic definitions of anonymity. They consider the probability that
each agent in an anonymity set is the sender of some anonymous message, and
use entropy to quantify the amount of information that the system is leaking;
Diaz et al. [15] and Danezis [11] use similar techniques. In this dissertation we
do not consider quantitative measurements of anonymity, but we do agree that it
is worthwhile to consider stronger notions of anonymity than the nonprobabilistic
definitions, or even α-anonymity, can provide. We hope to examine quantitative
definitions in future work.
The next definition strengthens Definition 18 in the way that Definition 15
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strengthens Definition 14. It requires that no agent in the anonymity set be a
more likely suspect than any other.
Definition 19 Action a, performed by agent i, is strongly probabilistically anony-
mous up to IA with respect to agent j if for each i
′ ∈ IA,
I |= θ(i, a) ⇒ Prj[θ(i, a)] = Prj[θ(i
′, a)].
Depending on the size of IA, this definition can be extremely strong. It does not
state simply that for all agents in IA, the observer must think it is reasonably likely
that the agent could have performed the action; it also says that the observer’s
probabilities must be the same for each such agent. Of course, we could weaken
the definition somewhat by not requiring that all the probabilities be equal, but
by instead requiring that they be approximately equal (i.e., that their difference
be small or that their ratio be close to 1). Reiter and Rubin [71], for example, say
that the sender of a message is beyond suspicion if she “appears no more likely to
be the originator of that message than any other potential sender in the system.”
In our terminology, i is beyond suspicion with respect to j if for each i′ ∈ IA,
I |= θ(i, a) ⇒ Prj[θ(i, a)] ≤ Prj[θ(i
′, a)].
This is clearly weaker than strong probabilistic anonymity, but still a very strong
requirement, and perhaps more reasonable, too. Our main point is that a wide
variety of properties can be expressed clearly and succinctly in our framework.
4.2.2 Conditional anonymity
While we have shown that many useful notions of anonymity—including many
definitions that have already been proposed—can be expressed in our framework,
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we claim that there are some important intuitions that have not yet been captured.
Suppose, for example, that someone makes a $5,000,000 donation to Cornell Uni-
versity. It is clearly not the case that everyone is equally likely, or even almost
equally likely, to have made the donation. Of course, we could take the anonymity
set IA to consist of those people who might be in a position to make such a large
donation, and insist that they all be considered equally likely. Unfortunately, even
that is unreasonable: a priori, some of them may already have known connections
to Cornell, and thus be considered far more likely to have made the donation.
All that an anonymous donor can reasonably expect is that nothing an observer
learns from his interactions with the environment (e.g., reading the newspapers,
noting when the donation was made, etc.) will give him more information about
the identity of the donor than he already had.
For another example, consider a conference or research journal that provides
anonymous reviews to researchers who submit their papers for publication. It is
unlikely that the review process provides anything like α-anonymity for a small α,
or strongly probabilistic anonymity up to some reasonable set. When a prelim-
inary version of this work, for example, was accepted by the Computer Security
Foundations Workshop, the acceptance notice included three reviews that were, in
our terminology, anonymous up to the program committee. That is, any one of the
reviews we received could have been written by any of the members of the program
committee. However, by reading some of the reviews, we were able to make fairly
good guesses as to which committee members had provided which reviews, based
on our knowledge of the specializations of the various members, and based on the
content of the reviews themselves. Moreover, we had a fairly good idea of which
committee members would provide reviews of the paper even before we received
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the reviews. Thus, it seems unreasonable to hope that the review process would
provide strong probabilistic anonymity (up to the program committee), or even
some weaker variant of probabilistic anonymity. Probabilistic anonymity would
require the reviews to convert our prior beliefs, according to which some program
committee members were more likely than others to be reviewers of the paper, to
posterior beliefs according to which all program committee members were equally
likely. This does not seem at all reasonable. However, the reviewers might hope
that that the process did not give us any more information than we already had.
In the definitions of secrecy given in the previous chapter, we tried to capture
the intuition that, when an unclassified user interacts with a secure system, she
does not learn anything about any classified user that she didn’t already know.
We did this formally by requiring that, for any three points (r,m), (r ′,m′), and
(r′′,m′′),
µ(r,m,j)(Ki(r
′′,m′′)) = µ(r′,m′,j)(Ki(r
′′,m′′)). (4.1)
That is, whatever the unclassified user j sees, her probability of any particular
classified state will remain unchanged.
When defining anonymity, we are not concerned with protecting all information
about some agent i, but rather the fact that i performs some particular action a.
Given an interpreted system I = (R, pi, µ) and a formula φ, let er(φ) consist of
the set of runs r such that φ is true at some point in r, and let ep(φ) be the set of
points where φ is true. That is
er(φ) , {r : ∃m((I, r,m) |= φ)},
ep(φ) , {(r,m) : (I, r,m) |= φ}.
The most obvious analogue to (4.1) is the requirement that, for all points (r,m)
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and (r′,m′),
µ(r,m,j)(ep(θ(i, a))) = µ(r′,m′,j)(ep(θ(i, a))).
This definition says that j never learns anything about the probability that i
performs performs a: she always ascribes the same probability to this event. In the
context of our anonymous donation example, this would say that the probability
(according to j) of i donating $5,000,000 to Cornell is the same at all times.
The problem with this definition is that it does not allow j to learn that someone
donated $5,000,000 to Cornell. That is, before j learned that someone donated
$5,000,000 to Cornell, j may have thought it was unlikely that anyone would donate
that much money to Cornell. We cannot expect that j’s probability of i donating
$5,000,000 would be the same both before and after learning that someone made
a donation. We want to give a definition of conditional anonymity that allows
observers to learn that an action has been performed, but that protects—as much
as possible, given the system—the fact that some particular agent performs the
action. If, on the other hand, the anonymous action has not been performed, then
the observer’s probabilities do not matter.
Suppose that i wants to perform action a, and wants conditional anonymity
with respect to j. Let θ(, a) represent the fact that a has been performed by some
agent other than j, that is, θ(, a) , ∨i′ 6=jθ(i′, a). The definition of conditional
anonymity says that j’s prior probability of θ(i, a) given θ(, a) must be the same
as his posterior probability of θ(i, a) at points where j knows θ(, a), i.e., at points
where j knows that someone other than j has performed (or will perform) a. Let
α = µ(er(θ(i, a)) | er(θ(, a))). This is the prior probability that i has performed
a, given that somebody other than j has. Conditional anonymity says that at
any point where j knows that someone other than j performs a, j’s probability
77
of θ(i, a) must be α. In other words, j shouldn’t be able to learn anything more
about who performs a (except that somebody does) than he know before he began
interacting with the system in the first place.
Definition 20 Action a, performed by agent i, is conditionally anonymous with
respect to j in the interpreted probability system I if
I |= Kjθ(, a) ⇒ Prj(θ(i, a)) = µ(er(θ(i, a)) | er(θ(, a))).
Note that if only one agent ever performs a, then a is trivially conditionally anony-
mous with respect to j, but may not be minimally anonymous with respect to j.
Thus, conditional anonymity does not necessarily imply minimal anonymity.
In Definition 20, we implicitly assumed that agent j was allowed to learn that
someone other than j performed action a; anonymity is intended to hide which
agent performed a, given that somebody did. More generally, we believe that we
need to consider anonymity with respect to what an observer is allowed to learn.
We might want to specify, for example, that an observer is allowed to know that
a donation was made, and for how much, or to learn the contents of a conference
paper review. The following definition lets us do this formally.
Definition 21 Action a, performed by agent i, is conditionally anonymous with
respect to j and φ in the interpreted probability system I if
I |= Kjφ⇒ Prj(θ(i, a)) = µ(er(θ(i, a)) | er(φ)).
Definition 20 is clearly the special case of Definition 21 where φ = θ(, a). In-
tuitively, both of these definitions say that once an observer learns some fact φ
connected to the fact θ(i, a), we require that she doesn’t learn anything else that
might change her probabilities of θ(i, a).
78
4.2.3 Example: probabilistic dining cryptographers
Returning the dining cryptographers problem, suppose that it is well-known that
one of the three cryptographers at the table is much more generous than the other
two, and therefore more likely to pay for dinner. Suppose, for example, that the
probability measure on the set of runs where the generous cryptographer has paid
is 0.8, given that one of the cryptographers paid for dinner, and that it is 0.1
for each of the other two cryptographers. Conditional anonymity for each of the
three cryptographers with respect to an outside observer means that when such
observer learns that one of the cryptographers has paid for dinner, his probability
that any of the three cryptographers paid should remain 0.8, 0.1, and 0.1. If the
one of the thrifty cryptographers paid, the generous cryptographer should think
that there is a probability of 0.5 = 0.1/(0.1 + 0.1) that either of the others paid.
Likewise, if the generous cryptographer paid, each of the others should think that
there is a probability of 0.8/(0.8 + 0.1) that the generous cryptographer paid and
a probability of 0.1/(0.8 + 0.1) that the other thrifty cryptographer paid. We can
similarly calculate all the other relevant probabilities.
More generally, suppose that (R, µ, pi) is an interpreted probabilistic system
representing instances of the dining cryptographers protocol, where the interpre-
tation pi once again interprets formulas of the form θ(i, “paid”) and θ(, “paid”)
in the obvious way, and where the formula γ is true if one of the cryptographers
paid. (That is, γ is equivalent to
∨
i∈{0,1,2} θ(i, “paid”).) For any cryptographer
i ∈ {0, 1, 2}, let α(i) be the prior probability that i paid, given that somebody else
did. That is, let
α(i) , µ(er(θ(i, “paid”)) | er(γ)).
In the more concrete example given above, if 0 is the generous cryptographer, we
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would have α(0) = 0.8 and α(1) = α(2) = 0.1.
For the purposes of conditional probability with respect to an agent j, we are
interested in the probability that some agent i paid, given that somebody other
than j paid. Formally, for i 6= j, let
α(i, j) , µ(er(θ(i, “paid”)) | er(θ(, “paid”))).
If an observer o is not one of the three cryptographers, than o didn’t pay, and
we have α(i, o) = α(i). Otherwise, if i, j ∈ {0, 1, 2}, we can use conditioning to
compute α(i, j):
α(i, j) =
α(i)
α(j ⊕ 1) + α(j ⊕ 2)
.
(Once again, we make our definitions and requirements more compact by using
modular arithmetic, where ⊕ denotes addition mod 3.)
The following formula captures the requirement of conditional anonymity in
the dining cryptographer’s protocol, for each cryptographer i, with respect to the
other cryptographers and any outside observers.
I |=
[
Ki⊕1θ(i⊕ 1, “paid”) ⇒ Pri⊕1(θ(i, “paid”)) = α(i, i⊕ 1)
]
∧
[
Ki⊕2θ(i⊕ 2, “paid”) ⇒ Pri⊕2(θ(i, “paid”)) = α(i, i⊕ 2)
]
∧
[Koθ(o, “paid”) ⇒ Pro(θ(i, “paid”)) = α(i, o)] .
Chaum’s original proof that the dining cryptographers protocol provides ano-
nymity actually proves conditional anonymity in this general setting. Note that if
the probability that one of the cryptographers will pay is 1, that cryptographer will
have conditional anonymity even though he doesn’t even have minimal anonymity.
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4.2.4 Other uses for probability
In the previous two subsections, we have emphasized how probability can be used to
obtain definitions of anonymity stronger than those presented in Section 4.1. How-
ever, probabilistic systems can also be used to define interesting ways of weakening
those definitions. Real-world anonymity systems do not offer absolute guarantees
of anonymity such as those those specified by our definitions. Rather, they guar-
antee that a user’s anonymity will be protected with high probability. In a given
run, a user’s anonymity might be protected or corrupted. If the probability of the
event that a user’s anonymity is corrupted is very small, i.e., the set of runs where
her anonymity is not protected is assigned a very small probability by the measure
µ, this might be enough of a guarantee for the user to interact with the system.
Recall that we said that i maintains total anonymity with respect to j if the
fact φ = θ(i, a) ⇒
∧
i′ 6=j Pj[θ(i
′, a)] is true at every point in the system. Total
anonymity is compromised in a run r if at some point (r,m), ¬φ holds. Therefore,
the set of runs where total anonymity is compromised is simply er(¬φ), using the
notation of the previous section. If µ(er(¬φ)) is very small, then i maintains total
anonymity with very high probability. This analysis can obviously be extended to
all the other definitions of anonymity given in previous sections.
Bounds such as these are useful for analyzing real-world systems. The Crowds
system [71], for example, uses randomization when routing communication traffic,
so that anonymity is protected with high probability. The probabilistic guarantees
provided by Crowds were analyzed formally by Shmatikov [83], using a probabilistic
model checker, and he demonstrates how the anonymity guarantees provided by
the Crowds system change as more users (who may be either honest or corrupt)
are added to the system. Shmatikov uses a temporal probabilistic logic to express
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probabilistic anonymity properties, so these properties can be expressed in our
system framework. (It is straightforward to give semantics to temporal operators
in systems; see [20].) In any case, Shmatikov’s analysis of a real-world anonymity
system is a useful example of how the formal methods that we advocate can be
used to specify and verify properties of real-world systems.
Chapter 5
Related Definitions of Secrecy and
Anonymity
5.1 Related definitions of secrecy
We are certainly not the first to discuss formal definitions of secrecy: many defi-
nitions have been proposed over the last two decades. One reason for this is that
researchers have sought an “ideal” definition of security that has a variety of use-
ful properties (such as verifiability and composability). While we certainly agree
that verifiability and composability are important properties, we believe that the
intuition behind secrecy should be isolated from stronger properties that happen
to imply secrecy—especially when we have to worry about subtle issues such as
probability and nondeterminism.
In this section we consider how our definitions relate to other information-flow
conditions. We show in particular how they can capture work that has been done in
the synchronous setting, the asynchronous setting, and the probabilistic setting.
Because there are literally dozens of papers that have, in one way or another,
defined notions of secrecy or confidentiality, this section is in no way meant to be
comprehensive or representative. Rather, we have chosen examples that inspired
our definitions, or examples for which our definitions give some insight. In light of
our earlier comments, we also focus on definitions that have tried to capture the
essence of secrecy rather than notions that have been more concerned with issues
like composability and verification.
One important strand of literature to which we do not compare our work di-
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rectly here is the work on defining information flow and noninterference using
process algebras related to CCS and CSP [21, 22, 73, 74]. Although we believe
that the intuitions behind many of these definitions are closely related to our no-
tions of secrecy, a careful discussion of this issue would take us too far afield. In
future work we hope to consider the issue in detail, by describing how processes
can be translated to the runs-and-systems framework in a way that captures their
semantics and then showing how some of the process-algebraic definitions can be
recast as examples of secrecy. In Section 5.2.2 we give one instance of such a trans-
lation: we show how definitions of anonymity given using CSP by Schneider and
Sidiropoulos [79] can be captured in the runs-and-systems framework.
5.1.1 Secrecy in trace systems
Many papers in computer security define information-flow conditions such as se-
crecy and noninterference using trace-based models. Traces are usually defined as
sequences of input and output events, where each event is associated with some
agent (either as an input that she provides or an output that she sees). However,
there have been some subtle differences among the trace-based models. In some
cases, infinite traces are used; in others, the traces are finite. Similarly, some
models assume that the underlying systems are synchronous while others do not.
Although asynchronous system models have been more common, we first consider
synchronous trace-based systems.
Both McLean [58] and Wittbold and Johnson [93] present their definitions
of security in the context of synchronous input/output traces. These traces are
essentially restricted versions of runs. Here we consider a slightly simplified version
of McLean’s framework and describe two well-known noninterference properties
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within the framework.
Let In(H) be a set of possible high input values, let In(L) be a set of possible
low input values, let Out(H) be a set of possible high output values, and Out(L)
be a set of possible low output values. (We assume that these sets are pairwise
disjoint and finite.) Write Ev(L) = In(L) ∪Out(L), Ev(H) = In(H) ∪Out(H),
and Ev = Ev(L) ∪Ev(H).
A tuple γ = 〈li, hi, lo, ho〉 (with li ∈ In(L), hi ∈ In(H), lo ∈ Out(L), and
ho ∈ Out(H)) represents a snapshot of a system at a given point in time; it
describes the input provided to the system by a low agent L and a high agent H,
and the output sent by the system to L andH. A synchronous trace t = 〈γ1, γ2, . . .〉
is an infinite sequence of such tuples. It represents an infinite execution sequence
of the entire system by describing the input/output behavior of the system at any
given point in time. (The traces are said to be synchronous because the input
and output values are specified for each agent at each time step, and both agents
can infer the time simply by looking at the number of system outputs they have
seen.) A synchronous trace system is a set Σ of synchronous traces, representing
the possible execution sequences of the system.
In a synchronous trace system, the local state of an agent can be defined using
a restriction function on traces. Given a set E ⊆ Ev, t  E gives us the trace t
with all elements not in E removed. For example, if
t = 〈〈l
(1)
i , h
(1)
i , l
(1)
o , h
(1)
o 〉, 〈l
(2)
i , h
(2)
i , l
(2)
o , h
(2)
o 〉, . . .〉,
then
tEv(L) = 〈〈l(1)i , l
(1)
o 〉, 〈l
(2)
i , l
(2)
o 〉, . . .〉.
Similarly, t Ev(H) contains only high events, and t  In(H) contains only high
input events. For brevity we write t  L and t  H as shorthand for t  Ev(L)
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and t Ev(H), respectively. Given a restriction set E, we denote the restriction
function (·E) as E (as a notational convenience).
Given a trace t = 〈γ1, γ2, . . .〉, the length-k prefix of t is tk = 〈γ1, γ2, . . . , γk〉,
that is, the finite sequence containing the first k state tuples of the trace t. Trace
restriction applies to trace prefixes in the obvious way.
It is easy to see that synchronous trace systems can be viewed as systems in
the multiagent systems framework. Given a trace t, we can define the run rt such
that rt(m) = (tm  L, tm H). (For simplicity, we have omitted the environment
state from the global state in this construction, since it plays no role.) Given a
synchronous trace system Σ, let R(Σ) = {rt : t ∈ Σ}. It is easy to check that
R(Σ) is synchronous, and that both agents L and H have perfect recall.
McLean defines a number of notions of secrecy in his framework. We consider
two of the best known here: separability [58] and generalized noninterference [56].
Separability, as its name suggests, ensures secrecy between the low and high agents,
whereas generalized noninterference ensures that the low agent is unable to know
anything about high input behavior.
Definition 22 A synchronous trace system Σ satisfies separability if, for every
pair of traces t, t′ ∈ Σ, there exists a trace t′′ ∈ Σ such that t′′  L = t  L and
t′′ H = t′ H.
Definition 23 A synchronous trace system Σ satisfies generalized noninterference
if, for every pair of traces t, t′ ∈ Σ, there exists a trace t′′ ∈ Σ such that t′′ L = tL
and t′′ In(H) = t′ In(H).
These definitions are both special cases of nondeducibility, as discussed in Sec-
tion 3.1.1: take the set of worlds W to be Σ, the information function g to be L,
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and the information function h to be H (for separability) and In(H) (for general-
ized noninterference). (It is not difficult to see that if the information functions g
and h are limited to trace restriction functions, then nondeducibility is essentially
equivalent in expressive power to selective interleaving functions, the mechanism
for defining security properties introduced by McLean [58].) In our framework,
separability essentially corresponds to synchronous secrecy, whereas generalized
noninterference corresponds to synchronous In(H)-secrecy. The following propo-
sition makes this precise. Let fhi be the information function that extracts a high
input trace prefix from a point in exactly the same way that In(H) extracts it
from the infinite trace.
Proposition 10 If a synchronous trace system Σ satisfies separability (resp., gen-
eralized noninterference), then H maintains synchronous secrecy (resp., synchronous
fhi-secrecy) with respect to L in R(Σ).
The converse to Proposition 10 is not quite true. There is a subtle but sig-
nificant difference between McLean’s framework and ours. McLean works with
infinite traces; separability and generalized noninterference are defined with re-
spect to traces rather than sets of points (i.e., trace prefixes). To see the impact of
this, consider a system Σ where the high agent inputs either infinitely many 0s or
infinitely many 1s. The output to the low agent is always finitely many 0s followed
by infinitely 1s, except for a single trace where the high agent inputs infinitely
many 0s and the low agent inputs infinitely many 0s. Thus, the system consists
of the following traces, where we have omitted the low inputs since they do not
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matter, and the high outputs, which can taken to be constant:
(0k1∞, 0∞), k = 0, 1, 2, 3, . . .
(0k1∞, 1∞), k = 0, 1, 2, 3, . . .
(0∞, 0∞).
In the system R(Σ), H maintains synchronous secrecy and thus synchronous fhi-
secrecy with respect to L, because by looking at any finite trace prefix, L cannot
tell whether the high inputs have been 0s or 1s. However, Σ does not satisfy sepa-
rability or generalized interference. If L “sees” infinitely many 0s, he immediately
knows that the high inputs have been 0s. This seems unreasonable. After all,
agents only makes observations at finite points in time.
Note that if t is a trace where the low outputs are all 0s and the high inputs are
all 1s, each finite prefix of the trace t is a prefix of a trace in Σ, even though t is
not in Σ. This turns out to be the key reason that the system satisfies synchronous
secrecy but not separability.
Definition 24 A synchronous trace system Σ is limit closed [16] if, for all syn-
chronous traces t, we have t ∈ Σ iff for every time k there exists a trace t′ ∈ Σ
such that t′k = tk.
Under the assumption of limit closure, we do get the converse to Proposition 10.
Proposition 11 A limit-closed synchronous trace system Σ satisfies separability
(resp. generalized noninterference) iff H maintains synchronous secrecy (resp.,
synchronous fhi-secrecy) with respect to L in R(Σ).
While we believe that it is unreasonable in general to assume that an agent’s
view includes the entire run (as McLean’s definitions implicitly do), these re-
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sults nonetheless demonstrate the close connection between our definition of syn-
chronous f -secrecy and security properties such as separability and generalized
noninterference.
Up to now we have considered a synchronous trace model, where the input
and output events of high and low users occur in lockstep. However, many trace-
based definitions of security are given in an asynchronous setting. We consider a
number of definitions of secrecy in this setting. For uniformity we use terminology
similar to that of Mantel [54], who has carefully compiled a variety of well-known
trace-based properties into a single framework.
In Mantel’s framework, traces are not infinite sequences of input/output value
tuples, but finite sequences of input/output events. As before, let the set Ev
consist of high and low input and output events. Let α range over elements of Ev.
If l, l′ ∈ Ev(L) and h, h′ ∈ Ev(H), a possible system trace could be
t = 〈l, h, l, h′, h′, l′, l′, l, h〉.
We define trace restriction as before. Given t above, for example, we have
tL = 〈l, l, l′, l′, l〉.
Note that because asynchronous traces are sequences of events rather than tuples,
restriction ignores high events altogether. This means that a low view of the system
may remain completely unchanged even as many high input events occur.
An asynchronous trace system is a set of traces that is closed under trace
prefixes. There is a straightforward way of associating with each system a set of
runs. A set T of traces is run-like if, for all traces t1 and t2 in T , either t1 is a prefix
of t2 or t2 is a prefix of t1. Intuitively, a run corresponds to a maximal run-like set
of traces. More formally, let T be a maximal run-like set of traces. Note that if T
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is infinite, then for all n ≥ 0 there exists exactly one trace in T of length n (where
the length of 〈α0, . . . , αn−1〉 is n); if T is finite, then there is some N ≥ 0 such that
T has exactly one trace of length n for all n ≤ N . If T is infinite, let the run rT be
such that rT (m) = 〈tm L, tm H〉, where tm is the unique trace in T of length m.
If T is finite, let rT be such that rT (m) = 〈tm L, tm H〉 if m ≤ N , where N is the
length of the longest trace in T , and rT (m) = rT (N) if m ≥ N ; that is, the final
state repeats forever. Given an asynchronous trace system Σ, let R(Σ) denote the
set of all runs of the form rT , where T is a maximal set of run-like traces in Σ.
Trace-based security properties are usually expressed as closure properties on
sets of traces, much like our possibilistic definitions of secrecy; see [53] for more de-
tails. We focus here on the definitions of asynchronous separability and generalized
noninterference given by Zakinthinos and Lee [94].
Definition 25 An asynchronous trace system Σ satisfies asynchronous separa-
bility if, for all traces t, t′ ∈ Σ, if t′′ is a trace that results from an arbitrary
interleaving of the traces tL and t′ H, then t′′ ∈ Σ.
The definition of generalized noninterference is slightly more complicated, because
the trace that results from interleaving does not include high inputs:
Definition 26 An asynchronous trace system Σ satisfies asynchronous generalized
noninterference if, for all traces t, t′ ∈ Σ, if t′′ is a trace that results from an
arbitrary interleaving of the traces tL and t′ In(H), there exists a trace t′′′ such
that t′′′ (Ev(L) ∪ In(H)) = t′′ (Ev(L) ∪ In(H)).
It is straightforward to relate these definitions to secrecy. Exactly as in the
synchronous case, let fhi be an information function that extracts a high input
trace prefix from a point: if rT (m) = 〈tL, tH〉, let fhi(rT ,m) = tIn(H).
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Proposition 12 If Σ is an asynchronous trace system that satisfies asynchronous
separability (resp. asynchronous generalized noninterference), then H maintains
total secrecy (resp. total fhi-secrecy) with respect to L in R(Σ).
The converse of Proposition 12 does not necessarily hold. We demonstrate this
by providing a counterexample that works for both separability and generalized
noninterference. Suppose that there are no high output events, only one low out-
put event lo, and arbitrary sets In(L) and In(H) of low and high input events,
respectively. Consider the system consisting of all traces t involving these events
such that lo occurs at most once in t, and when it occurs, it does not follow any
high input events. In R(Σ), H maintains total secrecy and fhi-secrecy with respect
to L, because any local state for L is compatible with any local state for H. (Be-
cause the system is asynchronous, L learns nothing by seeing lo: when L sees lo,
he thinks it possible that arbitrarily many high input events could have occurred
after lo. Furthermore, L learns nothing about H when he does not see lo: it is al-
ways possible that no high input events have occurred and that lo may yet occur.)
However, Σ does not satisfy asynchronous separability or asynchronous general-
ized noninterference, because interleavings where a high input event precedes lo
are ruled out by construction.
This example illustrates a potential weakness of our approach to secrecy. Al-
though H maintains total secrecy with respect to L in R(Σ), there is a sense in
which L learns something about H. Consider a point (r,m) in R(Σ) at which L
has not seen lo. At that point, L knows that if a high event has occurred, he will
never see lo. This knowledge does not violate secrecy, because it does not depend
on the local state of H; it is not an H-local fact. But there is a sense in which
this fact can be said to be “about” H: it is information about a correlation be-
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tween high events and a particular low event. However, it is unclear whether this
constitutes an information flow; at any rate, we have not been able to construct
an example where this knowledge is a problem. But it is worth pointing out that
all of our definitions of secrecy aim to protect the local state of some particular
user, and therefore that any “secret information” that cannot be characterized as
a local proposition is not protected.
In any case, we can show that total secrecy and separability are equivalent
if we assume a particularly strong form of asynchrony that rules out a temporal
dependence between high and low events. Formally, Σ is closed under interleavings
if for all asynchronous traces t and t′, if t ∈ Σ, t′  L = t  L and t′ H = t H,
then t′ ∈ Σ. Though this requirement allows L to learn about high events that
may occur in the future (or that have possibly occurred in the past), it rules out
any knowledge of the ordering of high and low events in a given run. With this
requirement, total secrecy and asynchronous separability coincide.
Proposition 13 If Σ is an asynchronous trace system that is closed under inter-
leavings, then Σ satisfies asynchronous separability iff H maintains total secrecy
with respect to L in R(Σ).
A similar result is true for generalized noninterference and fhi-secrecy if we
modify the definition of closure under interleavings to allow L to learn something
about the ordering of high output events; we omit the details.
5.1.2 Secrecy and user strategies
Program P1, described in Section 3.2.4, allows a high agent to transmit arbitrarily
long data strings directly to a low agent even though the high agent’s actual input
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values remain secret. We described one possible way to model the lack of secrecy
in the resulting system, by assuming that the string that high wants to transmit
is included in his initial local state. This example demonstrates that generalized
noninterference (as defined in the previous section) is insufficient to ensure that one
agent cannot interfere with another, even if we restrict our concern to possibilistic
information flows. By using a clever-enough strategy, an agent may be able to
exploit the nondeterminism of a system to transmit data to another agent.
Wittbold and Johnson, who first introduced the insecure one-time pad ex-
ample [93], also introduced nondeducibility on strategies to protect the strategy
employed by high agents. We modify their definition slightly so that it is compat-
ible with McLean’s framework of synchronous traces. A strategy ωH is a function
from a high input/output trace prefix tk H to a high input value hi ∈ In(H).
Intuitively, a strategy tells the high agent what to do at each step, given what he
has already seen and done. A trace t is consistent with a strategy ωH if, for all k,
ωH(tk−1 H) = h
(k)
i , where h
(k)
i is the high input value of the kth tuple in t. A
synchronous trace system Σ satisfies nondeducibility on strategies if, for all traces
t ∈ Σ and every high strategy ωH consistent with some trace in Σ, there exists
a trace t′ that is consistent with ωH such that t
′  L = t  L. If the strategy of
the high agent is included as part of her local state, and fprot is an H-information
function that extracts the strategy of the high agent from the local state, then it is
straightforward to show that nondeducibility on strategies is simply synchronous
fprot -secrecy.
Gray and Syverson [32] extend nondeducibility on strategies to probabilistic
systems using the Halpern-Tuttle framework. In Gray and Syverson’s terminology,
low and high agents use probabilistic strategies ωL and ωH , respectively. Again,
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the strategies (ωL and ωH) determine what the agents will input next, given what
they have seen and done so far. The system is assumed to have a fixed probability
distribution O that determines its output behavior, given the inputs and outputs
seen so far. Formally, for each trace prefix t of length k, ωH(· | (t  H)) is a
probability measure on high input events that occur at time k + 1, given the
restriction of t to the high input/output; similarly, ωL(· | (t  L)) is a probability
measure on low input events that occur at time k + 1 and O(· | t) is a probability
measure on output events that occur at time k + 1, given t. Gray and Syverson
require that the choices made by low agent, the high agent, and the system be
probabilistically independent at each time step. With this assumption, ωH , ωL,
and O determine a conditional distribution that we denote µL,H,O, where
µL,H,O(〈li, hi, lo, ho〉 | t) = ωL(li | (tL)) · ωH(hi | (tH)) ·O(lo, ho | t).
Let Λ and Γ be countable sets of strategies for the low and high agent, re-
spectively.1 Given Λ, Γ, and O (and, implicitly, sets of low and high input and
output values), we can define an adversarial probability system R∗(Λ,Γ,O) in a
straightforward way. Let Σ consist of all synchronous traces over the input and
out values. For each joint strategy (ωL, ωH) ∈ Λ×Γ, let R(Σ, ωL, ωH) consist of all
runs defined as in our earlier mapping from synchronous traces to runs, except that
now we include ωL in the low agent’s local state and ωH in the high agent’s local
state. Let R(Σ,Λ×Γ) , ∪(ωL,ωH)∈Λ×ΓR(Σ, ωL, ωH). We can partition R(Σ,Λ×Γ)
according to the joint strategy used; let D(Λ,Γ) denote this partition. Given the
independence assumptions, the joint strategy (ωL, ωH) also determines a probabil-
1Gray and Syverson take Λ and Γ to consist of all possible probabilistic strategies
for the low and high agent, respectively, but their approach still makes sense if Λ
and Γ are arbitrary sets of strategies, and it certainly seems reasonable to assume
that there are only countably many strategies that agents might be using.
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ity µL,H,O on R(Σ, ωL, ωH). Let ∆(Λ,Γ,O) , {µL,H,O : ωL ∈ Λ, ωH ∈ Γ}, and
let R∗(Λ,Γ,O) , (R(Σ,Λ × Γ),D,∆}. We can now define Gray and Syverson’s
notion of secrecy in the context of these adversarial systems. (Again, L and H
refer to the low agent and the high agent.)
Definition 27 An adversarial system R∗(Λ,Γ,O) satisfies probabilistic noninter-
ference if, for all low strategies ωL ∈ Λ, points (r,m) where L’s strategy is ωL, and
high strategies ωH , ωH′ ∈ Γ, we have
µ(L,H,O)(KL(r,m)) = µ(L,H′,O)(KL(r,m)).
Theorem 6 The following are equivalent:
(a) R∗(Λ,Γ,O) satisfies probabilistic noninterference;
(b) L obtains no evidence about H’s strategy (in the sense of Definition 13) in
R∗(Λ,Γ,O);
(c) H maintains generalized run-based probabilistic fprot -secrecy with respect to L
in (R(Σ,Λ×Γ),MINIT (∆(Λ,Γ,O))), where fprot is the information function
that maps from H’s local state to H’s strategy;
(d) H maintains generalized probabilistic synchronous fprot -secrecy with respect
to L in the standard generalized probability system determined by (R(Σ,Λ×
Γ),MINIT (∆(Λ,Γ,O))).
Proof: The fact that (a) implies (b) is immediate from the definitions, since H’s
initial choice is the strategy ωH . The equivalence of (b) and (c) follows from
Theorem 5. Finally, since the traces in Σ are synchronous, the equivalence of (c)
and (d) follows from Proposition 8. ut
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5.2 Related definitions of anonymity
5.2.1 Knowledge-based definitions of anonymity
As mentioned in the introduction, we are not the first to use knowledge to han-
dle definitions of anonymity. In particular, Syverson and Stubblebine [89] use an
epistemic logic to formalize anonymity. However, the focus of their work is very
different from ours. They describe a logic for reasoning about anonymity and a
number of axioms for the logic. An agent’s knowledge is based, roughly speak-
ing, on his recent actions and observations, as well as what follows from his log
of system events. The first five axioms that Syverson and Stubblebine give are
the standard S5 axioms for knowledge. There are well-known soundness and com-
pleteness results relating the S5 axiom system to Kripke structure semantics for
knowledge [20]. However, they give many more axioms, and they do not attempt
to give a semantics for which their axioms are sound. Our focus, on the other hand,
is completely semantic. We have not tried to axiomatize anonymity. Rather, we
try to give an appropriate semantic framework in which to consider anonymity.
In some ways, Syverson and Stubblebine’s model is more detailed than the
model used here. Their logic includes many formulas that represent various actions
and facts, including the sending and receiving of messages, details of encryption
and keys, and so on. They also make more assumptions about the local state of
a given agent, including details about the sequence of actions that the agent has
performed locally, a log of system events that have been recorded, and a set of
facts of which the agent is aware. While these extra details may accurately reflect
the nature of agents in real-world systems, they are orthogonal to our concerns
here. In any case, it would be easy to add such expressiveness to our model as
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well, simply by including these details in the local states of the various agents.
It is straightforward to relate our definitions to those of Syverson and Stub-
blebine. They consider facts of the form φ(i), where i is a principal, i.e., an agent.
They assume that the fact φ(i) is a single formula in which a single agent name
occurs. Clearly, θ(i, a) is an example of such a formula. In fact, Syverson and
Stubblebine assume that if φ(i) and φ(j) are both true, then i = j. For the θ(i, a)
formulas, this means that θ(i, a) and θ(i′, a) cannot be simultaneously true: at
most one agent can perform an action in a given run, exactly as in the setup of
Proposition 9.
There is one definition in [89] that is especially relevant to our discussion; the
other relevant definitions presented there are similar. A system is said to satisfy
(≥ k)-anonymity with respect to observer o if the following formula is valid:
φ(i) ⇒ ∃i1, . . . , ik−1 . Po(φ(i)) ∧ Po(φ(i1)) ∧ · · · ∧ Po(φ(ik−1)).
This definition says that if φ(i) holds, there must be at least k agents, including i,
that the observer suspects. The definition is essentially equivalent to our definition
of (k − 1)-anonymity. If Po(φ(i
′)) is true for k − 1 agents other than i, then the
formula must hold, because φ(i) ⇒ Po(φ(i)) is valid.
5.2.2 CSP and anonymity
A great deal of work on the foundations of computer security has used process
algebras such as CCS and CSP [62, 46] as the basic system framework [22, 78].
Process algebras offer several advantages: they are simple, they can be used for
specifying systems as well as system properties, and model-checkers are available
that can be used to verify properties of systems described using their formalisms.
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Schneider and Sidiropoulos [79] use CSP both to characterize one type of
anonymity and to describe variants of the dining cryptographers problem [5]. They
then use a model-checker to verify that their notion of anonymity holds for those
variants of the problem. To describe their approach, we need to outline some of the
basic notation and semantics of CSP. To save space, we give a simplified treatment
of CSP here. (See Hoare [46] for a complete description of CSP.) The basic unit
of CSP is the event. Systems are modeled in terms of the events that they can
perform. Events may be built up several components. For example, “donate.$5”
might represent a “donate” event in the amount of $5. Processes are the systems,
or components of systems, that are described using CSP. As a process unfolds
or executes, various events occur. For our purposes, we make the simplifying as-
sumption that a process is determined by the event sequences it is able to engage
in.
As with some of the previous system models considered, we can associate with
every process a set of traces. Intuitively, each trace in the set associated with
process P represents one sequence of events that might occur during an execution
of P . Informally, CSP event traces correspond to finite prefixes of runs, except
that they do not explicitly describe the local states of agents and do not explicitly
describe time.
Schneider and Sidiropoulos define a notion of anonymity with respect to a set A
of events. Typically, A consists of events of the form i.a for a fixed action a, where
i is an agent in some set that we denote IA. Intuitively, anonymity with respect to
A means that if any event in A occurs, it could equally well have been any other
event in A. In particular, this means that if an agent in IA performs a, it could
equally well have been any other agent in IA. Formally, given a set Σ of possible
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events and A ⊆ Σ, let fA be a function on traces that, given a trace t, returns a
trace fA(t) that is identical to t except that every event in A is replaced by a fixed
event α /∈ Σ. A process P is strongly anonymous on A if f−1A (fA(P )) = P , where
we identify P with its associated set of traces. This means that all the events in
A are interchangeable; by replacing any event in A with any other we would still
get a valid trace of P .
Schneider and Sidiropoulos give several very simple examples that are useful for
clarifying this definition of anonymity. One is a system where there are two agents
who can provide donations to a charity, but where only one of them will actually
do so. Agent 0, if she gives a donation, gives $5, and agent 1 gives $10. This is
followed by a “thanks” from the charity. The events of interest are “0.gives” and
“1.gives” (representing events where 0 and 1 make a donation), “$5” and “$10”
(representing the charity’s receipt of the donation), “thanks,” and “STOP” (to
signify that the process has ended). There are two possible traces:
1. 0.gives → $5 → “thanks” → STOP.
2. 1.gives → $10 → “thanks” → STOP.
The donors require anonymity, and so we require that the CSP process is strongly
anonymous on the set {0.gives, 1.gives}. In fact, this condition is not satisfied
by the process, because “0.gives” and “1.gives” are not interchangeable. This is
because “0.gives” must be followed by “$5,” while “1.gives” must be followed by
“$10.” Intuitively, an agent who observes the traces can determine the donor by
looking at the amount of money donated.
We believe that Schneider and Sidiropoulos’s definition is best understood as
trying to capture the intuition that an observer who sees all the events generated
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by P , except for events in A, does not know which event in A occurred. We can
make this precise by translating Schneider and Sidiropoulos’s definition into our
framework. The first step is to associate with each process P a corresponding set
of runs RP . We present one reasonable way of doing so here, which suffices for our
purposes. In future work, we hope to explore the connection between CSP and the
runs and systems framework in more detail.
Recall that a run is an infinite sequence of global states of the form
(se, s1, . . . , sn),
where each si is the local state of agent i, and se is the state of the environment.
Therefore, to specify a set of runs, we need to describe the set of agents, and then
explain how to derive the local states of each agent for each run. There is an obvious
problem here: CSP has no analogue of agents and local states. To get around this,
we could simply tag all events with an agent (as Schneider and Sidiropoulos in
fact do for the events in A). However, for our current purposes, a much simpler
approach will do. The only agent we care about is a (possibly mythical) observer
who is able to observe every event except the ones in A. Moreover, for events in
A, the observer knows that something happened (although not what). There may
be other agents in the system, but their local states are irrelevant. We formalize
this as follows.
Fix a process P over some set Σ of events, and let A ⊆ Σ. Following Schneider
and Sidiropoulos, for the purposes of this discussion, assume that A consists of
events of the form i.a, where i ∈ IA and a is some specific action. We say that a
system R is compatible with P if there exists some agent o such that the following
two conditions hold:
• for every run r ∈ R and every time m, there exists a trace t ∈ P such that
100
t = re(m) and fA(t) = ro(m);
• for every trace t ∈ P , there exists a run r ∈ R such that re(|t|) = t and
ro(|t|) = fA(t) (where |t| is the number of events in t).
Intuitively, R represents P if (1) for every trace t in P , there is a point (r,m) in R
such that, at this point, exactly the events in t have occurred (and are recorded in
the environment’s state) and o has observed fA(t), and (2) for every point (r,m) in
R, there is a trace t in P such that precisely the events in re(m) have happened in t,
and o has observed fA(t) at (r,m). We say that the interpreted system I = (R, pi)
is compatible with P if R is compatible with P and if (I, r,m) |= θ(i, a) whenever
the event i.a is in the event sequence re(m
′) for some m′.
We are now able to make a formal connection between our definition of anonymity
and that of Schneider and Sidiropoulos. As in the setup of Proposition 9, we as-
sume that an anonymous action a can be performed only once in a given run.
Theorem 7 If I = (R, pi) is compatible with P , then P is strongly anonymous on
the alphabet A if and only if for every agent i ∈ IA, the action a performed by i is
anonymous up to IA with respect to o in I.
Up to now, we have assumed that the observer o has access to all the infor-
mation in the system except which event in A was performed. Schneider and
Sidiropoulos extend their definition of strong anonymity to deal with agents that
have somewhat less information. They capture “less information” using abstrac-
tion operators. Given a process P , there are several abstraction operators that can
give us a new process. For example the hiding operator, represented by \, hides
all events in some set C. That is, the process P\C is the same as P except that
all events in C become internal events of the new process, and are not included
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in the traces associated with P\C. Another abstraction operator, the renaming
operator, has already appeared in the definition of strong anonymity: for any set
C of events, we can consider the function fC that maps events in C to a fixed
new event. The difference between hiding and renaming is that, if events in C are
hidden, the observer is not even aware they took place. If events in C are renamed,
then the observer is aware that some event in C took place, but does not know
which one.
Abstraction operators such as these provide a useful way to model a process
or agent who has a distorted or limited view of the system. In the context of
anonymity, they allow anonymity to hold with respect to an observer with a limited
view of the system in cases where it would not hold with respect to an observer who
can see everything. In the anonymous donations example, hiding the events $5 and
$10, i.e., the amount of money donated, would make the new process P\{$5, $10}
strongly anonymous on the set of donation events. Formally, given an abstraction
operator ABSC on a set of events C, we have to check the requirement of strong
anonymity on the process ABSC(P ) rather than on the process P .
Abstraction is easily captured in our framework. It amounts simply to changing
the local state of the observer. For example, anonymity of the process P\C in our
framework corresponds to anonymity of the action a for every agent in IA with
respect to an observer whose local state at the point (r,m) is fA(re(m))\C. We
omit the obvious analogue of Theorem 7 here.
A major advantage of the runs and systems framework is that definitions of
high-level properties such as anonymity do not depend on the local states of the
agents in question. If we want to model the fact that an observer has a limited
view of the system, we need only modify her local state to reflect this fact. While
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some limited views are naturally captured by CSP abstraction operators, others
may not be. The definition of anonymity should not depend on the existence of
an appropriate abstraction operator able to capture the limitations of a particular
observer.
As we have demonstrated, our approach to anonymity is compatible with the
approach taken in [79]. Our definitions are stated in terms of actions, agents,
and knowledge, and are thus very intuitive and flexible. The generality of runs
and systems allows us to have simple definitions that apply to a wide variety of
systems and agents. The low-level CSP definitions, on the other hand, are more
operational than ours, and this allows easier model-checking and verification. Fur-
thermore, there are many advantages to using process algebras in general: systems
can often be represented much more succinctly, and so on. This suggests that both
approaches have their advantages. Because CSP systems can be represented in the
runs and systems framework, however, it makes perfect sense to define anonymity
for CSP processes using the knowledge-based definitions we have presented here.
If our definitions turn out to be equivalent to more low-level CSP definitions, this
is ideal, because CSP model-checking programs can then be used for verification.
A system designer simply needs to take care that the runs-based system derived
from a CSP process (or set of processes) represents the local states of the different
agents appropriately.
5.2.3 Anonymity and function-view semantics
Hughes and Shmatikov [47] introduce function views and function-view opaqueness
as a way of expressing a variety of confidentiality properties in a succinct and
uniform way. Their main insight is that requirements such as anonymity involve
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restrictions on relationships between entities such as agents and actions. Because
these relationships can be expressed by functions from one set of entities to another,
hiding information from an observer amounts to limiting an observer’s view of
the function in question. For example, anonymity properties are concerned with
whether or not an observer is able to connect actions with the agents who performed
them. By considering the function from the set of actions to the set of agents who
performed those actions, and specifying the degree to which that function must be
opaque to observers, we can express anonymity using the function-view approach.
To model the uncertainty associated with a given function, Hughes and Shma-
tikov define a notion of function knowledge to explicitly represent an observer’s
partial knowledge of a function. Function knowledge focuses on three particular
aspects of a function: its graph, image, and kernel. (Recall that the kernel of
a function f with domain X is the equivalence relation ker on X defined by
(x, x′) ∈ ker iff f(x) = f(x′).) Function knowledge of type X → Y is a triple
N = (F, I,K), where F ⊆ X×Y , I ⊆ Y , and K is an equivalence relation on X. A
triple (F, I,K) is consistent with f if f ⊆ F , I ⊆ imf , and K ⊆ kerf . Intuitively,
a triple (F, I,K) that is consistent with f represents what an agent might know
about the function f . Complete knowledge of a function f , for example, would be
represented by the triple (f, imf, kerf).
With respect to anonymity (and other confidentiality properties), we are inter-
ested not in what an agent knows, but in what an agent does not know. This is
formalized by Hughes and Shmatikov in terms of opaqueness conditions for func-
tion knowledge. If N = 〈F, I,K〉 is consistent with f : X → Y , then, for example,
N is k-value opaque if |F (x)| ≥ k for all x ∈ X. That is, N is k-value opaque if
there are k possible candidates for the value of f(x), for all x ∈ X. Similarly, N
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is Z-value opaque if Z ⊆ F (x) for all x ∈ X. In other words, for each x in the
domain of f , no element of Z can be ruled out as a candidate for f(x). Finally, N
is absolutely value opaque if that N is Y -value opaque.
Opaqueness conditions are closely related to the nonprobabilistic definitions of
anonymity given in Section 4.1. Consider functions from X to Y , where X is a
set of actions and Y is a set of agents, and suppose that some function f is the
function that, given some action, names the agent who performed the action. If
we have k-value opaqueness for some view of f (corresponding to some observer
o), this means, essentially, that each action a in X is k-anonymous with respect
to o. Similarly, the view is IA-value opaque if the action is anonymous up to IA
for each agent i ∈ IA. Thus, function view opaqueness provides a concise way of
describing anonymity properties.
To make these connections precise, we need to explain how function views can
be embedded within the runs and systems framework. Hughes and Shmatikov
already show how we can define function views using Kripke structures, the stan-
dard approach for giving semantics to knowledge. A minor modification of their
approach works in systems too. Assume we are interested in who performs an
action a ∈ X, where X, intuitively, is a set of “anonymous actions.” Let Y be the
set of agents, including a “nobody agent” denoted N , and let f be a function from
X to Y . Intuitively, f(a) = i if agent i performs action a, and f(a) = N if no
agent performs action a. The value of the function f will depend on the point. Let
fr,m be the value of f at the point (r,m). Thus, fr,m(a) = i if i performs a in run
r. 2 We can now easily talk about function opaqueness with respect to an observer
o. For example, f is Z-value opaque at the point (r,m) with respect to o if, for all
2Note that for f(r,m) to be well-defined, it must be the case that only one agent
can ever perform a single action.
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z ∈ Z, there exists a point (r′,m′) such that r′o(m
′) = ro(m) and f(r′,m′)(x) = z.
In terms of knowledge, Z-value opaqueness says that for any value x in the range
of f , o thinks it possible that any value z ∈ Z could be the result of f(x). In-
deed, Hughes and Shmatikov say that function-view opaqueness, defined in terms
of Kripke structure semantics, is closely related to epistemic logic. The following
proposition makes this precise; it would be easy to state similar propositions for
other kinds of function-view opaqueness.
Proposition 14 Let I = (R, pi) be an interpreted system that satisfies (I, r,m) |=
f(x) = y whenever f(r,m)(x) = y. In system I, f is Z-value opaque for observer o
at the point (r,m) if and only if
(I, r,m) |=
∧
x∈X
∧
z∈Z
Po[f(x) = z].
Proof: This result follows immediately from the definitions. ut
Stated in terms of knowledge, function-view opaqueness already looks a lot like
our definitions of anonymity. Given f (or, more precisely, the set {f(r,m)} of func-
tions) mapping actions to agents, we can state a theorem connecting anonymity to
function-view opaqueness. There are two minor issues to deal with, though. First,
our definitions of anonymity are stated with respect to a single action a, while the
function f deals with a set of actions. We can deal with this by taking the domain
of f to be the singleton {a}. Second, our definition of anonymity up to a set IA
requires the observer to suspect agents in IA only if i actually performs the action
a. (Recall this is also true for Syverson and Stubblebine’s definitions.) IA-value
opaqueness requires the observer to think many agents could have performed an
action even if nobody has. To deal with this, we require opaqueness only when the
action has been performed by one of the agents in IA.
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Theorem 8 Suppose that (I, r,m) |= θ(i, a) exactly if f(r,m)(a) = i. Then action
a is anonymous up to IA with respect to o for each agent i ∈ IA if and only if at
all points (r,m) such that f(r,m)(a) ∈ IA, f is IA-value opaque with respect to o.
As with Proposition 14, it would be easy to state analogous theorems connecting
our other definitions of anonymity, including minimal anonymity, total anonymity,
and k-anonymity, to other forms of function-view opaqueness. We omit the details
here.
The assumptions needed to prove Theorem 8 illustrate two ways in which our
approach may seem to be less general than the function-view approach. First, all
our definitions are given with respect to a single action, rather than with respect
to a set of actions. However, it is perfectly reasonable to specify that all actions in
some set A of actions be anonymous. Then we could modify Theorem 8 so that the
function f is defined on all actions in A. (We omit the details.) Second, our def-
initions of anonymity only restrict the observer’s knowledge if somebody actually
performs the action. This is simply a different way of defining anonymity. As men-
tioned previously, we are not trying to give a definitive definition of anonymity,
and it certainly seems reasonable that someone might want to define or specify
anonymity using the stronger condition. At any rate, it would be straightfor-
ward to modify our definitions so that the implications, involving θ(i, a), are not
included.
Hughes and Shmatikov argue that epistemic logic is a useful language for ex-
pressing anonymity specifications, while CSP is a useful language for describing
and specifying systems. We agree with both of these claims. They propose func-
tion views as a useful interface to mediate between the two. We have tried to argue
here that no mediation is necessary, since the multiagent systems framework can
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also be used for describing systems. (Indeed, the traces of CSP can essentially
be viewed as runs.) Nevertheless, we do believe that function views can be the
basis of a useful language for reasoning about some aspects of confidentiality. We
can well imagine adding abbreviations to the language that let us talk directly
about function views. (We remark that we view these abbreviations as syntactic
sugar, since these are notions that can already be expressed directly in terms of
the knowledge operators we have introduced.)
On the other hand, we believe that function views are insufficiently expressive.
One obvious problem is adding probability. While it is easy to add probability
to systems, as we have shown, and to capture interesting probabilistic notions of
anonymity, it is far from clear how to do this if we take function views triples as
primitive.
To sum up, we would argue that to reason about knowledge and probability,
we need to have possible worlds as the underlying semantic framework. Using
the multiagent systems approach gives us possible worlds in a way that makes
it particularly easy to relate them to systems. Within this semantic framework,
function views may provide a useful syntactic construct with which to reason about
anonymity and other confidentiality properties.
Chapter 6
Information-Flow Security for
Interactive Programs
In this chapter we consider secrecy in systems described by imperative programs.
As mentioned in the Introduction, we are concerned with interactive programs,
which interact with users at runtime, rather than batch-job programs that can be
characterized as a function from inputs to outputs. Our language and security
conditions synthesize two branches of information-flow security research, in that
we leverage the trace-based definitions that have been proposed for interactive sys-
tems to provide novel security conditions for imperative programs. Furthermore,
our interactive programming language can be viewed as a specification language
for interactive systems that more closely approximates the implementation of real
programs than the abstract system models that have previously been used. Our
goal is to leverage the definitions of secrecy given in Chapter 3 to state noninter-
ference requirements for interactive systems directly in terms of the operational
semantics of an imperative language.
In giving definitions of information-flow security for interactive programs, we
pay special attention to the issue of nondeterminism, which arises in real-world
systems for a number of reasons (including concurrency and probabilistic random-
ization). Nondeterminism is orthogonal to interactivity, but the interplay between
information flow and nondeterminism is often quite subtle. We examine two kinds
of nondeterministic choices: those which we assume are made probabilistically, and
those which we are unable or unwilling to assign probabilities. We refer to the for-
mer as probabilistic choice, and to the latter as nondeterministic choice. Following
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the approach taken in Chapter 3, we factor out nondeterministic choice so that we
can reason about it in isolation from probabilistic choice. By explicitly represent-
ing the resolution of nondeterministic choice in the language semantics, we adapt
our security condition to rule out refinement attacks in which the resolution of
nondeterministic choice results in insecure information flows. (We thus explicitly
rule out possibilistic breaches of secrecy, as discussed in earlier chapters.) We also
give a probabilistic security condition based on Definition 13 in Section 3.2.5.
6.1 User strategies
It might seem at first that information-flow security for interactive programs can
be obtained by adopting the same approach used for batch-job programs, that
is, by preventing low users from learning anything about high inputs. However,
several papers, starting with Wittbold and Johnson [93], have described systems in
which high users can transmit information to low users even though low users learn
nothing about the high inputs. This is demonstrated by Program P1, which we
described in Section 3.2.4. We reproduce P1 here. Recall that input x from C reads
a value from a channel named C and stores it in variable x; similarly, output e to C
outputs the value of expression e on a channel named C. Assume that low users
may use only channel L, that high users may use channel H, and that no users
may observe the values of program variables. Infix operator p8 executes its first
operand with probability p and its second operand with probability 1− p.
P1 : while (true) do
x := 0 0.58 x := 1;
output x to H;
input y from H;
output x xor (y mod 2) to L
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Because the probabilistic choice is resolved in a way that is unpredictable to the
low user, he will be unable to determine the inputs on channel H: for any output
on L, the input on H could have been either 0 or 1. Yet the high user can still
communicate an arbitrary confidential bit z to channel L at each iteration of the
loop by choosing z xor x as input on H.
The confidential information z is never directly acquired by the program: it is
neither the initial value of a program variable nor an input supplied on a channel.
As Wittbold and Johnson observe, maintaining the secrecy of all high inputs (and
even the initial values of program variables) is therefore insufficient to preserve the
secrecy of confidential information.
In Program P1, the high user is able to communicate arbitrary confidential
information by selecting his next input as a function of outputs he has previously
received. This suggests that if we want to prevent confidential information from
flowing to low users, we should protect the secrecy of the function that high users
employ to select inputs. Following Wittbold and Johnson’s terminology, we call
this function a user strategy. In the remainder of this section we develop the
mathematical structures needed to define user strategies formally.
6.1.1 Types, users, and channels
We assume a set L of security types with ordering relation ≤ and use metavariable
τ to range over security types. For simplicity, we assume that L equals {L,H} with
L ≤ H. (Our results generalize to partial orders of security types.) Security type
L represents low confidentiality, and H represents high confidentiality. The order-
ing ≤ indicates the relative restrictiveness of security types: high-confidentiality
information is more restricted in its use than low-confidentiality information.
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Users are agents (including humans and programs) that interact with executing
programs. We associate with each user a security type indicating the highest level
of confidential information that the user is permitted to read. Conservatively, we
assume that users of the same security type may collaborate while attempting to
subvert the security of a program. We can thus simplify our security analyses by
reasoning about exactly two users, one representing the pooled knowledge of low
users and another representing the pooled knowledge of high users.
We also assume the existence of channels with blocking input and nonblocking
output. Although input is blocking, we assume that all inputs prompted for are
eventually supplied. Each channel is associated with a security type τ , and only
users of that type are permitted to use the channel. For simplicity, we assume
that there are exactly two channels, L and H. We also assume that the values
that are input and output on channels are integers. These are not fundamental
restrictions; our results could be extended to allow multiple channels of each type,
to allow high users to observe low channels, and to allow more general data types.
6.1.2 Traces
An event is the transmission of an input or output on a channel. Denote the input
of value v on the channel of type τ as in(τ, v) and the output of v on τ as out(τ, v).
Let Ev(τ) be the set of all events that could occur on channel τ :
Ev(τ) ,
⋃
v∈Z
{in(τ, v), out(τ, v)}.
Let Ev be the set of all events:
Ev ,
⋃
τ∈L
Ev(τ).
We use metavariable α to range over events in Ev.
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A trace is a finite list of events. Given E ⊆ Ev, an event trace on E is a
finite, possibly empty list 〈α1, . . . , αn〉 such that αi ∈ E for all i. The empty trace
is written 〈〉. The set of all traces on E is denoted Tr(E), and we abbreviate
the set of all traces Tr(Ev) as Tr. Trace equality is defined pointwise, and the
concatenation of two traces t and t′ is denoted tˆt′. A trace t′ extends trace t if
there exists a trace t′′ such that t′ = tˆt′′. The restriction of t to E, denoted tE,
is the trace that results from removing all events not contained in E from t. We
write t  τ as shorthand for t Ev(τ). A low trace is the low restriction t L of a
trace t.
6.1.3 User strategies
As demonstrated by Program P1, the input supplied by a user may depend on
past events observed by that user. To capture this dependence we employ a user
strategy, which determines the input for a particular channel as a function of the
events that occur on the channel. Because events on a channel include both inputs
and outputs, this function depends on both the user’s observations and previous
actions. Formally, a user strategy for a channel with security type τ is a function of
type Tr(Ev(τ)) → Z. Let UserStrat be the set of all user strategies. (Note that,
to simulate the batch-job model, the initial inputs provided by users can be rep-
resented by a constant strategy that selects inputs without regard for past inputs
or outputs. Also, high user strategies can be extended to depend on observation
of the low channel, as described at the end of Section 6.2.)
As an example, we present a strategy that a high user could employ to transmit
an arbitrary stream of bits z1z2 . . . to the low user in Program P1. This user
strategy, g, ensures that if b was the previous output on H, then the next input on
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H is the bitwise exclusive-or of b and zi. Note that every second event on channel
H is an input event in(H, v).
g(〈α1, . . . , αn〉) =


zi xor b if αn = out(H, b) and n = 2i− 1
0 otherwise
A joint strategy is a collection of user strategies, one for each channel. Formally,
a joint strategy ω is a function of type L → UserStrat, that is, a function from
security types to user strategies. Let Strat be the set of all joint strategies.
6.2 Noninterference for interactive programs
While-programs, extended with commands for input and output, constitute our
core interactive programming language. The syntax of this language is:
(expressions) e ::= n | x | e0 ⊕ e1
(commands) c ::= skip | x := e | c0; c1 |
input x from τ | output e to τ |
if e then c0 else c1 | while e do c
Metavariable x ranges over Var, the set of all program variables. Variables take
values in Z, the set of integers. Literal values n also range over integers. Binary
operator ⊕ denotes any total binary operation on the integers.
6.2.1 Operational semantics
The execution of a program modifies the values of variables and produces events
on channels. A state determines the values of variables. Formally, a state is a
function of type Var → Z. Let σ range over states. A configuration is a 4-tuple
(c, σ, t, ω) representing a system about to execute c with state σ and joint strategy
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(Assign)
(x := e, σ, t, ω) −→ (skip, σ[x := σ(e)], t, ω)
(Seq-1)
(skip; c, σ, t, ω) −→ (c, σ, t, ω)
(Seq-2)
(c0, σ, t, ω) −→ (c
′
0, σ
′, t′, ω)
(c0; c1, σ, t, ω) −→ (c
′
0; c1, σ
′, t′, ω)
(In)
ω(τ)(tτ) = v
(input x from τ, σ, t, ω) −→ (skip, σ[x := v], tˆ〈in(τ, v)〉, ω)
(Out)
σ(e) = v
(output e to τ, σ, t, ω) −→ (skip, σ, tˆ〈out(τ, v)〉, ω)
(If-1)
σ(e) 6= 0
(if e then c0 else c1, σ, t, ω) −→ (c0, σ, t, ω)
(If-2)
σ(e) = 0
(if e then c0 else c1, σ, t, ω) −→ (c1, σ, t, ω)
(While)
(while e do c, σ, t, ω) −→ (if e then (c; while e do c) else skip, σ, t, ω)
Figure 6.1: Operational semantics.
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ω. Trace t is the history of events produced by the system so far. Let m range
over configurations. Terminal configurations, which have no commands remaining
to execute, have the form (skip, σ, t, ω).
The operational semantics for our language is a small-step relation −→ on
configurations. Membership in the relation is denoted
(c, σ, t, ω) −→ (c′, σ′, t′, ω),
meaning that execution of command c can take a single step to command c′,
while updating the state from σ to σ′. Trace t′ extends t with any events that
were produced during the step. Note that joint strategy ω is unchanged when
a configuration takes a step; we include it in the configuration only to simplify
notation and presentation.
The inductive rules defining relation −→ are given in Figure 6.1. The rules for
commands other than input and output are all standard. In Rule Assign, σ(e)
denotes the value of expression e in state σ, and state update σ[x := v] changes
the value of variable x to v in σ. Rule In uses the joint strategy ω to determine
the next input event and appends it to the current trace, and rule Out simply
appends the output event to the current trace.
Let −→∗ be the reflexive transitive closure of −→. Intuitively, if
(c, σ, t, ω) −→∗ (c′, σ′, t′, ω),
then configuration (c, σ, t, ω) can reach configuration (c′, σ′, t′, ω) in zero or more
steps. Configuration m emits t, denoted m t, when there exists a configuration
(c, σ, t, ω) such that m −→∗ (c, σ, t, ω). Note that emitted events may include both
inputs and outputs.
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6.2.2 A strategy-based security condition
We now develop a security condition which ensures that users with access only to
channel L do not learn anything about the strategies employed by users interacting
with channel H. Since strategies encode the possible actions that users may take as
they interact with the system, protecting the secrecy of high strategies ensures that
the actions taken by high users cannot affect (or “interfere with”) the observations
of low users. As we will demonstrate in Section 6.5, the security condition can be
seen as an instance of our definitions of secrecy.
Informally, a program is secure if, for every initial state σ, any trace of events
seen on channel L is consistent with every possible user strategy for channel H.
This ensures that low users cannot learn any information, including inputs, that
high users attempt to convey—even if low users know the program text.
Definition 28 (Noninterference) A command c satisfies noninterference if for
all m = (c, σ, 〈〉, ω) and m′ = (c, σ, 〈〉, ω′) such that ω(L) = ω′(L) and for all traces
t such that m t, there exists a t′ such that tL = t′ L and m′  t′.
According to this condition, the high strategy ω(H) in m can be replaced by
any other high strategy without affecting the low traces emitted. Although the
condition assumes that programs begin with an empty trace of prior events, it can
be generalized to account for arbitrary traces. (See Appendix C.) Some additional
implications of this security condition are discussed below.
Initial variable values. The security condition does not protect the secrecy of the
initial values of variables. More concretely, the program output x to L is considered
secure for any x ∈ Var, whereas the program input x from H; output x to L
is obviously considered insecure. The definition thus reflects our intuition that
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high users interact with the system only via input and output events on the high
channel and have no control over the initialization of variables. Systems in which
the high user controls the initial values of some or all variables can be modeled
by prepending commands that read inputs from the high user and assign them to
variables.
Variable typings. It is not necessary to assign security types to program variables
in order to determine whether a program is secure. (A program with no high inputs,
for example, is secure regardless of its variables or their types.) Accordingly, our
security condition makes no reference to the security types of variables. This
distinguishes our work from most batch-job conditions, where variable typings are
fundamental. We do, however, employ variable typings for the static analysis
technique presented in Section 6.6.
Timing sensitivity. Our observational model is asynchronous: users do not
observe the time when events occur or the time that passes while a program is
blocking on an input command. The security condition is thus timing-insensitive.
We could incorporate timing sensitivity into the model by assuming that users
observe a “tick” event at each execution step or by tagging events with the time
at which they occur; strategies could then make use of this additional temporal
information.
Termination sensitivity. We make the standard assumption that users are
unable to observe the nontermination of a program. Nonetheless, our security
condition is termination-sensitive when low events follow commands that may not
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terminate. Consider the following program:
P2 : input x from H;
if (x = 0) then {while (true) do skip} else skip;
output 1 to L
A high user can cause this program to transmit the value 1 to a low user. Since this
would allow the low user to infer something about the high strategy, this program
is insecure according to our security condition.
We do not assume that users are able to observe the termination of a program
directly, but it would be easy to make termination observable by adding a distin-
guished termination event that is broadcast on all channels when execution reaches
a terminal configuration.
Observation of channels. We have assumed that high users cannot observe the
low channel, but this restriction can be removed in several ways. For example, it
is straightforward to amend the operational semantics to echo low events to high
channels by adding an additional high output event (prepended with a label to
distinguish it from a regular high output events) to the trace every time a low
input or output event occurs.
6.3 Nondeterministic programs
We distinguish two kinds of nondeterminism that appear in programs: probabilis-
tic choice and nondeterministic choice. Intuitively, probabilistic choice represents
explicit use of randomization, whereas nondeterministic choice represents program
behavior that is underspecified (perhaps due to unpredictable factors such as the
scheduler in a concurrent setting). Following the approach of previous work [44, 90],
we factor out the latter kind of nondeterminism by assuming that all nondetermin-
istic choices are made as if they were specified before the program began
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(The implications of this approach are discussed at the end of the section.) This al-
lows reasoning about nondeterministic choice and probabilistic choice in isolation,
and our definitions of noninterference reflect the resulting separation of concerns.
In this section we extend our model to include nondeterministic choice. We return
to probabilistic choice in Section 6.4.
6.3.1 Refiners
We extend the language of Section 6.2 with nondeterministic choice:
c ::= . . . | c0 8τ c1
Each nondeterministic choice is annotated with a security type τ that is used in
the operational semantics. The need for the annotation is explained below; we
remark, however, that the type system described in Section 6.6 could be used to
infer annotations automatically, so that programmers need not specify them.
To factor out the resolution of nondeterminism, we introduce infinite lists of
binary values called refinement lists. Denote the set of all such refinement lists
as RefList. Informally, when a nondeterministic choice is encountered during
execution, the head element of a refinement list is removed and used to resolve the
choice. The program executes the left command of the nondeterministic choice if
the element is 0 and the right command if the element is 1. Refinement lists are
an operational analog of Milner’s oracle domains [61] for denotational semantics.
We do not want choices made in accordance with refinement lists to cause
unwanted information flows. More generally, nondeterministic choices should not
cause insecure information flows, even if low users can predict how the choices will
be made. While it might seem that using a single refinement list would suffice
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to ensure that no insecure information flows arise as a result of the resolution of
nondeterministic choice, the following program demonstrates that this is not the
case:
input x from H;
if (x = 0) then {skip 8H skip} else skip;
output 0 to L 8L output 1 to L
If the refinement list 〈1, 0, . . .〉 is used to execute this program, the output on
channel L will equal the input on channel H. An insecure information flow arises
because the same refinement list is used to make both low and high choices. To
eliminate this flow, we identify the security type of a choice based on its annota-
tion and require that different lists be used to resolve choices at each type. This
ensures that the number of choices made at a given security level cannot become a
covert channel. (Note that this requirement lends itself to natural implementation
techniques. For example, if choices are made by using a stream of pseudorandom
numbers, then different streams should be used to resolve high and low choices.
Or if 8 represents scheduler choices, then the scheduler should resolve choices at
each security type independently.)
A refiner is a function ψ : L → RefList that associates a refinement list with
each security type. Let Ref denote the set of all refiners. Denote the standard list
operations of reading the first element of a list and removing the first element of a
list as head and tail , respectively. Given a refiner ψ, the value head(ψ(τ)) is used
to resolve the next choice annotated with type τ .
6.3.2 Operational semantics
Using refiners, we extend the operational semantics of Section 6.2 to account for
nondeterministic choice. A command c is now executed with respect to a refiner
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(Seq-2)
(c0, σ, ψ, t, ω) −→ (c
′
0, σ
′, ψ′, t′, ω)
(c0; c1, σ, ψ, t, ω) −→ (c
′
0; c1, σ
′, ψ′, t′, ω)
(Choice)
head(ψ(τ)) = i
(c0 8τ c1, σ, ψ, t, ω) −→ (ci, σ, ψ[τ := tail(ψ(τ))], t, ω)
Figure 6.2: Operational semantics for nondeterministic choice.
ψ, in addition to a state σ, trace t, and joint strategy ω. We thus modify con-
figurations to be 5-tuples (c, σ, ψ, t, ω); terminal configurations now have the form
(skip, σ, ψ, t, ω).
All of the operational rules from Figure 6.1 are adapted in the obvious way
to handle the new configurations. The only interesting change is Seq-2, which
is restated in Figure 6.2. Nondeterministic choice is evaluated by the new rule
Choice, which uses refiner ψ to resolve the choice and specifies how the refiner
changes as a result. Refiner ψ[τ := tail(ψ(τ))] is the refiner ψ with the refinement
list for τ replaced by tail(ψ(τ)).
Note that a refiner factors out all nondeterminism in the program: once a re-
finer, state, and joint strategy have been fixed, execution is completely determined.
6.3.3 A security condition for nondeterministic programs
A well-known problem arises with nondeterministic programs: they are vulnerable
to refinement attacks, in which a seemingly secure program can be refined to an
insecure program. For example, whether the input from H is kept secret in the
following program depends on how the nondeterministic choice is resolved:
P3 : input x from H;
output 0 to L 8 output 1 to L
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If the choice is made independently of the current state of the program, say by
tossing a coin, the program is secure. But if the choice is made as a function of x,
the program may leak information about the high input.
To ensure that a program is resistant to refinement attacks, we insist that,
for all possible resolutions of nondeterminism, the program does not leak any
confidential information. Our model allows this quantification to be expressed
cleanly, since refiners encapsulate the resolution of nondeterministic choice. We
adapt the security condition of Section 6.2.2 to ensure that, for any refinement of
the program, users with access only to channel L do not learn anything about the
strategies employed by users of channel H.
Definition 29 (Noninterference Under Refinement) A command c satisfies
noninterference under refinement if for all configurations m = (c, σ, ψ, 〈〉, ω) and
m′ = (c, σ, ψ, 〈〉, ω′) such that ω(L) = ω′(L) and for all traces t such that m  t,
there exists a t′ such that tL = t′ L and m′  t′.
Some implications of this definition are discussed below.
Low-observable nondeterminism. This security condition rules out refinement
attacks but allows programs that appear nondeterministic to a low user. For exam-
ple, Program P3 (with 8 replaced by 8L) satisfies noninterference under refinement,
yet repeated executions may reveal different program behavior to the low user.
Initial refinement lists. The security condition does not require the secrecy of
the initial refinement list for H. More concretely, the program
output 0 to L 8H output 1 to L
is considered secure even though it reveals information about the first value of
ψ(H). The definition thus reflects our intuition that high users interact with the
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system only via input and output events on the high channel, which gives them no
control over refinement lists. The definition of noninterference under refinement
could be adapted to systems where high users may exert control over refinement
lists.
Expressivity of refiners. Our model can represent only those refinements that
appear as if they were made before the program began execution. Refinements
that may depend upon dynamic factors, such as the values of variables or the
current program counter, cannot be represented. Our model therefore captures
compiler-time nondeterminism but not runtime nondeterminism [45]. We leave
development of more sophisticated refiners as future work.
6.4 Probabilistic programs
Probabilistic choice can be seen as refinement of arbitrary nondeterministic choice.
Now that we have shown how refiners can be used to factor out the nondeterministic
choices to which we are unable or unwilling to assign probabilities, we can model
probabilistic choice explicitly.
We begin by extending the nondeterministic language of Section 6.3 with prob-
abilistic choice:
c ::= . . . | c0 p8 c1
Informally, probabilistic choice c0 p8 c1 executes command c0 with probability p
and command c1 with probability 1 − p. The probability annotation p must be a
real number such that 0 ≤ p ≤ 1. We assume that probabilistic choices are made
independently of one another.
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(Prob-1)
(c0 p8 c1, σ, ψ, t, ω)
p
−→ (c0, σ, ψ, t, ω)
(Prob-2)
(c0 p8 c1, σ, ψ, t, ω)
1−p
−→ (c1, σ, ψ, t, ω)
Figure 6.3: Operational semantics for probabilistic choice.
6.4.1 Operational semantics
To incorporate probability in the operational semantics we extend the small-step
relation −→ of previous sections to include a label for probability. We denote
membership in the new relation by
m
p
−→ m′,
meaning that configuration m steps with probability p to configuration m′. Con-
figurations remain unchanged from the nondeterministic language of Section 6.3.
The new operational rules defining this relation are given in Figure 6.3. To facil-
itate backwards-compatibility with the operational rules of previous sections, we
interpret m −→ m′ as shorthand for m
1
−→ m′. The operational rules previously
given in Figures 6.1 and 6.2 thus remain unchanged.
6.4.2 A probabilistic security condition
It is well-known that probabilistic programs may be secure with respect to nonprob-
abilistic definitions of noninterference but leak confidential information with high
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probability. As an example, consider the following program:
P4 : input x from H;
if xmod 2 = 0 then
output 0 to L 0.998 output 1 to L
else
output 0 to L 0.018 output 1 to L
If we regard probabilistic choice p8 as identical to nondeterministic choice 8L, then
this program satisfies noninterference under refinement. Yet with high probability,
the program leaks the parity of the high input to channel L.
Toward preventing such probabilistic information flows, observe that if a low
trace t is likely to be emitted with one high user strategy and unlikely with an-
other, then the low user learns something about the high strategy by observing the
occurrence of t. We thus conclude that our security condition should require that
the probability with which low traces are emitted be independent of the strategy
employed on the high channel, that is, that low-equivalent configurations should
produce particular low traces with the same probability. This intuition is con-
sistent with security conditions given by Gray and Syverson [32] and with the
definition of “no evidence” given in Chapter 3.
More formally, let Em(t) represent the event that configuration m emits low
trace t. Suppose that we had a probability µm on such events. Then our security
condition should require, for all configurations m and m′ that are equivalent except
for the choice of high strategy, and all low traces t, that µm(Em(t)) = µm′(Em′(t)).
The remainder of this section is devoted to defining µm and Em(t).
We begin with two additional intuitions. First, since probabilistic choices are
made independently, the probability of an execution sequence
m0
p0
−→ m1
p1
−→ . . .
pn−1
−→ mn
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is equal to the product of the probabilities pi of the individual steps. Second,
a configuration m could emit the same trace t along multiple sequences, so the
probability that m emits t should be the sum of the probabilities associated with
those sequences.
Based on these intuitions, we now construct probability measure µm by adapt-
ing a standard approach for reasoning about probabilities on trees [36]. For any
configuration m, relation
p
−→ gives rise to a rooted directed probability tree whose
vertices are labeled with configurations, edges are labeled with probabilities, and
root is m. Denote the probability tree for m by Tm and the set of vertices of Tm
by Vm. A path in the tree is a sequence of vertices, starting with the root, where
each successive pair of vertices is an edge. Given a vertex v, let tr(v) be the trace
of events in the configuration with which v is labeled. We say that t appears at
v when tr(v) = t but tr(v′) 6= t for all ancestors v′ of v. Let ap(t) be the set of
vertices where t appears. In accordance with the intuitions described above, let
pi(v) be the product of the probabilities on the path to v.
A ray is an infinite path or a finite path whose terminal node has no descen-
dants, Rays therefore represent maximal execution sequences. Let Rm denote the
set of rays of Tm. Let Rm(v) be the set of rays that go through vertex v:
Rm(v) , {ρ ∈ Rm | v is on ρ}.
Let Am be the σ-algebra on Rm generated by sets of rays going through par-
ticular vertices, that is, by the set {Rm(v) | v ∈ Vm}.The following result yields a
probability measure on sets of rays. It is a consequence of elementary results in
probability theory, and we omit the proof.
Theorem 9 For any configuration m, there exists a unique probability measure
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µm on Am such that for all v ∈ Vm we have µm(Rm(v)) = pi(v).
Now that we have constructed µm, we must show how to use it to obtain the
probability of a set of traces in terms of the probability of a corresponding set of
rays. For a set T of traces, let Rm(T ) be the set of rays on which a trace in T
appears. Let emm(T ) = {t ∈ T |m  t} be the set of traces in T emitted by m,
and note that
Rm(T ) ,
⋃
t∈emm(T )
⋃
v∈ap(t)
Rm(v),
because a trace appears on a ray r if and only if it appears at a vertex v on r.
The set Rm(T ) is measurable with respect to Am because both emm(T ) and Vm
are countable sets. Given a trace t, the set {Rm(v) | v ∈ ap(t)} is a partition of
the set of rays on which t appears. It follows that
µm(Rm({t})) = µm(
⋃
v∈ap(t)Rm(v))
=
∑
v∈ap(t) µm(Rm(v))
=
∑
v∈ap(t) pi(v),
that is, that the probability that m emits t is equal to the sum of the values pi(v)
for vertices v where t appears, as desired.
We can now define Em(t). Given a security type τ and a trace t, let [t]τ be the
equivalence class of traces that are equal to t when restricted to τ :
[t]τ , {t
′ ∈ Tr | t′ τ = tτ}.
Finally, let Em(t) be the set of rays on which there is some vertex v such that
tr(v)L = tL:
Em(t) , Rm([t]L).
The set Em(t) is in Am. By Theorem 9, µm(Em(t)) is equal to the sum of values
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pi(v) for vertices v such that tr(v)L = tL and tr(v ′)L 6= tL for any ancestor
v′ of v.
We are now ready to formalize our security condition.
Definition 30 (Probabilistic Noninterference) A command c satisfies proba-
bilistic noninterference if for all m = (c, σ, ψ, 〈〉, ω) and m′ = (c, σ, ψ, 〈〉, ω′) such
that ω(L) = ω′(L) and for all t ∈ Tr(Ev(L)), we have µm(Em(t)) = µm′(Em′(t)).
Returning to Program P4 at the start of this section, it is easy to check that the
probability of the low trace 〈out(L, 0)〉 is 0.99 when the high strategy is to input an
even number, and 0.01 when the high strategy is to input an odd number. Clearly,
the program does not satisfy probabilistic noninterference.
Program P1, the insecure one-time pad implementation, does not satisfy prob-
abilistic noninterference. However, if the output to H is removed, the resulting
program
while (true) do
x := 0 0.58 x := 1;
input y from H;
output x xor (y mod 2) to L
does satisfy noninterference. The probability of low outputs is independent of the
high strategy, which can no longer exploit knowledge of the value of the one-time
pad x.
User strategies as defined thus far are deterministic. However, our approach
to reasoning about probability applies to randomized user strategies as well as to
randomized programs, so it would be straightforward to adapt our model to handle
randomized strategies.
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6.5 Characterizing noninterference as secrecy
It is straightforward to interpret our definitions of noninterference as instances of
the more general definitions of secrecy presented in Chapter 3. As in Chapter 5,
we must demonstrate how a system—in this case, a program—gives rise to a set
of runs. We reason about two agents L and H who interact with the channels
of the same names, and for simplicity we assume that a state σ and a refiner ψ
are fixed. (If they were not fixed, we could, without loss of generality, model the
states of agents to include information about the initial state and the refiner ψ. In
particular, by including the initial state and the refiner in L’s local state, we can
ensure that H maintains secrecy with respect to L even if L knows both the initial
values of variables and how the nondeterministic choices in the program will be
resolved.) We also assume that an agent’s local state encodes the strategy that
she is using. This is technically necessary, because the goal is to ensure that low
agents obtain no information about which strategy a high agent is using, but it
also seems reasonable to assume that agents know how they will behave.
Our goal is to exhibit a set of runs that characterizes the possible execution
sequences of the system. Given a particular joint strategy ω, we can derive a
natural set of runs from the corresponding rays of the probability tree for the
configuration (c, σ, ψ, t, ω); a system can then be characterized by the sets of runs
that arise from the possible joint strategies.
We associate a run rρ with a ray ρ as follows. If ρ is infinite, let rρ be a run
that, for each time step n, maps to a global state 〈(t L, ωL), (t H,ωH)〉, where t
is the trace appearing at the depth-n vertex of ρ and ωL, ωH are user strategies.
1
1We apologize for the inevitable overloading of the symbol m, which denotes
time steps in previous chapters and configurations in this chapter. In this section
we use n for time steps and m for configurations.
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(The first element of the pair is the local state of the low agent, and the second
element is the local state of the high agent.) More formally, let t(ρ, n) be the trace t
such that the depth-n vertex of ρ is labeled with configuration (c, σ, ψ, t, ω). Given
an infinite ray ρ from the probability tree T(c,σ,ψ,t,ω), let r
ρ be the run such that
rρ(n) = 〈(t(ρ, n)L, ω(L)), (t(ρ, n)H,ω(H))〉. Given a finite ray ρ whose terminal
vertex is of depth N , let rρ be the run such that
rρ(n) = 〈(t(ρ, n)L, ω(L)), (t(ρ, n)H,ω(H))〉
for all n ≤ N , and
rρ(n) = 〈(t(ρ,N)L, ω(L)), (t(ρ,N)H,ω(H))〉
for all n ≥ N .
A joint strategy ω thus gives us a set of runs Dω, a corresponding σ-algebra Fω,
and a probability measure µω. (Since there is a one-to-one correspondence between
rays and runs, Fω contains exactly those sets of runs derived from sets of rays in
A(c,σ,ψ,t,ω).) Let D , {Dω |ω ∈ Strat}, and let ∆ , {(Dω,Fω, µω, ) |Dω ∈ D},
in accordance with the definition of an adversarial probability system given in
Section 3.2.4. Finally, let R , ∪D∈DD.
This setup is sufficient to establish a connection between probabilistic nonin-
terference and “no evidence” (in the sense of Definition 13):
Theorem 10 Command c satisfies probabilistic noninterference if and only if, for
all initial states σ and refiners ψ, the low agent L obtains no evidence for the initial
choice in the adversarial probability system (R,D,∆) derived from c, σ, and ψ.
Proof: Given a point (r, n), let tL(r, n) be the event trace appearing in the local
state rL(n) of the low user. We begin by noting that for every joint strategy ω
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and every point (r, n) such that R(KL(r, n))∩Dω 6= ∅, we have µω(R(KL(r, n))) =
µm(Em(tL(n))) (where m = (c, σ, ψ, t, ω)). In other words, the probability of a
low-information set is the same as the probability that the associated low trace
will be emitted by the configuration using joint strategy ω. This follows because
we have
R(KL(r, n)) = {r
ρ | ρ ∈ Em(tL(n)),
by the definitions of R(KL(r, n)) and Em(tL(n)). Now, note that given a point
(r, n) and partitions Dω, Dω′ ∈ D, we have
R(KL(r, n)) ∩Dω 6= ∅
and
R(KL(r, n)) ∩Dω′ 6= ∅
only if ω(L) = ω′(L), because the local state of the low agent includes the low
strategy. The reader can now check that Definitions 13 and 30 coincide. ut
This result may seem tedious and relatively trivial, but by translating pro-
grams to sets of runs we can exploit Theorem 5 to demonstrate that probabilistic
noninterference coincides with run-based secrecy (according to Definition 12). In
particular, for any countable set of joint strategies, probabilistic noninterference
implies that the high agent maintains probabilistic run-based fprot -secrecy with
respect to the low-agent (where fprot extracts the high agent’s strategy) in the cor-
responding generalized run-based probability system. This result can be restated
in terms of the low agent’s beliefs about which strategy the high agent is using: if
the low user starts out with an initial probability distribution on high strategies,
he will be unable to improve the accuracy of that distribution as he interacts with
the system.
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6.6 A sound type system
The problem of characterizing programs that satisfy noninterference is, for many
definitions of noninterference, intractable. For definitions appearing in the previous
sections, there is a straightforward reduction from the halting problem to the
noninterference problem. It follows that no decision procedure for certifying the
information-flow security of programs can be both sound and complete with respect
to our definitions of noninterference. The goal of this section is to demonstrate
that static analysis techniques can be used to soundly identify secure programs.
We use a type system based on that of Volpano, Smith, and Irvine [92]. It
is interesting to note that a type system designed to enforce batch-job noninter-
ference conditions also enforces our interactive conditions, including probabilistic
noninterference, even though the type system is oblivious to the subtleties of prob-
ability, interactivity, and user strategies. We believe that other type systems for
information flow (e.g., [4, 48, 84, 86]) can also be easily adapted for our interactive
model, and thus that advances in precision and expressiveness can be applied to
our work.
The type system consists of a set of axioms and inference rules for deriving
typing judgments of the form Γ ` p : κ, meaning that phrase p has phrase type
κ under variable typing Γ. A phrase is either an expression or a command. A
phrase type is either a security type τ or a command type τ cmd, where τ ∈ L.
A variable typing is a function Γ : Var → L mapping from variables to security
types. Informally, a command c has type τ cmd when τ is a lower-bound on the
effects that c may have, that is, when the types (under Γ) of any variables that c
updates are bounded below by τ , and any input or output that c performs is on
channels whose security type is bounded below by τ .
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(T-Lit)
Γ ` n : τ
(T-Var)
Γ(x) = τ
Γ ` x : τ
(T-Op)
Γ ` e0 : τ Γ ` e1 : τ
Γ ` e0 ⊕ e1 : τ
(T-Assign)
Γ(x) = τ Γ ` e : τ
Γ ` x := e : τ cmd
(T-Skip)
Γ ` skip : τ cmd
(T-If)
Γ ` e : τ Γ ` c0 : τ cmd Γ ` c1 : τ cmd
Γ ` if e then c0 else c1 : τ cmd
(T-Seq)
Γ ` c0 : τ cmd Γ ` c1 : τ cmd
Γ ` c0; c1 : τ cmd
(T-While)
Γ ` e : L Γ ` c : τ cmd
Γ ` while e do c : L cmd
(T-Choice)
Γ ` c0 : τ cmd Γ ` c1 : τ cmd
Γ ` c0 8τ c1 : τ cmd
(T-Prob)
Γ ` c0 : τ cmd Γ ` c1 : τ cmd
Γ ` c0 p8 c1 : τ cmd
(T-In)
Γ(x) = τ ′ τ ≤ τ ′
Γ ` input x from τ : τ cmd
(T-Out)
Γ ` e : τ
Γ ` output e to τ : τ cmd
(T-Subtype)
Γ ` p : κ0 κ0 ≤ κ1
Γ ` p : κ1
(ST-Base)
L ≤ H
(ST-Refl)
κ ≤ κ
(ST-Cmd)
τ0 ≤ τ1
τ1 cmd ≤ τ0 cmd
Figure 6.4: Typing rules.
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Axioms and inference rules for the type system are given in Figure 6.4. There
are two types of rules: typing rules (prefixed with “T”) and subtyping rules (pre-
fixed with “ST”). Typing rules can be used to infer the type of an expression or
command directly. Subtyping rules allow a low-typed expression to be treated as
a high-typed expression and a high-typed command to be treated as a low-typed
command. (It is safe, for example, to store a low-typed expression in a high vari-
able, or to output data to a high user in the body of a loop with a low-typed
guard.)
Most of the rules in this type system are standard. Rules T-In and T-Out
are both similar to T-Assign: T-In ensures that values read from the τ channel
are stored in variables whose type is bounded below by τ , whereas T-Out ensures
that only τ -typed expressions are output on the τ channel. Rules T-Choice
and T-Prob are similar to T-Seq, except that T-Choice also checks that the
typing is consistent with the syntactic type annotation. Rule T-While forbids
high-guarded loops, ensuring that loop termination does not depend on the high
user’s strategy. This prohibits insecure programs such as P2 (in Section 6.2.2).
We believe this rule could be relaxed using techniques described by Boudol and
Castellani [4] and Smith [86].
The following theorem states that this type system soundly enforces noninter-
ference. Recall that our security conditions do not depend on the security types of
variables. Noninterference is enforced provided there exists some variable typing
under which the program is well-typed.2 The proof is in Appendix C.
Theorem 11 For any command c, if there exists a variable typing Γ and a security
2Because the security types of variables can be inferred, programmers need not
specify them. In a (trivially secure) program with no high inputs, for example, all
variables can be assigned type L.
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type τ such that Γ ` c : τ cmd, then
(a) if c does not contain nondeterministic or probabilistic choice, then c satisfies
noninterference;
(b) if c does not contain probabilistic choice, then c satisfies noninterference
under refinement; and
(c) c satisfies probabilistic noninterference.
6.7 Related work
Definitions of information-flow security for imperative programs began with the
work of Denning and Denning [13]. Many subsequent papers define information-
flow security for various sequential imperative languages, but nearly all of these
papers assume a batch-job model of computation. Therefore, they attempt to
ensure the secrecy of high-typed program variables rather than of the behavior of
high users who interact with the system. See Sabelfeld and Myers [76] for a survey
of language-based information-flow security.
Another line of work considers end-to-end information-flow restrictions for non-
deterministic systems that provide input and output functionality for users. Def-
initions of noninterference exist both for abstract systems (such as finite state
machines) that include input and output operations (Goguen and Meseguer [31],
McCullough [56], McLean [58], Mantel [54]), and for systems described using pro-
cess algebras such as CCS, the pi-calculus, and related formalisms (Focardi and
Gorrieri [22], Ryan and Schneider [73], Zdancewic and Myers [96]).
Definitions of noninterference based on process algebras typically require that
the observations made by a public user are the same regardless of which high
processes (if any) are interacting with the system. These definitions are thus
136
similar in spirit to our definitions of noninterference. Indeed, there is a close
connection between strategies and processes: both can be viewed as description
of how an agent will behave in an interactive setting. A formal comparison with
process-based definitions (such as [24]) may uncover further connections between
process-based system models and imperative programs.
Wittbold and Johnson [93] give the first strategy-based definition of information-
flow security, and Gray and Syverson [32] give a strategy-based definition of prob-
abilistic noninterference. Our definitions of noninterference are the first strategy-
based security conditions for an imperative programming language of which we are
aware. Our work can thus be viewed as a unification of two distinct strands of
the information-flow literature. In this sense our work is similar to that of Man-
tel and Sabelfeld [55], who demonstrate a connection between security predicates
taken from the MAKS framework of Mantel [54] and bisimulation-based definitions
of security for a concurrent imperative language due to Sabelfeld and Sands [77].
However, Mantel and Sabelfeld do not consider interactive programs.
Our probabilistic noninterference condition can be interpreted as precluding
programs that allow low users to make observations that improve the accuracy of
their beliefs about high behavior, that is, their beliefs about which high strategy is
used. As we discuss in Section 6.5, probabilistic noninterference suffices to ensure
that low users cannot improve the accuracy of their subjective beliefs about high
behavior by interacting with a program. Our probabilistic security condition also
ensures that the quantity of information flow due to a secure program is exactly zero
bits in the belief-based quantitative information-flow model of Clarkson, Myers,
and Schneider [10].
The bisimulation-based security condition of Sabelfeld and Sands [77] can be
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viewed as a relaxation of the batch-job model. However, as Mantel and Sabelfeld [55]
point out, bisimulation-based definitions are difficult to relate to trace-based con-
ditions when a nondeterministic choice operator is present in the language. The
following program, for example, satisfies both noninterference under refinement
and probabilistic noninterference (for suitable interpretations of the 8 operator),
but it is not secure with respect to a bisimulation-based definition of security:
input x from H;
if (x = 0)
output 0 to L;
{output 1 to L 8 output 2 to L}
else
{output 0 to L; output 1 to L} 8
{output 0 to L; output 2 to L}
Bisimulation-based security conditions implicitly assume that users can observe
internal choices made by a program. When users observe only inputs and outputs
on channels, our observational model is more appropriate.
Interactivity between users and a program is similar to message-passing be-
tween threads. Sabelfeld and Mantel [75] present a multi-threaded imperative
language with explicit send, blocking receive, and non-blocking receive operators
for communication between processes. They describe a bisimulation-based secu-
rity condition and a type system to enforce it. However, it is not clear how to
model user behavior in their setting. Users cannot be modeled as processes since
user behavior is unknown, and their security condition applies only if the entire
program is known.
Almeida Matos, Boudol, and Castellani [2] state a bisimulation-based secu-
rity condition for reactive programs, which allow limited communication between
processes, and they give a sound type system to enforce the condition. In their
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language, programs react to the presence and absence of named broadcast sig-
nals and can emit signals to other programs in a “local area.” It is possible to
implement our higher-level channels and events within a local area, using their
lower-level reactivity operators. However, it is unclear how to use reactivity to
model interactions with unknown users who are not part of a local area.
Focardi and Rossi [23] study the security of processes in dynamic contexts
where the environment, including high processes, can change throughout execution.
This is similar to how high user strategies describe changing inputs throughout
execution. However, user strategies depend upon the history of the computation,
whereas dynamic contexts do not, so it is unclear how to encode a user strategy
using dynamic contexts.
Previous work dealing with the susceptibility of possibilistic noninterference to
refinement attacks takes one of two approaches to specifying how nondeterministic
choice is resolved. One approach is to assume that choices are made according to
fixed probability distributions, as we do in Section 6.4. Volpano and Smith [91], for
example, describe a scheduler for a multithreaded language that chooses threads
to execute according to a uniform probability distribution. A second approach is
to insist that programs be observationally deterministic for low users. McLean [57]
and Roscoe [72] both advocate observational determinism as an appropriate secu-
rity condition for nondeterministic systems, and Zdancewic and Myers [96] give a
security condition based on observational determinism for a concurrent language
based on the join calculus [25].
Observational determinism implies noninterference under refinement and thus
immunity to refinement attacks. In settings where the resolution of nondeterminis-
tic choice may depend on confidential information, we conjecture that observational
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determinism and noninterference under refinement are equivalent. However, when
the resolution of some choices is independent of confidential information, obser-
vational determinism is a stronger condition: any program that is observationally
deterministic satisfies noninterference under refinement, but the converse does not
hold.
Chapter 7
Conclusion
We have defined general notions of secrecy for systems with which multiple agents
interact over time, and have given syntactic characterizations of our definitions
that connect them to logics of knowledge and probability. We have applied our
definitions to the problem of characterizing the absence of information flow, and
have shown how our definitions can be viewed as a generalization of a variety of
information-flow definitions that have been proposed in the past. We have also
given general definitions of anonymity for agents acting in multiagent systems,
and have compared and contrasted our definitions to other similar definitions of
anonymity.
Our knowledge-based system framework provides a number of advantages:
• We are able to state confidentiality properties succinctly and intuitively, and
in terms of the knowledge of the observers or attackers who interact with the
system.
• Our system has a well-defined semantics that lets us reason about knowledge
in systems of interest, such as systems specified using process algebras or
strand spaces as well as systems derived from imperative programs.
• We are able to give straightforward probabilistic definitions of secrecy and
anonymity.
As we discuss in Chapter 5, we are not the first to attempt to provide a gen-
eral framework for analyzing secrecy or anonymity. However, we believe that our
definitions are more closely related to the intuitions that people in the field have
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had, in part because those intuitions have often often been expressed informally in
terms of the knowledge of the agents who interact with a system.
Although we have discussed secrecy largely with respect to the kinds of input
and output systems that have been popular with the theoretical security commu-
nity, our definitions of secrecy apply in other contexts, such as protocol analysis,
semantics for imperative programming languages, and database theory. Chor, Gol-
dreich, Kushilevitz, and Sudan [8], for example, consider the situation where a user
wants to query a replicated database for some specific database item, but wants a
guarantee that no one will be able to determine, based on his query, which item
he wants. It is not hard to show that the definition of privacy given by Chor et
al. is a special case of secrecy in an adversarial system with a cell corresponding
to each possible item choice.
One possible direction for future work is a careful consideration of how defini-
tions of secrecy can be weakened to make them more useful in practice. Here we
briefly consider some of the issues involved:
• Declassification: Not all facts can be kept secret in a real-world computer
system. The canonical example is password checking, where a system is
forced to release information when it tells an attacker that a password is
invalid. Declassification for information-flow properties has been addressed
by, for example, Myers, Sabelfeld, and Zdancewic [65]. It would be interesting
to compare their approach to our syntactic approach to secrecy, keeping
in mind that our syntactic definitions can be easily weakened simply by
removing facts from the set of facts that an agent is required to think are
possible.
• Computational secrecy: Our definitions of secrecy are most appropriate for
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attackers with unlimited computational power, since agents “know” any fact
that follows logically from their local state, given the constraints of the sys-
tem. Such an assumption is unreasonable for most cryptographic systems,
where secrecy depends on the inability of attackers to solve difficult compu-
tational problems. The process-algebraic approach advocated by Mitchell,
Ramanathan, Scedrov, and Teague [63] and the work on probabilistic algo-
rithm knowledge of Halpern and Pucella [43] may help to shed light on how
definitions of secrecy can be weakened to account for agents with computa-
tional limitations.
• Quantitative secrecy: Our definitions of probabilistic secrecy require abso-
lute secrecy: no information about the state of high users may be revealed
to low users. One way to weaken these requirements is to place bounds on
the amount of information (measured in, say, bits) that can be revealed to
low users. This intuition can be formalized using the information-theoretic
notions of relative entropy and mutual information, which can be viewed
as generalizations of probabilistic independence. Rather than requiring that
a low agent learns nothing, quantitative definitions of secrecy use entropy-
based metrics to measure (and place bounds on) how much a low agent
learns as he interacts with a system. Information-theoretic approaches to
secrecy have been discussed by Wittbold and Johnson [93], and more re-
cently by Clark, Hunt, and Malacaria [9], Lowe [52], Di Pierro, Hankin, and
Wiklikcy [14], and Clarkson, Myers, and Schneider [10].
• Statistical privacy: In some systems, such as databases that release aggre-
gate statistical information about individuals, our definitions of secrecy are
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much too strong because they rule out the release of any useful information.
Formal definitions of secrecy and privacy for such systems have recently been
proposed by Evfimievski, Gehrke, and Srikant [18] and by Chawla, Dwork,
McSherry, Smith and Wee [6]. These definitions seek to limit the informa-
tion that an attacker can learn about a user whose personal information is
stored in the database. It would be interesting to cast those definitions as
weakenings of secrecy.
These weakenings of secrecy are all conceptually different, but there are obvi-
ously many relations and connections among them. We hope that our work will
help to clarify some of the issues involved.
With respect to anonymity, there are a number of issues that this paper has
not addressed. We have focused almost exclusively on properties of anonymity
and have not considered related notions, such as pseudonymity and unlinkabil-
ity [47, 68]. There seems to be no intrinsic difficulty capturing these notions in
our framework. For example, one form of message unlinkability specifies that no
two messages sent by an anonymous sender can be “linked,” in the sense that an
observer can determine that both messages were sent by the same sender. More
formally, two actions a and a′ are linked with respect to an observer o if o knows
that there exists an agent i who performed both a and a′. This definition can be
directly captured using knowledge. Its negation says that o considers it possible
that there exist two distinct agents who performed a and a′; this can be viewed as a
definition of minimal unlinkability. This minimal requirement can be strengthened,
exactly as our definitions of anonymity were, to include larger numbers of distinct
agents, probability, and so on. Although we have not worked out the details, we
believe that our approach will be similarly applicable to other related definitions.
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Another obviously important issue is verification and enforcement, that is,
checking whether a given system specifies one of the confidentiality properties we
have introduced. The sound type system of Section 6.6 is one example of a static
enforcement mechanism, but is specific to the domain of imperative programs. An-
other technique for enforcement that is more generally applicable to our definitions
is model-checking. Recent work on the problem of model checking in the multia-
gent systems framework suggests that this may be viable. Van der Meyden [59]
discusses algorithms and complexity results for model checking a wide range of
epistemic formulas in the runs and systems framework, and van der Meyden and
Su [60] use these results to verify the dining cryptographers protocol [5], using
formulas much like those described in Section 4.1.3. Even though model checking
of formulas involving knowledge seems to be intractable for large problems, these
results are a promising first step toward being able to use knowledge for both the
specification and verification of secrecy and anonymity. Shmatikov [83], for exam-
ple, analyzes the Crowds system using the probabilistic model checker PRISM [49].
This is a particularly good example of how definitions of anonymity can be made
precise using logic and probability, and how model-checking can generate new in-
sights into the functioning of a deployed protocol.
Our definitions of noninterference for imperative programs constitute a step
toward understanding and enforcing information-flow security in real-world pro-
grams. Many programs interact with users, and the behavior of these users will
often be dependent on previous inputs and outputs. Also, many programs, espe-
cially servers, are intended to run indefinitely rather than to perform some compu-
tation and then halt. Our model of interactivity is thus more suitable for analyzing
real-world systems than the batch-job model. In addition, our imperative language
145
approximates the implementation of real-world interactive programs more closely
than abstract system models such as the pi-calculus. Our work thereby contributes
to understanding the security properties of programs written in languages with in-
formation flow control, such as Jif [66] or Flow Caml [85], that support user input
and output.
In closing, we want to emphasize that our goal is not to advocate any par-
ticular definitions of secrecy or anonymity as being the “right” definition for all
situations. Rather, we argue that system designers should work with definitions
that are as simple and intuitive as possible. The definitions and results that we
have presented, and their underlying intuitions of knowledge and independence,
do not depend on the particular system representation that we describe here,
so they should be broadly applicable. Indeed, one major theme of our work is
the importance of having good system models and of isolating general notions
of confidentiality from particular system representations. Given the right system
model and the right measure of uncertainty, a reasonable definition of secrecy or
anonymity usually follows quite easily. By providing a general, straightforward way
to model systems, the runs-and-systems framework provides a useful foundation
for appropriate definitions of security.
Appendix A
Proofs for Chapter 3
A.1 Examples of systems
In this section, we give examples of simple systems that show the limitations of
various theorems. All the systems involve only two agents, and we ignore the
environment state. We describe each run using the notation
〈(Xi,1, Xj,1), (Xi,2, Xj,2), (Xi,3, Xj,3), . . .〉,
where Xi,k is the local state of agent i at time k. For asynchronous systems, we
assume that the final global state—(Xi,3, Xj,3), in the example above—is repeated
infinitely. For synchronous systems we need different states at each time step, so
we assume that global states not explicitly listed encode the time in some way, so
change at each time step. For notational simplicity, we use the same symbol for a
local state and its corresponding information set.
Example 1: Suppose that the synchronous system R consists of the following
two runs:
r1 , 〈(X,A), (Y1, B1), (Y2, B2), . . .〉
r2 , 〈(Z,A), (Y1, C1), (Y2, C2), . . .〉
Note that agent 2 has perfect recall in R, but agent 1 does not (since at time 0
agent 1 knows the run, but at all later times, he does not). It is easy to check
that agent 2 maintains synchronous secrecy with respect to 1, but not run-based
secrecy, since R(B1) ∩R(Z) = ∅.
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For the same reasons, if we take the probability measure µ on R with µ(r1) =
µ(r2) = 1/2, probabilistic synchronous secrecy and run-based probabilistic secrecy
do not coincide. This shows that the perfect recall requirement is necessary in
both Propositions 3 and 8. ut
Example 2: Suppose that the R consists of the following three runs (where, in
each case, the last state repeats infinitely often):
r1 , 〈(X,A) . . .〉
r2 , 〈(X,B), (Y,A) . . .〉
r3 , 〈(Y,A) . . .〉,
It is easy to see that agent 2 maintains run-based secrecy with respect to agent 1
in R, but not total secrecy or synchronous secrecy (since, for example, Y ∩B = ∅).
Now consider a probability measure µ on R such µ(r1) = µ(r3) = 2/5, and
µ(r2) = 1/5. Then µ(R(A) |R(X)) = µ(R(A) |R(Y )) = 1 and µ(R(B) |R(X)) =
µ(R(B) |R(Y )) = 1/3, so agent 2 maintains run-based probabilistic secrecy with
respect to 1 in R. 1 does not maintain probabilistic secrecy with respect to 2
in (R, µ), since µ(R(X) |R(A)) = 3/5, while µ(R(X) |R(B)) = 1. Thus, if the
agents do not have perfect recall and the system is not synchronous, then run-
based probabilistic secrecy is not necessarily symmetric. ut
Example 3: Suppose that the synchronous system R consists of the following
four runs:
r1 , 〈(X,A), (Y1, C1), (Y2, C2), . . .〉
r2 , 〈(X,B), (Y1, D1), (Y2, D2), . . .〉
r3 , 〈(Q,A), (R1, D1), (R2, D2), . . .〉
r4 , 〈(Q,B), (R1, C2), (R2, C2), . . .〉
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Note that agent 2 does not have perfect recall in R, although agent 1 does. Let µ
give each of these runs equal probability. It is easy to check that for all i ≥ 1, we
have
• µ(R(A) |R(X)) = µ(R(A) |R(Q)) = 1/2,
• µ(R(B) |R(X)) = µ(R(B) |R(Q)) = 1/2,
• µ(R(Ci) |R(X)) = µ(R(Ci) |R(Q)) = 1/2, and
• µ(R(Di) |R(X)) = µ(R(Di) |R(Q)) = 1/2.
Because R(X) = R(Yi) and R(Q) = R(Ri) for all i ≥ 1, it follows that agent 2
maintains run-based probabilistic secrecy with respect to 1 in (R, µ).
Now, let p be a primitive proposition and let pi be an interpretation such that
p is true if 2’s local state is either A or D1. Thus, p is 2-local in I = (R, µ, pi).
Since µ(R(A)∪R(D1) |R(X)) = 1 while µ(R(A)∪R(D1) |R(Q)) = 1/2, there is
no constant σ such that I |= Pr1(♦p) = σ. This shows that the assumption that
agent j has perfect recall is necessary in Theorem 4. ut
A.2 Proofs for Section 3.1
Proposition 2: If R is a system where i and j have perfect recall, C depends only
on timing, and j maintains C-secrecy with respect to i, then j maintains run-based
secrecy with respect to i.
Proof: Given (r,m) and (r′,m′), we must find a run r′′ and times m1 and m2 such
that r′′i (m1) = ri(m) and r
′′
j (m2) = r
′
j(m
′). Because C depends only on timing,
there exists a point (r, n) such that (r′,m′) ∈ C(r, n). The proof now splits into
two cases:
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• Suppose that n ≥ m. By C-secrecy, there exists a point (r′′,m2) such that
r′′i (m2) = ri(n) and r
′′
j (m2) = r
′
j(m
′). Because i has perfect recall, there
exists some m1 ≤ m2 such that r
′′
i (m1) = ri(m).
• Suppose thatm > n. Because C depends only on timing, there exists n′ ≥ m′
such that (r′, n′) ∈ C(r,m). By C-secrecy, there exists a point (r′′,m2) such
that r′′i (m2) = ri(m) and r
′′
j (m2) = r
′
j(n
′). Because j has perfect recall, there
exists some m1 ≤ m2 such that r
′′
j (m1) = r
′
j(m
′).
ut
Proposition 3: If R is a synchronous system where both i and j have perfect
recall, then agent j maintains synchronous secrecy with respect to i iff j maintains
run-based secrecy with respect to i.
Proof: Suppose that agent j maintains synchronous secrecy with respect to j in
R. Because both i and j have perfect recall, j maintains run-based secrecy with
respect to i by Proposition 2.
Conversely, suppose that j maintains run-based secrecy with respect to i. Given
runs r, r′ ∈ R and any time m, there exists a run r′′, and times n and n′, such
that r′′i (n) = ri(m) and r
′′
j (n
′) = r′j(m). By synchrony, m = n = n
′, and we have
r′′i (m) = ri(m) and r
′′
j (m) = r
′
j(m). Thus j maintains synchronous secrecy with
respect to i. ut
Proposition 4: A formula φ is j-local in an interpreted system I = (R, pi)
iff there exists a set Ω of j-information sets such that (I, r,m) |= φ whenever
(r,m) ∈
⋃
K∈ΩK.
Proof: Suppose that φ is j-local. Let
Ω = {Kj(r,m) | (I, r,m) |= φ}.
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If (I, r,m) |= φ, then Kj(r,m) ∈ Ω by definition, so (r,m) ∈
⋃
K∈ΩK. Likewise, if
(r,m) ∈
⋃
K∈ΩK, then (r,m) ∈ Kj(r
′,m′) for some (r′,m′) such that (I, r′,m′) |=
φ. By j-locality, (I, r,m) |= φ.
Conversely suppose that there exists a set of j-information sets Ω such that
(I, r,m) |= φ whenever (r,m) ∈
⋃
K∈ΩK. We need to show that φ is j-local.
Suppose that rj(m) = r
′
j(m
′). If (I, r,m) |= φ, then (r,m) ∈ Kj(r
′′,m′′) for some
Kj(r
′′,m′′) ∈ Ω, and clearly (r′,m′) ∈ Kj(r
′′,m′′) ⊆
⋃
K∈ΩK too, so (I, r
′,m′) |= φ
by assumption. ut
Theorem 1: Suppose that C is an i-allowability function. Agent j maintains
C-secrecy with respect to agent i in system R iff, for every interpretation pi and
point (r,m), if φ is j-local and (I, r′,m′) |= φ for some (r′,m′) ∈ C(r,m), then
(I, r,m) |= Piφ.
Proof: Suppose that j maintains C-secrecy with respect to i in R. Let pi be an
interpretation, let (r,m) be a point, and let φ be a formula that is j-local such
that (I, r′,m′) |= φ for some (r′,m′) ∈ C(r,m). By C-secrecy, there exists a
point (r′′,m′′) ∈ Ki(r,m) ∩ Kj(r
′,m′). Because φ is j-local, (I, r′′,m′′) |= φ. Thus
(I, r,m) |= Piφ, as required.
For the converse, given (r,m) ∈ PT (R) and (r′,m′) ∈ C(r,m), let pi be an
interpretation such that pi(r′′,m′′)(p) = true iff (r′′,m′′) ∈ Kj(r
′,m′). Let I =
(R, pi). Clearly, p is j-local. By assumption, (I, r,m) |= Pip. Thus, there exists
some point (r′′,m′′) ∈ Ki(r,m) such that (I, r
′′,m′′) |= p. By definition, (r′′,m′′) ∈
Kj(r
′,m′). Because (r′′,m′′) ∈ Ki(r,m) ∩ Kj(r
′,m′), j maintains C-secrecy with
respect to i in R. ut
Theorem 2: Agent j maintains run-based secrecy with respect to agent i in system
151
R iff, for every interpretation pi, if φ is j-local and satisfiable in I = (R, pi), then
I |= Pi♦φ.
Proof: Suppose that j maintains run-based secrecy with respect to i. Let pi
be an interpretation and let φ be a j-local formula formula that is satisfiable in
I = (R, pi). Choose a point (r,m). Because φ is satisfiable, there exists a point
(r′,m′) such that (I, r′,m′) |= φ. Because j maintains run-based secrecy with
respect to i, there exist a run r′′ and times n and n′ such that r′′i (n) = ri(m) and
r′′j (n
′) = r′j(m
′). By j-locality, (I, r′′, n′) |= φ. It follows that (I, r′′, n) |= ♦φ, and
that (I, r,m) |= Pi♦φ, as desired.
For the converse, given points (r,m) and (r′,m′), let pi be an interpretation
such that pi(r′′,m′′)(p) = true iff (r′′,m′′) ∈ Kj(r
′,m′). We must show that
R(Ki(r,m))∩R(Kj(r
′,m′)) 6= ∅. Clearly p is j-local and satisfiable, so (I, r,m) |=
Pi♦p. Thus, there exists a point (r′′, n) ∈ Ki(r,m) such that (I, r′′, n) |= ♦p.
By definition of p, there exists n′ such that (r′′, n′) ∈ Kj(r
′,m′). It follows that
r′′ ∈ R(Ki(r,m)) ∩R(Kj(r
′,m′)). ut
A.3 Proofs for Section 3.2
Proposition 5: If (R,PR) is a probability system such that µr,m,i({(r,m)}) > 0
for all points (r,m) and j maintains probabilistic total secrecy with respect to i in
(R,PR), then j also maintains total secrecy with respect to i in R.
Proof: Suppose that j maintains probabilistic total secrecy with respect to i
in (R,PR), and (r,m) and (r′,m′) are arbitrary points. Then (taking (r′′,m′′) =
(r′,m′) in the definition) we have µr,m,i(Kj(r
′,m′)∩Ki(r,m)) = µr′,m′,i(Kj(r
′,m′)∩
Ki(r
′,m′)). But (r′,m′) ∈ Kj(r
′,m′)∩Ki(r
′,m′), so µr′,m′,i(Kj(r
′,m′)∩Ki(r
′,m′)) ≥
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µr′,m′,i({(r
′,m′)}) > 0, by assumption. Thus, µr,m,i(Kj(r
′,m′)∩Ki(r,m)) > 0, from
which it follows that Kj(r
′,m′) ∩ Ki(r,m) 6= ∅. ut
The following result is proved by Gill, van der Laan, and Robins [28]; see also
Gru¨nwald and Halpern [33, Theorem 3.1]. (A more general version is stated and
proved as Proposition 3.)
Lemma 1 Suppose that µ is a probability on W , X,Y ⊆ W , Y1, Y2, . . . is a count-
able partition of Y ⊆ W , and X,Y1, Y2, . . . are all measurable. The following are
equivalent:
(a) µ(X |Yi) = µ(X |Yj) for all Yi, Yj such that µ(Yi) > 0 and µ(Yj) > 0.
(b) µ(X |Yi) = µ(X |Y ) for all Yi such that µ(Yi) > 0, so that Yi is conditionally
independent of X given Y .
Proposition 6: If (R,PR) is a probability system (resp., synchronous probability
system) that satisfies the common prior assumption with prior probability µcp, the
following are equivalent:
(a) Agent j maintains probabilistic total (resp., synchronous) secrecy with respect
to i.
(b) Agent i maintains probabilistic total (resp., synchronous) secrecy with respect
to j.
(c) For all points (r,m) and (r′,m′),
µcp(Kj(r
′,m′) | Ki(r,m)) = µcp(Kj(r
′,m′))
(resp., for all points (r,m) and (r′,m),
µcp(Kj(r
′,m) | Ki(r,m)) = µcp(Kj(r
′,m) | PT (m)),
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where PT (m) is the set of points occurring at time m; that is, the events
Ki(r,m) and Kj(r
′,m) are conditionally independent with respect to µcp,
given that the time is m).
Proof: We prove the synchronous case here. The proof for total secrecy is almost
identical and left to the reader. Recall that j maintains probabilistic synchronous
secrecy with respect to i if, for all times m and all runs r, r′, r′′,
µr,m,i(Kj(r
′′,m) ∩ Ki(r,m)) = µr′,m,i(Kj(r
′′,m) ∩ Ki(r
′,m)).
Because (R,PR) satisfies the common prior assumption with prior probability
µcp , this requirement can be restated as
µcp(Kj(r
′′,m) | Ki(r,m)) = µcp(Kj(r
′′,m) | Ki(r
′,m)).
By Lemma 1, taking Y = PT (m) and the Yi’s to be the i-information sets at
time m, it follows that j maintains probabilistic synchronous secrecy with respect
to i iff Kj(r
′′,m) is conditionally independent of Ki(r,m) conditional on PT (m)
for all runs r and r′′. By the symmetry of conditional independence, it immedi-
ately follows that this is true iff i maintains probabilistic synchronous secrecy with
respect to j. ut
Lemma 2 If R is a system where agent i has perfect recall and Ω is an arbitrary
set of i-information sets, then there exists a set Ω′ ⊆ Ω such that {R(K) | K ∈ Ω′}
is a partition of
⋃
K∈ΩR(K).
Proof: Define a set K ∈ Ω to be dominated by a set K′ ∈ Ω if K 6= K′ and there
exists a run r and times m′〈m such that (r,m) ∈ K and (r,m′) ∈ K′. Let Ω′ consist
of the information sets in Ω that are not dominated by another set in Ω. Note
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that if r ∈ ∪K∈ΩR(K), then r ∈ R(K
′) for some K′ ∈ Ω′. To see this, consider
the set Ω(K) consisting of K and all information sets in Ω that dominate K. By
perfect recall, i’s local state sequence at each information set in Ω(K) is a (not
necessarily strict) prefix of i’s local state sequence in K. Let K′ be the information
set in Ω(K) where i’s local state sequence is shortest. It follows that K′ is not
dominated by another information set in Ω(K). Furthermore, if there exists an
information set K′′ ∈ Ω−Ω(K) that dominates K′, then K′′ would dominate K as
well, contradicting the construction of Ω(K). Therefore, K′ ∈ Ω′ and r ∈ K′. Thus
⋃
K∈Ω′R(K) =
⋃
K∈ΩR(K). Moreover, if K and K
′ are different sets in Ω′, then
R(K) and R(K′) must be disjoint, for otherwise one of K or K′ would dominate
the other. ut
Proposition 7: If (R,F , µ) is a run-based probability system that is either
synchronous or one where agents i and j both have perfect recall, then the following
are equivalent:
(a) Agent j maintains run-based probabilistic secrecy with respect to i.
(b) Agent i maintains run-based probabilistic secrecy with respect to j.
(c) For all points (r,m) and (r′,m′), R(Ki(r,m)) and R(Kj(r
′,m′)) are proba-
bilistically independent with respect to µ.
Proof: First, note that if R is synchronous or if i has perfect recall, then there
exists a collection Ω of i-information sets such that the set {R(K) | K ∈ Ω} is a
partition of R. In the case of perfect recall, this follows by Lemma 2 applied to
the set of all information sets (whose union is clearly R). With synchrony we can
take Ω to consist of sets of the form R(Ki(r,m)), for some fixed time m.
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Now, suppose j maintains run-based probabilistic secrecy with respect to i. By
definition,
µ(R(Kj(r
′′,m′′)) |R(Ki(r,m))) = µ(R(Kj(r
′′,m′′)) |R(Ki(r
′,m′)))
for all points (r,m), (r′,m′), and (r′′,m′′). In particular, for all K,K′ ∈ Ω, and all
points (r′,m′), µ(R(Kj(r
′,m′) |R(K))) = µ(R(Kj(r
′,m′)) |R(K′)). By Lemma 1
it follows that µ(R(Kj(r
′,m′′)) |R(K)) = µ(R(Kj(r
′,m′′))) for all information sets
K ∈ Ω. But then it follows by secrecy that µ(R(Kj(r
′,m′)) |R(Ki(r,m))) =
µ(R(Kj(r
′,m′)) for all i-information sets R(Ki(r,m)). Therefore R(Kj(r
′,m′))
and R(Ki(r,m)) are independent for all information sets Kj(r
′,m′) and Ki(r,m).
Thus secrecy implies independence, and this holds if we reverse the roles of i and
j.
It is also clear that independence implies secrecy. For suppose that (c) holds.
Then, for all points (r,m), (r′,m′), and (r′′,m′′), we have
µ(R(Kj(r
′′,m′′)) |R(Ki(r,m))) = µ(R(Kj(r
′′,m′′)))
= µ(R(Kj(r
′′,m′′)) |R(Ki(r
′,m′))),
so that j maintains run-based probabilistic secrecy with respect to i. Similarly, i
maintains secrecy with respect to j. ut
Proposition 8: If (R,PR) is the standard system determined by the synchronous
run-based probability system (R,F , µ) and agents i and j have perfect recall in R,
then agent j maintains run-based probabilistic secrecy with respect to i in (R,F , µ)
iff j maintains probabilistic synchronous secrecy with respect to i in (R,PR).
Proof: Clearly if j maintains run-based probabilistic secrecy with respect to i in
(R, µ) and (R,PR) is the standard system determined by (R, µ) then, at all times
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m,
µr,m,i(Kj(r
′′,m) ∩ Ki(r,m)) = µ(Kj(r
′′,m) | Ki(r,m))
= µ(Kj(r
′′,m) | Ki(r
′,m))
= µr′,m,i(Kj(r
′′,m) ∩ Ki(r
′,m)),
so j maintains probabilistic synchronous secrecy with respect to i in (R,PR).
For the converse, suppose that j maintains probabilistic synchronous secrecy
with respect to i in (R,PR). We want to show that, for all points (r,m), (r ′,m′),
and (r′′,m′′),
µ(R(Kj(r
′′,m′′)) |R(Ki(r,m))) = µ(R(Kj(r
′′,m′′)) |R(Ki(r
′,m′))). (A.1)
We first show that, for all runs r and r′′ and times m and m′′,
µ(R(Kj(r
′′,m′′)) |R(Ki(r,m))) = µ(R(Kj(r
′′,m′′)) |R(Ki(r,m
′′))). (A.2)
Since (A.2) also holds with r replaced by r′, (A.1) easily follows from (A.2) and
the assumption that j maintains probabilistic synchronous secrecy with respect to
i.
To prove (A.2), we consider two cases: m ≤ m′′ and m′′ < m. If m ≤ m′′
then, by synchrony and perfect recall, we can partition the runs in R(Ki(r,m))
according to i’s local state at time m′′. Let Ω = {Ki(r
∗,m′′) | r∗ ∈ R(Ki(r,m))}.
By perfect recall and synchrony, R(Ki(r,m)) is the disjoint union of the sets in Ω.
Thus,
µ(R(Kj(r
′′,m′′)) |R(Ki(r,m)))
=
∑
K∈Ω µ(R(Kj(r
′′,m′′)) ∩R(K) |R(Ki(r,m)))
=
∑
K∈Ω µ(R(Kj(r
′′,m′′)) |R(K)) · µ(R(K) |R(Ki(r,m)))
= µ(R(Kj(r
′′,m′′)) |R(Ki(r,m
′′))) ·
∑
K∈Ω µ(R(K) |R(Ki(r,m)))
= µ(R(Kj(r
′′,m′′)) |R(Ki(r,m
′′))).
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The argument is similar if m′′ < m. We now partition the runs in R(Ki(r,m
′′))
according to i’s local state at time m and the runs in R(Kj(r
′′,m′′)) according to
j’s local state at time m. Define
Ωi = {Ki(r
∗,m) | r∗ ∈ R(Ki(r,m
′′)}.
and
Ωj = {Kj(r
∗,m) | r∗ ∈ R(Kj(r
′′,m′′))}.
We now have
µ(R(Kj(r
′′,m′′)) |R(Ki(r,m
′′)))
=
∑
Kj∈Ωj
µ(R(Kj) |R(Ki(r,m
′′)))
=
∑
Kj∈Ωj
∑
Ki∈Ωi
µ(R(Kj) |R(Ki)) · µ(R(Ki) |R(Ki(r,m
′′)))
=
∑
Kj∈Ωj
µ(R(Kj) |R(Ki)) ·
∑
Ki∈Ωi
µ(R(Ki) |R(Ki(r,m
′′)))
=
∑
Kj∈Ωj
µ(R(Kj) |R(Ki(r,m)))
= µ(R(Kj(r
′′,m′′)) |R(Ki(r,m))),
as needed. ut
Theorem 3:
(a) If (R,PR) is a probabilistic system, then agent j maintains probabilistic total
secrecy with respect to agent i iff, for every interpretation pi and formula
φ that is j-local in I = (R,PR, pi), there exists a constant σ such that
I |= Pri(φ) = σ.
(b) If (R,PR) is a synchronous probabilistic system, then agent j maintains
probabilistic synchronous secrecy with respect to agent i iff, for every inter-
pretation pi, time m, and formula φ that is j-local in I = (R,PR, pi), there
exists a constant σm such that (I, r,m) |= Pri(φ) = σm for all runs r ∈ R.
158
Proof: We prove part (b) here. The proof of (a) is similar.
Suppose R is synchronous and that j maintains synchronous probabilistic se-
crecy with respect to i. Let pi be an interpretation, m be an arbitrary time,
and φ be a j-local formula in I = (R, µ, pi). Because φ is j-local, by Propo-
sition 4, there exists a set Ω of j-information sets such that (I, r,m) |= φ iff
(r,m) ∈
⋃
K∈ΩK. Let Ψ =
⋃
K∈ΩK. Let S = {r
′ ∈ R | (r′,m) ∈ Ψ}, and let
Ω(m) = {K ∈ Ω | (r′,m) ∈ K for some r′ ∈ R}. Since j maintains synchronous
probabilistic secrecy with respect to i, for every element K ∈ Ω(m), there is a con-
stant σ(K,m) such that, for all runs r ∈ R, µ(R(K) |R(Ki(r,m))) = σ(K,m). Let
σm =
∑
K∈Ω(m) σ(K,m), and fix r ∈ R. By synchrony, the set {R(K) | K ∈ Ω(m)}
partitions S, and
µ(S |R(Ki(r,m))) =
∑
K∈Ω(m)
µ(R(K) |R(Ki(r,m))) = σm.
Because Ψ ∩ Ki(r,m) = Ki(r,m)(S), we have µr,m,i(Ψ) = µ(S |R(Ki(r,m))), and
it follows that (I, r,m) |= Pri(φ) = σm, as desired.
For the converse, suppose that for every interpretation pi and time m, if φ is
j-local in I = (R, µ, pi), then there exists a constant σm such that (I, r,m) |=
Pri(φ) = σm for all runs r ∈ R. Fix a time m. Suppose that r, r
′, r′′ ∈ R and
that pi is an interpretation such that pi(r∗, n)(p) = true iff (r∗, n) ∈ Kj(r
′′,m).
The proposition p is j-local, so there exists a constant σm such that (I, r,m) |=
Pri(p) = σm and (I, r
′,m) |= Pri(p) = σm. It follows that
µr,m,i(Kj(r
′′,m)) = σm = µr′,m,i(Kj(r
′′,m)),
as desired. ut
Theorem 4: If (R,PR) is a standard probability system where agent j has
perfect recall, then agent j maintains run-based probabilistic secrecy with respect
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to agent i iff, for every interpretation pi and every formula φ that is j-local in
I = (R,PR, pi), there exists a constant σ such that I |= Pri(♦φ) = σ.
Proof: Suppose that j maintains probabilistic secrecy with respect to agent i in
(R, µ). Given an interpretation pi and a formula φ that is j-local in I = (R, µ, pi),
by Proposition 4 there exists a set Ω of j-information sets such that (I, r,m) |= φ
whenever (r,m) ∈
⋃
K∈ΩK. Let Ψ =
⋃
K∈ΩR(K). Note that (I, r,m) |= ♦φ
iff r ∈ R(
⋃
K∈ΩK) = Ψ. By Lemma 2, there exists a set Ω
′ ⊆ Ω such that
{R(K) : K ∈ Ω} is a partition of Ψ. By probabilistic secrecy, for each K ∈ Ω′,
there exists a constant σK such that
µ(R(K) |R(Ki(r,m))) = σK
for all points (r,m). Let σ =
∑
K∈Ω′ σK. Because {R(K) | K ∈ Ω
′} is a partition of
Ψ, for all points (r,m),
µ(Ψ |R(Ki(r,m))) =
∑
K∈Ω
µ(R(K) |R(Ki(r,m))) = σ.
Because µr,m,i(Ki(r,m)(Ψ)) = µ(Ψ |R(Ki(r,m))), it follows that I |= Pri(♦φ) = σ.
For the converse, suppose that for every interpretation pi and formula φ that
is j-local in I = (R, µ, pi), there exists a constant σ such that I |= Pri(♦φ) = σ.
Given points (r,m), (r′,m′), and (r′′,m′′), let pi be an interpretation such that
pi(r∗, n)(p) = true iff (r∗, n) ∈ Kj(r
′′,m′′). The proposition p is j-local, so I |=
Pri(♦p) = σ. It follows that
µ(R(Kj(r
′′,m′′)) |R(Ki(r,m))) = µr,m,i(Ki(r,m)(R(Kj(r
′′,m′′)))) = σ,
and the same holds if we replace (r,m) with (r′,m′), so
µ(R(Kj(r
′′,m′′)) |R(Ki(r,m))) = µ(R(Kj(r
′′,m′′)) |R(Ki(r
′,m′))).
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This gives us probabilistic secrecy. ut
Theorem 5: Let (R,D,∆) be the adversarial probability system determined by
INIT and suppose that R is either synchronous or a system where i has perfect
recall. Agent i obtains no evidence for the initial choice in (R,D,∆) iff agent
i− maintains generalized run-based probabilistic fi−-secrecy with respect to i in
(R,MINITi (∆)).
Proof: For the forward direction, we want to show that i− maintains generalized
run-based probabilistic fi−-secrecy with respect to i in (R,M
INIT
i (∆)). Suppose
that µ ∈ MINITi (∆). The information function fi− maps an i
−-information set to
the choices made by the agents other than i. Let an i−-choice set be a set of runs
of the form ∩j 6=iDyj . We must show that for arbitrary points (r,m) and (r
′,m′)
and i−-choice sets Di− , we have
µ(Di− |R(Ki(r,m))) = µ(Di− |R(Ki(r
′,m′))). (A.3)
Since, by assumption, i’s choice is encoded i’s local state, there exists a unique yi
such that R(Ki(r,m)) ⊆ Dyi . Since i obtains no evidence for the initial choice, we
have that for all i−-choice sets Di− and D
′
i− ,
µDyi∩Di− (R(Ki(r,m))) = µDyi∩D′i−
(R(Ki(r,m))). (A.4)
Thus, whenever µ(Dyi ∩Di−) > 0 and µ(Dyi ∩D
′
i−) > 0, we have
µ(R(Ki(r,m)) |Dyi ∩Di−) = µDyi∩Di− (R(Ki(r,m)))
= µDyi∩D′i−
(R(Ki(r,m)))
= µ(R(Ki(r,m)) |Dyi ∩D
′
i−).
It now follows by Lemma 1 that R(Ki(r,m)) is conditionally independent of every
i−-choice set given Dyi . (Though Lemma 1 actually shows only that R(Ki(r,m))
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is conditionally independent of every i− choice set Di− such that µ(Di− ∩Dyi) > 0,
conditional independence is immediate if µ(Di−∩Dyi) = 0) Thus, for any i
−-choice
set Di− , we have
µ(Di− |R(Ki(r,m))) = µ(Di− |R(Ki(r,m)) ∩Dyi) = µ(Di− |Dyi) = µ(Di−),
where the last equality follows because we have assumed that i’s choice is inde-
pendent of the choices made by other agents. Similarly, µ(Di− |R(Ki(r
′,m′))) =
µ(Di−), so (A.3) follows, and i
− does indeed maintain generalized run-based prob-
abilistic fi−-secrecy with respect to i.
For the converse, suppose that i− maintains generalized run-based probabilistic
fi−-secrecy with respect to i. Thus, for all points (r,m), i
−-choice sets Di− , and
measures µ ∈ MINITi (∆), we have (A.3). Given two i
−-choice sets Di− and D
′
i−
and an i-information set Ki(r,m) such that R(Ki(r,m)) ⊆ Dyi , we want to show
(A.4). To do so we first show that there exists a measure µ ∈MINITi (∆) that places
positive probability on all the cells. (We will make use of this particular measure for
the duration of the proof.) Our strategy is to take a countable linear combination
of the cell-specific probability measures, such that the set of runs in each cell is
assigned positive probability by µ. Let yi1, yi2, . . . be a countable enumeration of
INIT i, and let D1, D2, . . . be a countable enumeration of the possible i
−-choice
sets. Define the function µ such that for U ∈ F ,
µ(U) =
∑
j≥1,k≥1
µDyij∩Dk(U ∩Dyij ∩Dk)
2jk
.
It is straightforward to check that µ ∈ MINITi (∆) and that it places a positive
probability on all the cells in D. Furthermore, we have µDyi∩Di− (R(Ki(r,m))) =
µ(R(Ki(r,m)) |Dyi ∩Di−), and the same holds if we replace Di− with D
′
i− .
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Given an i-information set Ki(r,m), let yi be the initial choice for i such that
R(Ki(r,m)) ⊆ Dyi . For all i
− choice sets Di− , we have
µDyi∩Di− (R(Ki(r,m))) = µ(R(Ki(r,m) |Dyi ∩Di−).
Thus, to prove (A.4), it suffices to show that
µ(R(Ki(r,m) |Dyi ∩Di−) = µ(R(Ki(r,m) |Dyi ∩D
′
i−).
Standard probabilistic manipulations show that
µ(R(Ki(r,m)) |Dyi ∩Di−) · µ(Dyi |Di−) = µ(R(Ki(r,m)) ∩Dyi |Di−); (A.5)
a similar equation holds if we replace Di− by D
′
i− . Since either R is synchronous
or i has perfect recall in R, there exists a set Ω of i-information sets such that
{R(K) : K ∈ Ω} partitions R. By Lemma 1 and (A.3), it follows that i−-
choice sets are independent of the i-information sets in Ω. Applying (A.3) again,
it follows that i−-choice sets are independent of all i-information sets. Thus,
µ(R(Ki(r,m)) ∩ Dyi |Di−) = µ(R(Ki(r,m)) |Di−) = µ(R(Ki(r,m))). Since Di−
and Dyi are independent by assumption, it follows that µ(Dyi |Di−) = µ(Dyi).
Thus, (A.5) reduces to
µ(R(Ki(r,m)) |Dyi ∩Di−) · µ(Dyi) = µ(R(Ki(r,m))).
The same is true forD′i− , so because µ(Dyi) > 0 it follows that µ(R(Ki(r,m)) |Dyi∩
Di−) = µ(R(Ki(r,m)) |Dyi ∩D
′
i−). (A.4) is now immediate. ut
A.4 Generalizing from probability to plausibility
In this section we give the details of the plausibilistic results presented in Section
3.3. All those results correspond to probabilistic results from the previous section;
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in many cases the proofs are almost identical. For brevity we focus here on the
nontrivial subtleties that arise in the plausibilistic case.
To show that Proposition 8 generalizes to run-based plausibility systems is
straightforward. We simply replace all occurrences of multiplication and addition
in the proof of Proposition 8 with ⊗ and ⊕; all the resulting equations hold by the
properties of cacps’s.
To define analogues of Theorems 3 and 4, we need a language that allows
statements of the form Pli(φ) = c, where c is a constant that is interpreted as
a plausibility value. Once we do this, the proofs of these results transfer to the
plausibilistic setting with almost no change. We omit the straightforward details.
To prove Propositions 6 and 7, we first prove two results that generalize Lemma
1. To do so, we need the following definition, taken from [36]. Define a cacps to be
acceptable if U ∈ F ′ and Pl(V |U) 6= ⊥ implies that V ∩ U ∈ F ′. To understand
the intuition behind this definition, consider the special case where U = W . Since
W ∈ F ′ (this follows from the fact that F ′ is a nonempty and is closed under
supersets in F), we get that if Pl(V ) 6= ⊥, then V ∈ F ′. This is an analogue of
the situation in probability, where we can always condition on a set of nonzero
measure.
Lemma 3 Let (W,F ,F ′,Pl) be an acceptable cacps. Suppose that Y1, Y2, . . . is a
partition of Y ∈ F ′, and that Yi ∈ F for i = 1, 2, 3, . . .. For all X ∈ F , the
following are equivalent:
(a) Pl(X |Yi) = Pl(X |Yj) for all Yi, Yj ∈ F
′.
(b) Pl(X |Yi) = Pl(X |Y ) for all Yi ∈ F
′.
Proof: Clearly (b) implies (a). To see that (a) implies (b), first note that since we
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are dealing with an acceptable cacps, if Yj /∈ F
′, then Pl(Yj |Y ) = ⊥ and hence,
for all X, Pl(X ∩ Yj |Y ) = ⊥. Given Yi ∈ F
′, it follows that
Pl(X |Y ) = ⊕{j:Yj∈F ′}Pl(X ∩ Yj |Y )
= ⊕{j:Yj∈F ′}(Pl(X |Yj)⊗ Pl(Yj |Y ))
= ⊕{j:Yj∈F ′}(Pl(X |Yi)⊗ Pl(Yj |Y ))
= Pl(X |Yi)⊗ (⊕{j:Yj∈F ′}Pl(Yj |Y ))
= Pl(X |Yi),
as needed. ut
In the probabilistic setting, if either part (a) or (b) of Proposition 1 holds,
we are able to conclude that Yi is conditionally independent of X given Y . By
the symmetry of independence in the probabilistic setting, we can conclude that
X is also conditionally independent of Yi given Y , that is, that Pr(Yi |X ∩ Y ) =
Pr(Yi |Y ). In the plausibilistic setting, independence is not symmetric in general
unless we make an additional assumption, namely that ⊗ is symmetric. We say
that a cacps is commutative if its ⊗ operator is commutative.
Lemma 4 Suppose that (W,F ,F ′,Pl) is a commutative acceptable cacps; Y1, Y2, . . .
is a partition of Y ∈ F ′; X ∈ F ′, X ⊆ Y , and Pl(X |Y ) 6= ⊥; and for all
Yi, Yj ∈ F
′, Pl(X |Yi) = Pl(X |Yj). Then, for all Yi ∈ F , Pl(Yi |X) = Pl(Yi |Y ).
Proof: First, suppose that Yi ∈ F
′. By Lemma 3, we have that Pl(X |Yi) =
Pl(X |Y ). Since Yi ∩ Y = Yi and ⊗ is commutative, we have
Pl(X ∩ Yi |Y ) = Pl(X |Yi)⊗ Pl(Yi |Y )
= Pl(X |Y )⊗ Pl(Yi |Y )
= Pl(Yi |Y )⊗ Pl(X |Y ).
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Similarly, since X ⊆ Y , we have
Pl(X ∩ Yi |Y ) = Pl(Yi |X)⊗ Pl(X |Y ).
Thus, Pl(Yi |Y ) ⊗ Pl(X |Y ) = Pl(Yi |X) ⊗ Pl(X |Y ). Since Pl(X |Y ) 6= ⊥ by
assumption, it follows from the definition of a cacps that Pl(Yi |Y ) = Pl(Yi |X).
If Yi 6∈ F
′ but Yi ∈ F , then Yi∩X /∈ F
′ (since F ′ is closed under supersets in F).
Since we are working in an acceptable cacps, Pl(Yi |Y ) = ⊥ and Pl(Yi |X) = ⊥,
so again Pl(Yi |Y ) = Pl(Yi |X). ut
With these results, plausibilistic versions of Propositions 6 and 7 can be proved
with only minor changes to the proof in the probabilistic case, provided we make
the additional assumptions stated in the main text. We replace the use of Lemma 1
by Lemma 3. The appeal to the symmetry of conditional independence is replaced
by an appeal to Lemma 4. However, to use this lemma, we need to assume that
⊗ is commutative and that for all points (r,m),
• Plcp(Ki(r,m) | PT (R)) 6= ⊥ and Plcp(Kj(r,m) | PT (R)) 6= ⊥ (in the proof
of total secrecy in the generalization of Proposition 6);
• Plcp(Ki(r,m) | PT (m)) 6= ⊥ and Plcp(Kj(r,m) | PT (m)) 6= ⊥ (in the the
proof of synchronous secrecy in the generalization of Proposition 6); and
• Pl(R(Ki(r,m)) |R) 6= ⊥ and Pl(R(Kj(r,m)) |R) 6= ⊥ (in the generalization
of Proposition 7).
(We do not have to assume that the relevant cacps’s are acceptable for these
propositions; it is enough that they are commutative. We used acceptability in
the proof of Lemma 3 to show argue that if a set Yi is not in F
′, then Pl(Yi) = ⊥.
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Here, the sets Yi are of the form R(Ki(r,m)), and our other assumptions guarantee
that they are in F ′.)
Turning to the generalization of Theorem 5, the first step is to define an adver-
sarial plausibility system. The definition is completely analogous to that of that of
an adversarial probability system, except that now the set ∆ consists of the accept-
able conditional plausibility spaces (D,FD,F
′
D,PlD), for each cell D ∈ D. Again,
we assume that R(Ki(r,m)) ∩ D ∈ FD and that, if R(Ki(r,m)) ∩ D 6= ∅, then
R(Ki(r,m))∩D ∈ F
′
D and PlD(R(Ki(r,m))∩D) 6= ⊥. We say that an agent i ob-
tains no plausibilistic evidence for the initial choice in (R,D,∆) if for allD,D ′ ∈ D
and all points (r,m) such that R(Ki(r,m))∩D 6= ∅ and R(Ki(r,m))∩D
′ 6= ∅, we
have
PlD(R(Ki(r,m)) ∩D) = PlD′(R(Ki(r,m)) ∩D
′).
Suppose that D is determined by INIT (as in the probabilistic case), and that
the conditional plausibility spaces of ∆ are all defined with respect to the same
domain D of plausibility values and with the same operations ⊕ and ⊗, where ⊗ is
commutative. Let FD be the σ-algebra generated by ∪D∈DFD. Let M
INIT ,Pl
i (∆)
consist of all the acceptable plausibility spaces (R,FD,F
′,Pl) such that
• F ′ is a nonempty subset of FD that is closed under supersets;
• if A ∈ FD and B ∈ F
′ ∩ F ′D , then Pl(A |B) = PlD(A |B);
• for all agents i and points (r,m), there exists a cell D such that Pl(D) 6= ⊥
and R(Ki(r,m)) ∩D 6= ∅; and
• Pl(D(y1,...,yn)) = Pl(Dyi)⊗ Pl(∩j 6=iDyj).
We can now state and prove the plausibilistic analogue of Theorem 5.
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Theorem 12 Let (R,D,∆) be the adversarial plausibility system determined by
INIT and suppose that R is either synchronous or a system where i has perfect
recall. Agent i obtains no evidence for the initial choice in (R,D,∆) iff agent
i− maintains generalized run-based plausibilistic fi−-secrecy with respect to i in
(R,MINIT ,Pli (∆)).
Proof: The proof is basically the same as that of Theorem 5, but some new
subtleties arise because we are dealing with plausibility. For the forward di-
rection, we want to show that i− maintains generalized run-based plausibilis-
tic fi−-secrecy under the assumption that i obtains no evidence for the initial
choice in (R,D,∆). Much as in the proof of Theorem 5, we can show that
Pl(R(Ki(r,m)) |Dyi ∩ Di−) = Pl(R(Ki(r,m)) |Dyi ∩ D
′
i−) if Di− ∩ Dyi ∈ F
′
and D′i− ∩ Dyi ∈ F
′. Continuing in the spirit of that proof, we now want to
show that Pl(Di− |R(Ki(r,m)) ∩ Dyi) = Pl(Di− |Dyi) = Pl(Di−). For the sec-
ond equality, note that, by assumption, Pl(Di− ∩ Dyi) = Pl(Di−) ⊗ Pl(Dyi).
Since the properties of acceptable conditional plausibility spaces guarantee that
Pl(Di− |Dyi)⊗ Pl(Dyi) = Pl(Di− ∩Dyi), it follows that Pl(Di− |Dyi)⊗ Pl(Dyi) =
Pl(Di−)⊗ Pl(Dyi). Since Pl(Dyi) 6= ⊥, Pl(Di− |Dyi) = Pl(Di−).
To prove the first equality, we want to apply Lemma 4. To do so, we must
first show that Pl(R(Ki(r,m)) |Dyi) 6= ⊥. To see that this holds, recall that by
assumption there exists a cell D such that Pl(D) 6= ⊥, PlD(R(Ki(r,m))∩D) 6= ⊥,
andR(Ki(r,m))∩D ∈ F
′. SinceR(Ki(r,m))∩D 6= ∅, we must have that D ⊆ Dyi .
Indeed, we must have D = D̂i− ∩Dyi for some i
−-choice set D̂i− . Thus, we have
Pl(R(Ki(r,m)) |Dyi) ≥ Pl(R(Ki(r,m)) ∩D |Dyi)
= Pl(R(Ki(r,m)) |D)⊗ Pl(D̂i− |Dyi)
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= PlD(R(Ki(r,m)) ∩D)⊗ Pl(D̂i−).
By assumption PlD(R(Ki(r,m)) ∩ D) 6= ⊥. Since Pl(D) 6= ⊥ and D ⊆ D̂i− , it
follows that Pl(D̂i−) 6= ⊥. Thus, Pl(R(Ki(r,m)) |Dyi) 6= ⊥.
For the converse, we must construct an acceptable measure Pl and a set F ′
such that (R,FD,F
′,Pl) ∈MINIT ,Pli (∆). We take F
′ to consist of the sets U such
that U ∩ D ∈ F ′D for some cell D. For Pl, we start by taking some arbitrary
total ordering ≺ of the cells in D. Given V ∈ F and U ∈ F ′, let Pl(V |U) =
PlD(V ∩D |U ∩D) where D is the highest-ranked cell such that U ∩D ∈ FD. By
construction, Pl behaves identically to the cell-specific measures when we condition
on subsets of cells. It is easy to check that for all yi ∈ INIT i and i
−-choice sets Di− ,
we have Pl(Dyi ∩Di−) = >, Pl(Dyi) = >, and Pl(Di−) = >. The independence of
the choices made by i and i− follows immediately.
To see that the measure satisfies the conditioning axiom (in the definition of
a cacps), suppose that U1, U2, U3 ∈ F and U2 ∩ U3 ∈ F
′. We must show that
Pl(U1 ∩ U2 |U3) = Pl(U1 |U2 ∩ U3) ⊗ Pl(U2 |U3). There are two cases. If the
highest-ranked cell that intersects U3 (call it D) also intersects U2, then all three
terms in the equality are determined by PlD, and the equality follows by applying
the conditioning axiom to PlD with U1 ∩ D,U2 ∩ D, and U3 ∩ D. If the highest-
ranked cell D that intersects U3 does not intersect U2, then the first and third terms
in the equality are both determined by PlD and must be ⊥ because U2 ∩D = ∅.
Finally, the measure Pl is acceptable (as required) because the underlying cell-
specific measures are acceptable.
The remainder of the proof is a relatively straightforward extension of the
probabilistic case. That i−-choice sets are independent of i-information sets follows
from Lemma 4, using the facts that agent i− maintains generalized run-based
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plausibilistic fi−-secrecy, cells (and thus i
−-choice sets) have non-⊥ plausibility by
construction, and all information sets are in F ′. ut
Appendix B
Proofs for Chapter 5
Proposition 10: If a synchronous trace system Σ satisfies separability (resp.,
generalized noninterference), then H maintains synchronous secrecy (resp., syn-
chronous fhi-secrecy) with respect to L in R(Σ).
Proof: We prove the result for separability. The proof for generalized nonin-
terference is similar and left to the reader. Suppose that Σ satisfies separability.
Let rt and rt
′
be runs in R(Σ). We want to show that, for all times m, we have
KL(r
t,m) ∩ KH(r
t′ ,m) 6= ∅. Since Σ satisfies separability, there exists a trace
t′′ ∈ Σ such that t′′  L = t  L and t′′ H = t′ H. It follows immediately that
t′′m L = tm L and t
′′
m H = t
′
m H. Thus, (r
t′′ ,m) ∈ KL(r
t,m) ∩ KH(r
t′ ,m). ut
Proposition 11: A limit-closed synchronous trace system Σ satisfies separability
(resp. generalized noninterference) iff H maintains synchronous secrecy (resp.,
synchronous fhi-secrecy) with respect to L in R(Σ).
Proof: We give the argument for separability here; the argument for generalized
noninterference is similar. The forward direction follows from Proposition 10. For
the converse, suppose that H maintains synchronous secrecy with respect to L in
R(Σ). Given t, t′ ∈ Σ, let t′′ be the trace such that t′′ L = tL and t′′ H = t′ H.
We must show that t′′ ∈ Σ. Since H maintains synchronous secrecy with respect
to L in R(Σ), for all m, there exists a run rm ∈ R(Σ) such that rmL (m) = r
t
L(m)
and rmH (m) = r
t′
H(m). Thus, for all m, there exists a trace t
m ∈ Σ such that
tmm L = tm L and t
m
m H = t
′
m H. It follows that t
′′
m = t
m
m for all m. Since t
m ∈ Σ
for all m, it follows by limit closure that t′′ ∈ Σ, as desired. ut
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Proposition 12: If Σ is an asynchronous trace system that satisfies asynchronous
separability (resp. asynchronous generalized noninterference), then H maintains
total secrecy (resp. total fhi-secrecy) with respect to L in R(Σ).
Proof: Suppose that Σ satisfies asynchronous separability, and let (r,m) and
(r′,m′) be arbitrary points. By the construction ofR(Σ), there exist traces t, t′ ∈ T
such that rL(m) = t L and rH(m) = t′ H. Let t′′ be an interleaving of t L and
t′ H. Since Σ satisfies asynchronous separability, t′′ ∈ Σ. Let T ′′ be a run-like set
of traces that contains t′′. (Such a set must exist because Σ is closed under trace
prefixes.) By definition, rT
′′
∈ R(Σ). Taking m to be the length of t′′, it follows
that r′′L(m
′′) = rL(m) and r
′′
H(m
′′) = r′H(m
′). Thus, H maintains total secrecy with
respect to L.
The proof for asynchronous generalized noninterference (and total fhi-secrecy)
is analogous. ut
Proposition 13: If Σ is an asynchronous trace system that is closed under in-
terleavings, then Σ satisfies asynchronous separability iff H maintains total secrecy
with respect to L in R(Σ).
Proof: We have already established the forward direction. For the converse,
suppose that H maintains total secrecy with respect to L in R(Σ), and that Σ is
closed under interleavings. Given t, t′ ∈ Σ, there exist points (r,m) and (r′,m′)
in PT (R(Σ)) such that rL(m) = t  L and r′H(m
′) = t′ H. Since H maintains
total secrecy with respect to L in R(Σ), there exists a point (r′′,m′′) such that
r′′L(m
′′) = rL(m) and r
′′
H(m
′′) = r′H(m
′). By the construction of R(Σ), there exists
a run-like set T of traces such that r′′ = rT . Taking t′′ to be the trace of length
m′′ in T , it follows that t′′ L = tL and t′′ H = t′ H. Because Σ is closed under
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interleavings, t′′ ∈ Σ as required. ut
Theorem 7: If I = (R, pi) is compatible with P , then P is strongly anonymous
on the alphabet A if and only if for every agent i ∈ IA, the action a performed by
i is anonymous up to IA with respect to o in I.
Proof: Suppose that P is strongly anonymous on the alphabet A and that i ∈ IA.
Given a point (r,m), suppose that (I, r,m) |= θ(i, a), so that the event i.a appears
in re(n) for some n ≥ m. We must show that (I, r,m) |= Po[θ(i
′, a)] for every
i′ ∈ IA, that is, that a is anonymous up to IA with respect to o. For any i
′ ∈ IA,
this requires showing that there exists a point (r′,m′) such that ro(m) = r
′
o(m
′),
and r′o(n
′) includes i′.a, for some n′ ≥ m′. Because R is compatible with P , there
exists t ∈ P such that t = re(n) and i.a appears in t. Let t
′ be the trace identical
to t except that i.a is replaced by i′.a. Because P is strongly anonymous on A,
P = f−1A (fA(P )), and t
′ ∈ P . By compatibility, there exists a run r′ such that
r′e(n) = t
′ and r′o(n) = fA(t
′). By construction, fA(t) = fA(t
′), so ro(n) = r
′
o(n).
Because the length-m trace prefixes of fA(t) and fA(t
′) are the same, it follows that
ro(m) = r
′
o(m). Because (I, r
′,m) |= θ(i′, a), (I, r,m) |= Po[θ(i
′, a)] as required.
Conversely, suppose that for every agent i ∈ IA, the action a performed by i
is anonymous up to IA with respect to o in I. We must show that P is strongly
anonymous. It is clear that P ⊆ f−1A (fA(P )), so we must show only that P ⊇
f−1A (fA(P )). So suppose that t ∈ f
−1
A (fA(P )). If no event i.a appears in t, for
any i ∈ IA, then t ∈ P trivially. Otherwise, some i.a. does appear. Because
t ∈ f−1A (fA(P )), there exists a trace t
′ ∈ P that is identical to t except that i′.a
replaces i.a, for some other i′ ∈ IA. Because R is compatible with P , there exists
a run r′ ∈ R such that r′o(m) = fA(t
′) and r′e(m) = t
′ (where m = |t′|). Clearly
(I, r′,m) |= θ(i′, a) so, by anonymity, (I, r′,m) |= Po[θ(i, a)], and there exists a
173
run r such that ro(m) = r
′
o(m) and (I, r,m) |= θ(i, a). Because the action a can
be performed at most once, the trace re(m) must be equal to t. By compatibility,
t ∈ P as required. ut
Theorem 8: Suppose that (I, r,m) |= θ(i, a) exactly if f(r,m)(a) = i. Then action
a is anonymous up to IA with respect to o for each agent i ∈ IA if and only if at
all points (r,m) such that f(r,m)(a) ∈ IA, f is IA-value opaque with respect to o.
Proof: Suppose that f is IA-value opaque, and let i ∈ IA be given. If (I, r,m) |=
θ(i, a), then f(r,m)(a) = i. We must show that, for all i
′ ∈ IA, (I, r,m) |=
Po[θ(i
′, a)]. Because f is IA-value opaque at (r,m), there exists a point (r
′,m′)
such that r′o(m
′) = ro(m) and f(r′,m′)(a) = i
′. Because (I, r′,m′) |= θ(i′, a),
(I, r,m) |= Po[θ(i
′, a)].
Conversely, suppose that for each agent i ∈ IA, a is anonymous up to IA
with respect to o. Let (r,m) be given such that f(r,m)(a) ∈ IA, and let that i =
f(r,m)(a). It follows that (I, r,m) |= θ(i, a). For any i
′ ∈ IA, (I, r,m) |= Po[θ(i
′, a)],
by anonymity. Thus there exists a point (r′,m′) such that r′o(m
′) = ro(m) and
(I, r′,m′) |= θ(i′, a). It follows that f(r′,m′)(a) = i
′, and that f is IA-value opaque.
ut
Appendix C
Proof Sketch for Theorem 11
For the proof of Theorem 11, we treat the proof for nonprobabilistic noninterference—
that is, the proof of parts (a) and (b)—separately from the proof of probabilistic
noninterference. This is technically unnecessary, because the necessary lemmas for
the probabilistic proof are generalizations of the lemmas for the nonprobabilistic
proof. We take this approach so that we can prove the nonprobabilistic lemmas,
which are simpler to understand, without the overhead of probability trees and
probability distributions. The nonprobabilistic lemmas are proven in Section C.1,
whereas the probabilistic lemmas and Theorem 11 are proven in Section C.2.
All of the results in this section assume the existence of a single variable typing
Γ. When convenient, we avoid specifying Γ and assume that the typing is given.
We heavily overload the symbol ∼L to represent low equivalence relations. We
write σ ∼L σ
′ to denote that states σ and σ′ are low-equivalent with respect to
Γ, that is, if σ(x) = σ′(x) whenever Γ(x) = L. Refiners ψ, ψ′ ∈ Ref are low-
equivalent, written ψ ∼L ψ
′, if ψ(L) = ψ′(L). Similarly, joint strategies ω, ω′ ∈
Strat are low-equivalent, written ω ∼L ω
′ if ω(L) = ω′(L). Traces t and t′ are
low-equivalent, written t ∼L t
′, if tL = t′ L.
The low-equivalence relation on well-typed commands, denoted c ∼L c
′, is
defined by the following rules:
(a) c ∼L c for all commands c;
(b) if Γ ` c1 : H cmd and Γ ` c2 : H cmd, then c1 ∼L c2;
(c) if Γ ` c1 : H cmd and Γ ` c2 : H cmd, then c1; c ∼L c2; c for all commands
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c; and
(d) if Γ ` cH : H cmd, then cH ; c ∼L c and c ∼L cH ; c for all commands c.
Property 1 The relation ∼L is an equivalence relation on well-typed commands.
Proof: Reflexivity is immediate by rule (a), and symmetry follows because the
rules themselves are symmetric. Transitivity follows by a straightforward analysis
of each pair of rules. ut
Two configurations m = (c, σ, ψ, t, ω) and m′ = (c′, σ′, ψ′, t′, ω′) are low-equiv-
alent, written m ∼L m
′, if c ∼L c
′, σ ∼L σ
′, ψ ∼L ψ
′, t ∼L t
′, and ω ∼L ω
′.
C.1 Nonprobabilistic proof details
The following lemma, an analogue of the “Simple Security” lemma of [92], demon-
strates that low-typed expressions have the same values in low-equivalent states.
Lemma 5 If Γ ` e : L, then Γ(x) = L for every variable x appearing in e. In
particular, if Γ ` e : L and σ ∼L σ
′, then σ(e) = σ′(e).
Proof: By induction on the structure of e. ut
The following lemma demonstrates that configurations with high-typed com-
mands take steps that preserve low-equivalence (in the sense that no low events
are emitted and the resulting configuration is low-equivalent to the initial config-
uration).
Lemma 6 If Γ ` c : H cmd, then for all σ, ψ, t, and ω, if
(c, σ, ψ, t, ω) −→ (c′, σ′, ψ′, t′, ω′),
then (c, σ, ψ, t, ω) ∼L (c
′, σ′, ψ′, t′, ω′), and moreover Γ ` c′ : H cmd.
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Proof: By induction on the derivation of (c, σ, ψ, t, ω) −→ (c′, σ′, ψ′, t′, ω′). ut
The following lemma demonstrates that if the first command in a sequence ter-
minates with some configuration, then the sequence eventually steps to an identical
configuration with skip replaced by the second command in the sequence.
Lemma 7 For all c0, c1, σ, σ
′, ψ, ψ′, t, t′, ω, and ω′, if
(c0, σ, ψ, t, ω) −→
∗ (skip, σ′, ψ′, t′, ω′),
then
(c0; c1, σ, ψ, t, ω) −→
∗ (c1, σ
′, ψ′, t′, ω′).
Proof: By induction on the length of the derivation of
(c0, σ, ψ, t, ω) −→
∗ (skip, σ′, ψ′, t′, ω′),
using rule Seq-1 for the base case and rule Seq-2 for the inductive case. ut
The following lemma demonstrates that high-typed commands always termi-
nate, and that the resulting terminal configuration is low-equivalent to the initial
configuration.
Lemma 8 If Γ ` c : H cmd, then for any σ, ψ, t and ω there exists σ′, ψ′, t′ and
ω′ such that
(c, σ, ψ, t, ω) −→∗ (skip, σ′, ψ′, t′, ω′),
and
(c, σ, ψ, t, ω) ∼L (skip, σ
′, ψ′, t′, ω′).
Proof: Note that a high-typed command cannot contain a while-statement. The
result follows by structural induction on c, using Lemma 6 to demonstrate low
equivalence for the base cases. For sequences we appeal to Lemma 7. ut
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The following lemma demonstrates that low-equivalent configurations with the
same command take steps that preserve low equivalence.
Lemma 9 For all c, σ1, σ2, ψ1, ψ2, t1, t2, ω1, ω2, and m1, if
(c, σ1, ψ1, t1, ω1) ∼L (c, σ2, ψ2, t2, ω2), and (c, σ1, ψ1, t1, ω1) −→ m1,
then there exists a configuration m2 such that
(c, σ2, ψ2, t2, ω2) −→ m2, and m1 ∼L m2.
Proof: By induction on the derivation (c, σ1, ψ1, t1, ω1) −→ m1, using Lemma 5
for the rules Assign, Out, If-1, and If-2. ut
The main nonprobabilistic lemma demonstrates that the traces emitted by low-
equivalent configurations are low-equivalent.
Lemma 10 For all configurations m1, m2, and m
′
1, if
m1 ∼L m2 and m1 −→
∗ m′1,
then there exists a configuration m′2 such that
m2 −→
∗ m′2 and m
′
1 ∼L m
′
2.
Proof: By induction on the length of the derivation of m1 −→
∗ m′1. The base case
is trivial. Otherwise, write m1 = (c1, σ1, ψ1, t1, ω1) and m2 = (c2, σ2, ψ2, t2, ω2), and
consider the cases for c1 ∼L c2:
(a) If c1 = c2, then suppose that m1 −→ m
′′
1 and m
′′
1 −→
∗ m′1. By Lemma 9,
there is a state m′′2 such that m2 −→ m
′′
2 and m
′′
1 ∼L m
′′
2. We can then apply
the inductive hypothesis.
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(b) If c1 and c2 are both high-typed, suppose that m1 −→ m
′′
1 and m
′′
1 −→
∗ m′1.
By Lemma 6, m′′1 is low equivalent to m2, and we can apply the inductive
hypothesis.
(c) If c1 = cH1 ; c and c2 = cH2 ; c for some command c and high-typed commands
cH1 and cH2 , then consider the form of cH1 . If cH1 = skip, then m1 −→ mˆ,
where mˆ = (c, σ1, ψ1, t1, ω1), and since (c, σ1, ψ1, t1, ω1) is low equivalent to
m2, we can apply the inductive hypothesis. Otherwise, by Lemma 6 and
Seq-2, m1 −→ m
′′
1 for some m
′′
1 such that is low equivalent to m2, and we
can apply the inductive hypothesis.
(d) If c1 = cH1 ; c2, then consider the form of cH1 . If cH1 = skip, then m1 −→
(c2, σ1, ψ1, t1, ω1), and since (c2, σ1, ψ1, t1, ω1) is low equivalent to m2, we
can apply the inductive hypothesis. Otherwise, by Lemma 6 and Seq-2,
m1 −→ m
′′
1 such that m
′′
1 is low equivalent to m2, and we can apply the
inductive hypothesis.
If c2 = cH2 ; c1, then by Lemma 8 and Lemma 7, there is a configuration
m′′2 = (c1, σ
′′
2 , ψ
′′
2 , t
′′
2, ω
′′
2) such that m2 −→
∗ m′′2 and m2 ∼L m
′′
2, and thus
m1 ∼L m
′′
2. Suppose m1 −→ m
′′
1 and m
′′
1 −→
∗ m′1. Then by Lemma 9, there
is a configuration m′′′2 such that m
′′
2 −→ m
′′′
2 such that m
′′
1 ∼L m
′′′
2 , and we
can apply the inductive hypothesis.
ut
The first two cases of Theorem 11 follow directly from this result.
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C.2 Probabilistic proof details
We now generalize the results of the previous section to account for probabilistic
programs. The structure of the proof is similar to the nonprobabilistic results.
Given a vertex v of a probability tree Tm, let Tv denote the subtree of Tm rooted
at v, and let Vv and Rv denote the sets of vertices and rays of Tv, respectively. We
denote the configuration with which v is labeled as cf (v), and we write v ∼L v
′ if
cf (v) ∼L cf (v
′).
Let a frontier set of a vertex v be a finite set of vertices S ⊆ Vv such that for
every ray ρ ∈ Rv there exists exactly one vertex from S on ρ. Given a frontier set
S of v, we call F = (v, S) a frontier. Note that {v} is a frontier set of v, and that
given any frontier F we can obtain a new frontier F ′ by replacing any vertex in the
frontier set with all of its descendants. Note also that a frontier set S partitions
Rv into sets of rays that go through particular vertices in S.
Define the depth of a frontier (v, S) to be the length of the longest path (that
is, the number of edges in the longest path) between v and vertices in S.
Because the vertices in a frontier F = (v, S) induce a partition on the sets
of rays going through v, the function pi on vertices gives rise to a discrete prob-
ability measure on sets of vertices on S, normalized by the value of pi(v). More
concretely, for any vertex v′ in a frontier set S of v, let piv(v
′) be the product of
the probabilities on the path from v to v′. We can now compare the distribution of
low-equivalent configurations in two different frontiers. Given a frontier F = (v, S)
and a configuration m, let
[m]F , {v
′ ∈ S | cf (v′) ∼L m}
be the subset of S whose configurations are low-equivalent to m. Define two
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frontiers F = (v, S) and F ′ = (v′, S ′) to be low-equivalent, denoted F ∼L F
′, if for
any configuration m we have
∑
v′′∈[m]F
piv(v
′′) =
∑
v′′∈[m]F ′
piv′(v
′′).
The following lemma, which generalizes Lemma 7, demonstrates that if the
first command in a sequence terminates in all execution paths, then the sequence
eventually steps, in all execution paths, to the second command, while preserving
other aspects of the original terminal configuration.
Lemma 11 If v is a vertex in a probability tree such that cf (v) = (c0; c1, σ, ψ, t, ω),
and F0 = (v0, S0) is a frontier such that
• cf (v0) = (c0, σ, ψ, t, ω),
• the subtree rooted at v0 is finite, and
• S0 consists of the root vertices of the subtree rooted at v0,
then there exists a frontier F = (v, S) and a one-to-one mapping g : S0 →
S such that if v′0 ∈ S0 and cf (v
′
0) = (skip, σ
′, ψ′, t′, ω′), we have cf (g(v′0)) =
(c1, σ
′, ψ′, t′, ω′).
Proof: By induction on the depth of F0, using rules Seq-1 and Seq-2. ut
The following lemma, which generalizes Lemma 8, demonstrates that high-
typed commands terminate in all execution paths and that terminal configurations
are low-equivalent to the initial configuration.
Lemma 12 If v is a vertex in a probability tree such that cf (v) = (c, σ, ψ, t, ω)
and Γ ` c : H cmd, then the subtree rooted at v is finite and that for any leaf
vertex v′ of that subtree we have v′ ∼L v.
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Proof: By structural induction on c, using Lemma 11 for sequences and Lemma 6
to demonstrate low-equivalence for the base cases. ut
The following lemma, generalizing Lemma 9, demonstrates that low-equivalent
vertices have low-equivalent sets of children.
Lemma 13 If F1 = (v1, S1) and F2 = (v2, S2) are frontiers such that
• v1 ∼L v2,
• S1 and S2 are the sets of children of v1 and v2, and
• cf (v1) and cf (v2) share the same command c,
then F1 ∼L F2.
Proof: By structural induction on c, using Lemma 5 for the rules Assign, Out,
If-1, and If-2. ut
The following lemma is useful for the inductive cases of Lemma 15. It states
that we can combine frontiers of vertices in low-equivalent frontiers to obtain deeper
low-equivalent frontiers.
Lemma 14 If F1 = (v1, S1) and F2 = (v2, S2) are frontiers such that
• F1 ∼L F2;
• g1 is a mapping from S1 to frontier sets such that for any v ∈ S1, (v, g1(v))
is a frontier;
• g2 is a mapping from S2 to frontier sets such that for any v ∈ S2, (v, g2(v))
is a frontier; and
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• for all v′1 ∈ S1 and v
′
2 ∈ S2 such that v
′
1 ∼L v
′
2, we have (v
′
1, g1(v
′
1)) ∼L
(v′2, g2(v
′
2));
then F ′1 = (v1,∪v∈S1g1(v)) and F
′
2 = (v2,∪v∈S2g2(v)) are frontiers such that F
′
1 ∼L
F ′2.
Proof: F ′1 and F
′
2 are frontiers, which follows directly from the definition of a
frontier set. To demonstrate the low-equivalence of F ′1 and F
′
2, we must establish
that for all configurations m we have
∑
v∈[m]F ′1
piv1(v) =
∑
v∈[m]F ′2
piv2(v).
Let M denote a set of class representatives (for the equivalence relation ∼L) of
the set of configurations with which the elements of S1 ∪ S2 are labeled. We have
∑
v∈[m]F ′1
piv1(v) =
∑
v′1∈F1
∑
v∈[m]g1(v′1)
piv1(v
′
1) · piv′1(v)
=
∑
m′∈M
∑
v′1∈[m
′]F1
∑
v∈[m]g1(v′1)
piv1(v
′
1) · piv′1(v)
=
∑
m′∈M
∑
v′1∈[m
′]F1
piv1(v
′
1) ·
∑
v∈[m]g1(v′1)
piv′1(v).
However, by assumption, for any configuration m and for any v ′1 ∈ S1 and v
′
2 ∈ S2
such that v′1 ∼L v
′
2, we have (v
′
1, g1(v
′
1)) ∼L (v
′
2, g2(v
′
2)), and thus
∑
v∈[m]g1(v′1)
piv′1(v) =
∑
v∈[m]g2(v′2)
piv′2(v).
In fact, for any w ∈ S1 such that v
′
1 ∼L w, we also have
∑
v∈[m]g1(v′1)
piv′1(v) =
∑
v∈[m]g1(w)
piw(v).
Thus, this sum depends only on the low-equivalence class of v′1. We capture this
by defining s(m′,m) to be equal to this sum, resulting in the following equalities:
s(m′,m) =
∑
v∈[m]g1(v′1)
piv′1(v) for any v
′
1 ∈ S1 such that v
′
1 ∼L m
′
=
∑
v∈[m]g2(v′2)
piv′2(v) for any v
′
2 ∈ S2 such that v
′
2 ∼L m
′.
183
We therefore have
∑
v∈[m]F ′1
piv1(v) =
∑
m′∈M
∑
v′1∈[m
′]F1
piv1(v
′
1) · s(m
′,m)
=
∑
m′∈M s(m
′,m) ·
∑
v′1∈[m
′]F1
piv1(v
′
1)
=
∑
m′∈M s(m
′,m) ·
∑
v′2∈[m
′]F2
piv2(v
′
2) [as F1 ∼L F2]
=
∑
v∈[m]F ′2
piv2(v), [similarly]
as desired. ut
We can now state the main lemma, which generalizes Lemma 10.
Lemma 15 If F1 = (v1, S1) is a frontier and v2 ∼L v1, then there exists a frontier
set S2 of v2 such that F1 ∼L (v2, S2).
Proof: By induction on the depth of F1. The base case is trivial, and cases
(a)–(d) are analogues of the cases in the nonprobabilistic proof. As before, write
cf (v1) = (c1, σ1, ψ1, t1, ω1) and cf (v2) = (c2, σ2, ψ2, t2, ω2), and consider the cases
for c1 ∼L c2:
(a) Suppose that c1 = c2. If S
′
1 and S
′
2 are the sets of children of v1 and v2, we
have (v1, S
′
1) ∼L (v2, S
′
2) by Lemma 13. The inductive hypothesis applies to
v′1 ∈ S
′
1 (with appropriate frontier sets Sv′1 ⊆ S1) and elements v
′
2 ∈ S
′
2 such
that v′1 ∼L v
′
2, and the result follows by Lemma 14.
(b) If c1 and c2 are both high-typed, the result follows by Lemma 6, the inductive
hypothesis applied to the children of v1, and Lemma 14.
(c) If c1 = cH1 ; c and c2 = cH2 ; c for some command c and high-typed commands
cH1 and cH2 , let S
′
1 be the set of children of v1. For each v
′
1 ∈ S
′
1 we have
v′1 ∼L v1 ∼L v2 (by Seq-1 if cH1 is skip, or by Lemma 6 and Seq-2 otherwise),
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and we can therefore apply the inductive hypothesis. The result follows from
Lemma 14.
(d) If c1 = cH1 ; c2, we can apply the inductive hypothesis using the same rea-
soning used for case (c). Otherwise we have c2 = cH1 ; c1. Let S
′
1 be the set
of children of v1. By Lemma 11 and Lemma 12, there exists a frontier set
S ′2 of v2 such that for every element v
′
2 ∈ S
′
2, v
′
2 is labeled with a configu-
ration whose command is c1, and v
′
2 ∼L v2 ∼L v1. Given any v
′
2 ∈ S
′
2, let
Sv′2 be the set of children of v
′
2. By Lemma 13 we have (v1, S
′
1) ∼L (v
′
2, Sv′2),
and the inductive hypothesis applies to elements v′1 ∈ S
′
1 as in case (a). By
Lemma 14 we can combine the frontiers of the elements of Sv′2 to get a fron-
tier Fv′2 = (v
′
2, Sv′2) such that Fv′2 ∼L F1. Let S2 = ∪v′2∈S′2Sv′2 . We have
(v2, S2) ∼L F1 by Lemma 14.
ut
We are now ready to prove Theorem 11. We do so by establishing a connection
between µm(Em(t)), the probability that configuration m emits trace t, and the
probabilities of vertices of arbitrarily deep frontiers of Tm. Given a trace t and
probability tree Tm with root vertex vr and frontier (vr, S), define:
ES(t) , {ρ ∈ Rm | there exists a vertex v ∈ S on ρ and a trace t′
such that tr(v) extends t′ and t′ L = tL}.
The set ES(t) consists of those rays on which traces that are low-equivalent to t
appear at vertices that are ancestors of elements in S. Intuitively, µm(ES(t)) is an
approximation of µm(Em(t)).
Theorem 11: For any command c, if there exists a variable typing Γ and a
security type τ such that Γ ` c : τ cmd, then
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(a) if c does not contain nondeterministic or probabilistic choice, then c satisfies
noninterference;
(b) if c does not contain probabilistic choice, then c satisfies noninterference un-
der refinement; and
(c) c satisfies probabilistic noninterference.
Proof: That c satisfies noninterference and noninterference under refinement fol-
lows from Lemma 10. To demonstrate that c satisfies probabilistic noninterference,
we must show that, for all low-equivalent configurationsm andm′ and traces t, that
µm(Em(t)) = µm′(Em′(t)). We demonstrate that µm(Em(t)) ≤ µm′(Em′(t)); the re-
verse inequality is symmetric. Suppose, by way of contradiction, that µm(Em(t)) >
µm′(Em′(t)). We demonstrate below that there exists a sequence of frontier sets
{Si} of the root vertex vr of Tm such that µm(ESi(t)) converges to µm(Em(t)). It fol-
lows there exists a frontier set S of Tm such that µm(ES(t)) > µm′(Em′(t)). But by
Lemma 15, there exists a frontier F ′ = (v′r, S
′) of Tm′ such that F
′ ∼L (vr, S). Thus
µm′(ES′(t)) = µm(ES(t)), and µm′(ES′(t)) > µm′(Em′(t)). This is a contradiction,
because ES′(t) ⊆ Em′(t).
We now exhibit a sequence of frontier sets {Si} such that µm(ESi(t)) converges
to µm(Em(t)). Consider the sequence S0, S1, . . . , Si, . . . of frontier sets of vr that
comprise all the vertices at depth i of Tm. We have Em(t) = ∪i≥0ESi(t), and for
all i we have ESi(t) ⊆ ESi+1(t). Convergence follows due to a standard result in
probability theory [3]. ut
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